p. 403her life, to 20 shares of the capital stock of the New. York Central Railroad Company of the nominal or par yalne of $100 each. She is not entitled, however, to the 80 per cent scrip and certificates issued to the testator in his lifetime, as the holder of those shares.The certificates being the property of the testator at the time of Ms death, the widow has no claim to them, unless they are given to her by the will.They are not given by the will, unless they pass, as mere incidents, by a bequest of the stock eo nomine. That they thus passed, I tMnk cannot be mamtained. Whatever force there may be in the views advanced by the counsel for the defendants, as to the legal character and effect of the certificates, and the power of the company tó apply the future earnings to them payment, at the expense of the holders of the original stock, those views do not justify the conclusion that the certificates pass by a bequest of the stock. It is true the character of the certificates is somewhat anomalous. They are not capital stock, nor are they dividends, strictly speaking, either of cash or stock. They purport to represent past earnings of the company, which were expended in the construction and equipment of the road, and in the purchase of real estate and other property, with a view to the increase of the traffic of the company, and they are issued to the stockholders as evidence of such expenditures and of their right to reimbursement of the same, at some convenient future period. Yet they create no obligation on the part of the company to pay, even if the future earnings should be sufficient. They are payable, with dividends, at the pleasure of the company, and they are also convertible into capital stock at the option of the company, the legislature having authorized such conversion since the certificates were issued. Although they are the increase of the original stock, they are not mseparabiy connected with it; they may be sold and transferred separately, without affecting their va
p. 404lidity. It was competent for the testator to give the stock to one legatee, and the scrip certificates to another; and in my opinion he has done so "by the provisions of his will, the certificates being disposed of by the residuary clauses.The consolidation certificates are on a different footing. By the terms of the will, the widow was entitled to a delivery of the stock certificates at the expiration of thirty days after the death of the testator. The consolidation certificates were not issued, nor was the consolidation effected till after that time. She is therefore to be regarded as the holder and owner of the stock bequeathed to her, at the time of the consolidation and of the issuing of the consolidation certificates, and is entitled to receive her proportionate share of said certificates, as such shareholder.The same-observations apply to the sum of $518,310 retained out of the assets of the New York Central Bail-road Company for the purpose of equalization, on the consolidation of the two companies. If that sum, or any part of it, shall be paid over by the railroad corporation to tile stockholders during the lifetime of Mrs. Brundage, she will be entitled to receive her proportionate share thereof as such stockholder.So long as the consolidation certificates and the reserved fund remain in their present condition, Mrs. Brundage is not entitled to her share of the same absolutely, but only to the use and income thereof during her life. If the terms of consolidation between the companies are correctly understood, the corporation formed by the consolidation has the option to pay over the amount of such certificates from its future earnings, as earnings, or to convert the amount of such certificates into capital stock, and to pay dividends thereon. Earnings paid over as such to Mrs. Brundage, will belong to her absolutely; but as increased capital, will be hers for life only, and she will be required to preserve
p. 405it for those entitled in remainder, using only the income thereof for herself.She is not entitled, absolutely, to her proportionate share of the consolidation certificates and the reserved fund of $518,310, so long as the corporation has the option of converting them into capital.II. The defendant, Eliza Brundage, is also entitled, for life, to $2,000 in cash; to the household furniture left by the testator; and to a horse and other chattels mentioned in the first clause, which latter articles, if not belonging to the estate, are to be purchased by the executors to meet the bequest.III. The first clause also makes a final disposition, after the death of Eliza Brundage,aof all the property bequeathed to her during her life, namely, $1,000 of the railroad stock, and $1,000 in cash of the amount bequeathed to her, to the testator’s son, Charles C. Brundage, and the remainder of such property to the testator’s heirs equally, of whom there are three, viz., Charles, Mrs. Collar and Sarah Sophia Brundage.The bequests in the fifth clause to Charles, after the death of the testator’s wife, of $1,000 in Central railroad stock, and $1,000 in cash, are but repetitions of the like provisions in the first clause, and are not cumulative. By virtue of this bequest of $1,000 in stock of the Central railroad company, Charles will be entitled, on the death of Mrs. Brundage, to' ten shares of such stock, or shares of the nominal or par value of $1,000, of the stock of the corporation formed by the consolidation, or in whatever form said stock shall then exist.IV. The bequest in the fourth clause to Sarah S. Brundage, of $1,000 in New York Central railz’oad bonds, is not a specific, but a general or demonstrative legacy, and does zzot fail, though the testator had no such bonds at the time of his death. It is equivalent to a bequest of $1,000 in money. By the same clause, she has also a vested
p. 406legacy of §1,000 in cash, payable at the death of Eliza Brundage, out of the general assets of the testator.V. The bequest “to Mrs. Collar of ten shares of stock in the New York Central railroad, of §100 a share,” after the death of Eliza Brundage, is general and not specific. It is the duty of the executors to provide for its payment at the death of Mrs. Brundage, out of the general assets. The fact that the New York Central is consolidated with the Hudson River Railroad Company, does not work an ademption of the legacy, but the legatee will be entitled to the same number of shares in the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, or to shares in that company of the same nominal or par value,'in the aggregate, as in the case of the bequest to Charles.VI. The “surplus” or remainder of the personal property of the testator, after paying and providing for all the legacies and bequests contained in the will, together with debts and expenses of executing the will and administering on the estate, is given to Charles C. Brundage.The costs of this action, including the taxable costs and disbursements of the defendants, being in the nature of expenses' of executing the will, are to be paid by the executors, out of the residuary property.Judgment to be entered accordingly ”By a stipulation between the parties, Charles C. Brundage was made a party plaintiff in his individual right, and it is in that right his counsel insists he is entitled to a construction of the will as to the validity of - the bequest to Collar.Judgment was entered in conformity to the conclusions of the court above stated.The Special Term was right in holding that the executors were not entitled to call for a construction of the will as to the validity of
p. 407the devise of the farm to Collar. They have nothing to do with the land. They have no estate in nor control over it.
