Majority
Headnote
Injunction—Execution of Judgment.—An injunction will not lie to restrain the execution of a judgment upon grounds which were available to the defendant in the original action.The plaintiff was sued by the defendant McCoy in the justice’s court of Fall river township, county of Shasta, for having maliciously' caused his arrest upon a criminal charge, and at the trial of the action a verdict and judgment thereon was rendered against him. A motion for a new trial in the justice’s court was denied, and he then appealed from the judgment to the superior court, where his appeal was dismissed upon the ground that it was not taken within thirty days after the judgment was rendered. The present action was brought by him to procure a decree enjoining the enforcement of this judgment, and directing it to be canceled of record. In the title of the action he has named as defendants, in addition to the plaintiff in the original suit, “F. A. Moers, justice of the peace,” and “C. W. Levens, constable”; but there are no allegations in the complaint with reference to either of these last defendants, nor is it alleged that Moers was the justice before whom the action was tried. The grounds upon which he seeks the relief are, in substance, that certain persons were
The complaint fails to show any ground for the interference of a court of equity to restrain the enforcement of the judgment rendered in the justice’s court. It appears from the complaint that the plaintiff was informed of all the grounds which he urges 'in support of his action within a week after the verdict was given by the jury, and he then had a complete remedy against all the errors committed at the trial by an appeal to the superior court. His failure to take such appeal until more than thirty days after the rendition of the judgment was his own negligence, and cannot be invoked as a ground for the interference of equity. (Quinn v. Wetherbee, 41 Cal. 247 ; Daly v. Pennie, 86 Cal. 552 ; 21 Am. St. Rep. 16 .) “The correctness of a judgment cannot be reviewed in an independent action upon grounds which were available to the litigant in the original action.” (Johnson v. Reed, 125 Cal. 74 .) Neither is the plaintiff entitled to relief by reason of his having relied upon the promise of the justice to grant him a new trial. He does not claim that the plaintiff in the action in that court was a party to this promise, or knew that it had been made. He was, moreover, bound to know that the time for an appeal from the judgment was not prolonged by any proceedings before the justice’s court.
The judgment is affirmed.
Garout.te, J., and Van Dyke, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Quinn v. Wetherbee 41 Cal. 247 p. 23
- Daly v. Pennie 86 Cal. 552 p. 23
- Johnson v. Reed 125 Cal. 74 p. 23