p. 335tain seasons of the year the highway as then traveled was at times impassable, by means of snow banks and drifts, and that the proposed new route was not subject to snow drifts. This offer and proposition the said appellants conceded and admitted. The appellants then proposed to the commissioner and his counsel to waive any and all proof, and let the referees decide the said appeal upon their view and examination of the said route, and statement as aforesaid. The said commissioner, by his counsel, then stated to us that he was willing the said referees should decide upon their view and examination of the said route in connection with the proof which the parties might make. We, the referees, after consultation, said to the respective parties, and decided, that after the view and examination we had made, such proof would not, in our opinion, influence our final decision; but that the parties were at liberty to introduce such legal proof as they thought proper, and we would hear it. To this the counsel for the said commissioner excepted.” .
The return then states that no further proof or evidence was given or offered by either party, and that after hearing the arguments submitted on behalf of the respective parties, the referees made their decision by which they reversed the determination of the said commissioner of highways, and reduced their decision to writing, setting forth the same.
David Bumsey, for the relator,
A. M. Spooner, for the defendants in error.
There was no waiver by any of the parties, of the oath of the referees which they were required by the statute to take before proceeding to hear the appeal. It does not appear that either the relator, the applicants for the road, or the defendants, knew whether the referees had been sworn as the statute requires, or not. (2 R. S. 5th cd. 403, 404, § 123, last clause.) It was the duty of the
p. 336referees to be sworn, before proceeding to hear the appeal, and the parties had a right to presume they had performed that duty; and can not he charged with notice of their neglect ; and no implied waiver can ever be intended of an irrcg->' ularity or omission of which they had no notice or of which they can not be charged with notice. Besides, the parties to these proceedings had no right to waive such an irregularity as this omission of the referees to be sworn. The whole town had an interest in the proposed highway, and had a right to require that the proceedings should, in all material respects, conform to the requirements of the statute, which, in effect, declares that until the referees are sworn they are incompetent do any other act as referees. It was an act necessary to give them jurisdiction to proceed in the discharge of their-duties ; the omission of which rendered, all their acts
coram non juclice and void. The cases of
Howard v. Sexton, ( 1
Denio, 440 ,) and
Keator v.
The Ulster and Delaware Pl. R. Co., (7
How. Pr. R. 41,) relied upon by the counsel for-the defendants, have no application to the present case.. Both of those cases were civil actions, where the parties had the perfect right to waive any irregularities they'chose.
[Monroe General Term,
March 5, 1866.
The decision of the referees reversing the determination of the relator as commissioner of highways of the town of Cohocton must therefore be reversed.
Ordered accordingly.
Johnso®, Welles and E. Darwin
Smith-, Justices.]