Bor could the court give a construction to that clause on the application of Charles C. Brundage. It is charged in the complaint that Collar did not support the testator, but the allegation is denied in the answer, and there is no proof on the subject.
If Brundage desired to have the court pass upon that clause it was his duty to make proof of the facts alleged in the complaint; failing to do that, the court could not make any other disposition of the question than it has done. The case states that the plaintiff offered to prove that Collar abandoned the premises and failed to provide for the testator &c., and that the defendants objected to this evidence, and it was rejected. If by the plaintiff was meant Charles 0., I am not satisfied the learned judge was right in rejecting it. He obviously understood the offer to be made by the executors, and the mistake was not corrected, and it is too late to correct it now.
It was correctly held that the widow was not entitled to any share of, or interest in, the eighty per cent scrip issued by the Hew York Central Railroad Company to the testator.
The certificate for the eighty per cent is dated the 24th March, 1869, and was issued in pursuance of a resolution of the directors of said company, passed 18th December, 1868. The testator died 22d June, 1869. At the time of his death, therefore, the scrip was a part of Ms personal estate, and no connection between the original stock and the scrip is shown to exist thereafter, or that any connection between them was intended by the testator.
They were separate and distinct obligations against the company, assuming ttiat the scrip was valid; and
p. 408its validity is not called in question in this action.
(Currie v.
White, 37
How. 339 .)
Whatever dividends were made to the stockholders after the death of the testator, the widow was entitled to, to the extent of the shares of stock held by her, but not to any earned before, although not paid until after his death. (Redf. on Wills, part. 2, pp. 469, 470, and notes. Spear v. Hart, 3 Rob. 420 .) This scrip passed to the son Charles, as part of the surplus referred to in the-last clause of the will. Although not entitled to share in the eighty per cent scrip, she was entitled to the dividends or income derived from the twenty-seven per cent scrip, which was issued after the testator’s death, and also to the income from the consolidation scrip issued by the consolidated company. A dividend earned but not declared belongs to the person owning the stock when the dividend is actually declared, and not to the owner of the stock before such declaration.
On the death of the widow $1,000 of the railroad stock bequeathed to her passed to Charles C. Brundage, together with $1,000 of the cash, given her by the will, and the residue of the property given to the widow was to descend to his heirs.. Ten shares of the same stock is given by the third clause of the will to Mrs. Collar after the death of the widow. $1,000 of the cash given to the widow is by the fourth clause of the will given to Sarah S. Brundage.
By the fifth clause of the will, the residue of the property, the use of which was given to the widow for life, after paying the foregoing legacies, is given to Charles and his daughters Maria and Sophia, to be equally divided between them.
By the fourth clause, as modified by the first codicil, ten shares of New York Central stock, and $1,000 in bonds of the same company are given at the decease of the testator to his daughter Sarah S. If the testator
p. 409was the owner of ten shares of this stock not bequeathed to some other of the objects of the testator’s bounty, then ten shares are payable from such stock, but if not, it is the duty of the executors to purchase ten shares of $100 each, and transfer them to her. If such stock cannot be purchased, then Sarah is entitled to the market value, in money, of said stock, thirty days after the testator’s death.
As the testator owned no bonds of the Hew York Central Railroad, the executors must either procure such bonds and deliver the same to Sarah, or pay her the market value thereof in money, thirty days after the death of the testator.
By the fifth clause Charles C. is entitled, at the death of the testator, to $1,000 in cash.
Charles is entitled, under the will, to but one sum of $1,000 in cash, and $1,000 in stock, from the cash and stock bequeathed to the widow. The whole of that fund is disposed of by the clauses of the will preceding the fifth clause, and there is nothing in the will, or in the proof, to show that the testator intended to revoke or modify such clauses.
When the will was made, the testator had not purchased the house and lot, and he could not then have intended it should pass to Charles as part of the surplus referred to in the will.
There is nothing in either of the codicils, if they were made after the purchase of the house and lot, indicating any change of purpose as to what was intended to pass as surplus.
The surplus contemplated was, it seems, that which should remain of the personal, after paying the debts and the legacies specified in the will.
As the judgment in this case will not interfere with the right of Charles to insist, hereafter, that he is entitled to the house and lot, by the will, it is better for all
p. 410concerned that the- question should be reserved for decision, to another litigation.
[Fourth Department, General Teem,-at Buffalo,
June 3, 1873.
Mullin, Talcott and B. D. 'Smith, Justices.]
Judgment affirmed. The costs of the executor to be paid out of the estate.