p. 429an attorney and barrister in the supreme court of Hew Brunswick. Allison, the plaintiff in the attachment suit, was a member of the firm of John Carnes & Co. The plaintiff having rested, the defendant’s counsel moved the referee that the complaint and action be dismissed. First. On the ground that no cause of action had been made out. Second. That there was no proof that Thomas B. Moore ever rendered any services to the defendant. Third. That there was no evidence showing what were the expenses of said Moore in traveling from Hew Brunswick to Hew York, and back; that there was no proof of said Moore having incurred any expense for board while here, and ■ that the evidence in reference to all his said expenses was of too indefinite a nature to render a report or decision, for any specific amount of damages, possible. Fourth. That the agreement in evidence, on which the plaintiff claims, was invalid, inasmuch as the same was contrary to public policy, good morals, and the general policy of the common law, and that the same was consequently absolutely null and void. Fifth. That the promise of the defendant to pay the expenses of said Thomas B. Moore was a nudum pactum, and wholly without consideration, for the same reasons. All of which objections were overruled by the referee, and the motion to dismiss the complaint and action was denied; to which the counsel for the defendant excepted.
The referee found, as a conclusion of law, that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $107.50, with interest thereon from October 5th, 1858, amounting at the date of the report to the sum of $119.10, for which sum, besides costs, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
Various exceptions were taken to the report, and from the judgment entered thereon the defendant appealed.
Barrett, Brinsmade & Barrett, for the appellant.
Boies & Cooper, for the respondent.
p. 430However discreditable an act may be, in a moral point of view, or as a breach of con-, fidence, it does not follow that the act is on that account to be held a corrupt one, within the meaning of the law, so as to avoid a contract. It must be corrupt as tainted by fraud, or illegal as in violation of some rule of law or some statute, to warrant such defense.
Besides, in this case the act was done at the request of one of the partners, which would relieve it from the charge of having been done without any authority.
The claim appears to have' been allowed only for actual expenses, or the equivalent therefor. Although board was not actually paid, the evidence showed what the board was worth, and there was no ground for rejecting that item merely because it was not paid. So far as the board was referred to, it may have been paid for in some other way, more expensive to Moore than actually paying the money.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Clerke. Gould and Ingraham, Justices.]