p. 479It is most manifest, therefore, in this case, that when the plaintiffs received this $60,000 from Lawrence and Wiley, assignees of Lanes, Boyce & Co., and gave hack to them this agreement to repay the same, as above stated, they became absolutely the debtors of Lawrence and Wiley to that amount. This being so, I do not know of any principle of equity upon which the plaintiffs can claim the right to interplead their creditors, Lawrence and Wiley, with these strangers who claim the fund by a hostile and paramount title. These plaintiffs have a perfect right to pay this deposit to their depositors without incurring any liability to the other creditors of Lanes, Boyce & Company, upon the facts stated in this complaint. The plaintiffs have no right to maintain this suit to interplead Lawrence and Wiley and the other creditors of Lanes, Boyce & Co.
Eo case can be found in the books where a debtor has ever sustained a bill to interplead his creditor and an outsider—a mere stranger—who had no other claim to assert than a mere equity against the creditor to reach the fund loaned; and this really is all there is in this case. The case seems to me too plain for discussion or the citation of authorities.
The demurrer is well taken; for the complaint does not state facts sufficient to sustain a suit of interpleader, and judgment is therefore given for the defendants, upon the demurrer, with costs to he taxed.”
The plaintiff appealed from this decision to the general term.
E. S. Van Winkle, for the appellants.
J. Larocque, for the respondents.
A debtor who has been served with a notice that an attachment has been granted against the property of his creditor, has no standing in court to inter-
p. 480plead his creditor and the plaintiffs in the attachment. I am unable to perceive in what respect the present plaintiff h&s a better case for interpleader. It is, perhaps, not impossible that the money deposited with the plaintiff may be reached by the creditors of Lanes, Boyce
& Co. Upon this question it is not necessary to express any opinion. Should such creditors obtain any adjudication which will compel the plaintiffs in this case to apply the deposit on the demands of those creditors, instead of paying it to the depositors, it can be done only under circumstances affording full indemnity. The Trust Company have agreed to pay the deposit to certain persons, with interest. They cannot invoke the intervention of this court to disregard that contract, and inquire into the equities existing between the depositors and a class of persons who have no immediate, but only remote and contingent rights (if any) in respect to the fund.
[New York General Term,
May 2, 1864.
It would cast upon the court the duty of adjudging in a collateral action, whether the creditors of Lanes, Boyce & Co. can obtain a judgment declaring an assignment made for the benefit of creditors null and void. The creditors may not be in a situation to institute any such inquiry in court, or they may not desire to do so. A collateral inquiry into the merits of such a question ought not to be encouraged.
The claim of the creditors of Lanes, Boyce & Co. against the depositors or the fund, is too remote and contingent to be considered as a ground of interpleader. The manuscript opinion of Judge Ingraham in the case of Duncan, Sherman & Co. v. Bates and others, is directly in point here.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Leonard, Clerke and Sutherland, Justices.]