p. 224but if you allow another to put up a valuable erection on that line, and stand by while he is doing it, and make no objection, the law is, that you shall not object thereafter; the law says, that you shall not be allowed to do your neighbor so much injury by allowing him to expend his money in putting up buildings upon a line, and then object to it. To all this charge after the words “bound by it,” next following the last exception, the plaintiff’s counsel excepted. And the court proceeded, “If the defendant, with the knowledge of the plaintiff and with his assent, moved his wall, and put it up on this spot, the plaintiff is precluded and estopped from denying that that is the true line.” To which last proposition the plaintiff’s counsel excepted. The court proceeded, “ If there was no such agreement, that question is not in the case; nothing short of an agreement or assent that is followed by an erection of valuable structures along the line can estop the plaintiff.”
The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and the above exceptions were ordered to be heard in the first instance at the general term.
H. Humphrey, for the plaintiff.
I. Twenty years’ possession of lot 42, with claim of title under a deed of the lot, and with a board fence inclosure, was conclusive evidence of ownership to the line of the fence on the east. (2 R. S. 495, § 79, 4th ed. 10 John. 338 . 5 Cowen, 200. 16 John. 314 . 15 Wend. 171 . 7 Cowen, 637.) The above statute precluded a defense.II. Nothing appearing in the evidence on the question of estoppel was sufficient to authorize the jury to find an estoppel, or the judge to intimate to them in his charge that they might find the plaintiff estopped to insist upon the fence as the true line. He was not estopped. ( Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480 . Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 215 .) To be estopped he must have done or admitted something intentionally to mislead the defendant and must have misled him.
p. 225The defendant was misled only by his eagerness to possess what was not his.III. The charge of the judge was erroneous, as overruling the cases of Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend. 380 ,) and Miller v. Auburn and Syracuse R. R. Co., (6 JBJill, 61,) and many modern cases there cited—also as assuming that there was any evidence of assent by Corkhill to a removal of his fence. (Miller v. Auburn and Syracuse Rail Road Co., 6 Hill, 61 . 15 Wend. 380 . Hewlins v. Shippam, 5 Barn. & Cress. 221. 3 Kent’s Com. 452. Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. Rep. 533 .)IV. The rule at law that an equitable defense shall not prevail in ejectment, has not been changed by the code, except upon condition that the defendant by his answer entitle himself to a specific performance, and claim and have judgment for such performance. (Swick v. Sears, 1 Hill, 17 . Code, § 150, 2d clause. Dewey v. Hoag, 15 Barb. 365 . Haire v. Baker, 1 Seld. 357.)V. The fact that the evidence tending to show an estoppel was not objected to, does not prejudice the plaintiff. Estoppels are not* pleaded, but are used as evidence to establish facts. ( 8 Wend. 480 .)W. F. Cogswell, for the defendant.
I. There was no error in the charge of the judge, but the same was in strict accord with well settled jninciples of law. The doctrine of estoppel in pais is simply a doctrine of good faith, and is as applicable, and has been as readily applied, to real as personal property. It simply requires that when one has done an act, or made an admission upon which another relies and acts, he shall not be allowed to take back what he has done or said, to the prejudice of such other person. In the case in hand, the line between the parties’ lots was a line which was not self demonstrative. It had to be ascertained in some way; and the only practical way was by a surveyor, The parties
p. 227thereon. Such submission and award are not within the statute relative to arbitration, prohibiting the submission of certain questions to arbitration, and are valid although by parol. (Robertson v. McNeil, 12 Wend. 578 , 583. Jackson v. Gager, 5 Cowen, 383. 2 Kern. 266. 4 id. 143.) This proposition is embraced in the case as presented, because it was submitted to the jury to find whether Cornell had, in pursuance of the agreement of the parties, established the line, and whether if he did, the defendant built his house in reference to that line with the knowledge and assent of the plaintiff. The former part of the proposition was necessarily established by the verdict, if the case was decided against the plaintiff, on that branch of the charge excepted against. If it was on any other branch, there was no complaint that it was not properly submitted. (6 Ad. & Ellis, 499. 4Hurlst. &. Norm. 549. 2 Exch. R. 654. 10 Ad. & Ellis, 97.)The exceptions to the judge’s charge to the jury are not well taken. If the disputed boundary line had been fixed and settled by agreement between the parties, as the jury by their verdict have found the fact to be, and the defendant went on with the knowledge of the plaintiff, afterwards, and made valuable and expensive improvements relying upon such settlement, without any objection or remonstrance, or notice of dissent from the plaintiff in regard to such line, thus established, he is clearly estopped from now claiming that such was not the true boundary line betiveen their respective lots. If he did not intend to be bound by the survey and the line made and marked in his presence by the surveyor called with his assent for that purpose, it was his clear duty to notify the defendant when he saw him erecting his wall, and making the addition to his house, in accordance with the line thus made. He is presumed to have known that the defendant was making the improvement in the faith that he acquiesced in the line fixed by the sur
p. 228veyor in his presence, and without any dissent from him at the time. To allow him now, after the improvements are completed, to raise the objection and dispossess the defendant on the ground that the line was not in fact the true line, would be allowing him to take advantage of his own culpable neglect, to the great injury of the defendant. By his silence he must be deemed to have consented to the improvement being made and placed as it was, and to have encouraged and sanctioned the expenditure necessary thereto. Knowing that the defendant claimed the land to the new line, he by his silence assented to the claim while the improvement was going-on, and until it was too late for him to raise the objection. It is just the case where the principle of equitable estoppel applies. (Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 John. Ch. 343. Town v. Needham, 3 Paige, 545. Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 Comst. 303. Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N. Y. Rep. 359 .) In the last case Selden, J. at page 364, says: “ There may be cases in which an express agreement recognizing an erroneous boundary will conclude a party; as where the other party acting upon the faith of such agreement has made expensive improvements, the benefit of which will be lost to him if the. line is disturbed.” Such cases, the learned judge proceeds to say, rest upon the principle of estoppel in pais. The cases upon this subject are very numerous in the books, but it is unnecessary to multiply citations, as the principle is very clearly established. The rule applies equally to transactions in regard to real and personal property. It does not at all touch the question of creating title to real estate by parol. It estops a party from asserting his title when it would be fraudulent, and operate injuriously to allow him to do so. The principle is that he who is silent when conscience requires him to speak, shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent. There can be no doubt, I think, that a defense of this kind may be set up in the action of ejectment.. \J
p. 229[Monroe General'Term,
September 5, 1865
A mere equitable defense may be interposed in this action, since the code. (Crary v. Goodman, 2 N. Y. Rep. 266 .)
A new trial must therefore be denied.
Hew trial denied.
Johnson, E. Darwin Smith and James 0. Smith, Justices.J