Majority
Headnote
A copy of a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, and of the proceedings to recover the same, signed by the justice with his official signature, and proved by the testimony of a witness to be a correct copy, must, in a collateral action, be regarded as proof of the rendering of the judgment, and of the various proceedings by which it was obtained.The defendants were sued before a justice of the peace in the county of Dutchess, for the taking and the conversion of certain articles of personal property. The defendant Yorce was a constable, at the time of the alleged taking, and both the defendants pleaded a justification by virtue of a judgment and an execution issued thereon, which judgment was rendered in an action wherein the defendant Henry Wilbur was plaintiff and one Hiram Wilkinson was defendant, before W. K. Ostrom, a justice of the peace of the county of Dutchess. The plaintiffs in this action obtained judgment, whereupon the defendants brought an appeal to the county court, where the action was re-tried according to the form of the statute, and the plaintiff had a verdict, upon which judgment was entered, and the defendants appealed to this court.
Upon the trial in the county court, the defendants produced and proved by the witness, Henry Killmer, that the paper shown him, which purported to be a copy of the judgment and proceedings which the defendants set up in justification, was a correct copy of a judgment and the proceedings to recover the same, rendered in the action wherein Henry Wilbur was plaintiff and Hiram Wilkinson defendant, by W. R. Ostrom, justice of the peace, on the 31st day of October, 1861, for the sum of $46.15 damages and costs, for goods and merchandise sold and delivered. The copy of the judgment was signed by the justice with his official signature, from which it appeared that the summons was issued on the 25th of October, 1861, returnable on the 31st of the same month, at ten o’clock a. m. at the house of John Crandle.
The plaintiff, upon the trial in the county court, took several objections to this proof. 1st. That there was nothing to show that Brewer had authority to serve the summons, and it should appear that he was deputized in writing. 2d. That there was no proof of the service of the summons. 3d. That if Brewer served the summons under authority, he was thereby a constable pro hoc vice, and could not appear and act as the attorney for the plaintiff in the action. The county court sustained these objections, and rejected the proof as insufficient to show a valid judgment, but the specific ground of the decision does not appear; whether because the copy of the proceedings and judgment before the justice was not proof of the facts therein stated; or whether because Brewer, who acted as the constable in the service of the process, also appeared at the return thereof as the attorney for the plaintiff. Upon either ground I think the county court committed an error.
The power of the justice over the subject matter of the action, his authority to issue the process, and to deputize a person other than a constable to serve the process, is expressly given by the statute, and not disputed. But the plaintiff contends that there must be actual proof of the power of the deputy, by the production of the written authority required
The case of Knight v. Odell, ( 18 How. Pr. Rep. 279 ,) affirms that a person serving process under a special authority given by the justice is to be deemed a constable quoad the action, and is prohibited from appearing and acting as counsel upon the trial. Brewer was therefore disqualified from doing what he did, and his appearance upon the trial was an error for which the judgment and the proceedings would have been reversed upon appeal. The decision of the county court
[Kings General Term,
February 8, 1864.
The judgment of the county court should be reversed, with costs. '
Brown, Scrugham and Lott, Justices.]