Majority
Headnote
On the 28d of November, 1850, the plaintiff sold to the firm of M. &. H. certain property for $20,500, payable, $5000 in cash, $5500 in the note of M. & H. and $10,000 in the draft of M. & H., on S. & Co., at three months. The purchase was made fpr the benefit of M. & H. alone, and the draft was accepted by S. & Go., (of Which firm M. was a member,) for the accommodation of the plaintiff. In December, 1850, the plaintiff placed the acceptance in the hands of A. & Co., as his agents, and as security for advances made to him, and informed M., before it matured, that A. & Co. had the same for collection, with full power to settle with them. In May, 1851, S. & Co. became insolvent, and in October, 1851, the firm was dissolved. In August, 1852, A. & Co. accepted the individual notes of M. for $4000 in full for said acceptance, which notes were paid to A. & Co., and the acceptance delivered to M. Subsequently, A. & Co. rendered an account of said settlement, to the plaintiff, and paid him the balance due to him, informing him that they had delivered the acceptance to S. or to M. On the 27th of October, 1851, when the firm of S. & Co. was dissolved, M. assumed all the debts and liabilities of the firm, and gave to S. a bond to indemnify him against the same. In an action commenced by the plaintiff March 20,1866, againstIt is not disputed that the statute of limitations is a defense to the second cause of action contained in the complaint. I am of opinion that that plea is also an answer to the first cause of action, and that whether the amendment of 1867 is or not to be considered applicable to the case. If that amendment applies, of course the period of limitation would have expired. But if it does not—and I express no opinion on that point—I still think the cause of action barred, even deducting from the referee’s calculation the absences in Europe and Missouri, which the appellant insists the
[First Department, General Term, at New York,
April 4, 1871.
The payment in August, 1852, was made by Middleton after the dissolution. There is no evidence that Selover had anything to do with it, or that he authorized it in anyway. It is settled that such a payment has no effect, so far as he is concerned. ( Van Keuren v. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 523 . Winchell v. Hicks, 18 id. 558 .) Whether the payment be made before or after the action is barred by the statute of limitations, makes no difference. (Shoemaker v. Benedict, 1 Kern. 176.) In neither case does the payment affect the running of the statute, as to the partner who did not make or authorize it.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Ingraham, P. J., and Cardozo and Geo. G. Barnard, Justices.
Cases cited
- Van Keuren v. Parmelee 2 N. Y. 523 p. 316