Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co.

This action was brought to recover from the corporation defendant for labor performed by plaintiff and for labor performed by others for defendant corporation, whose claims have been assigned to plaintiff. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff, and defendants appeal. The case comes here on the judgment-roll. The findings show that the defendant corporation, while engaged in business in Sierra county, California, became indebted to plaintiff and some twenty others, who before the commencement of this action assigned their claims to plaintiff, for labor performed by the month at the instance of defendant corporation in its quartz mine in said county, and the same has not been paid. That four hundred dollars is a reasonable attorney’s fee to be allowed to plaintiff for the prosecution of the action. As conclusions of law, the court found that plaintiff was entitled to judgment against defendant corporation for the sum of five thousand and thirty-nine dollars and fifty-seven cents and for four hundred dollars attorney’s fees, and that the same is a first lien upon all the property described in the complaint, consisting of certain real estate, mining claims, and personal property, consisting of mining materials, tools, engines, cars, wood, lumber, merchandise for mining, etc., and that all the said property, or so much thereof as might be necessary, be sold to pay the plaintiff’s judgment, costs, and attorney’s fees. Judgment was accordingly entered. The action was brought to recover monthly wages and attorney’s fees, and to have the amount declared a lien upon the property of the defendant corporation under an act approved March 29, 1897. (Stats. 1897, p. 231.) As the constitutionality of the act is the main question in controversy here, it will be necessary to give the sections of the act herein discussed in full. The sections material are as follows:

“Section 1. Every corporation doing business in this state

shall pay, at least once a month, each and every employee employed by such corporation, in transacting or carrying on its business, or in the performance of labor for it, the wages earned by such employee during the preceding month; provided, however, that if at the time of payment any employee shall be absent, or not engaged in his usual employment, he shall be entitled to said payment at any time thereafter upon demand.

“Sec. 2. A violation of any of the provisions of section 1 of this act shall entitle each of the said employees to a lien on all the property of said corporation for the amount of their wages, which lien shall take preference over all other liens, except duly recorded mortgages or deeds of trust; and in any action to recover the amount of such wages, or to enforce said lien, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the court, and which shall form part of the judgment in said action, and shall also be entitled to an attachment against said property. An unrecorded deed shall be no-defense to such actions.

“Sec. 3. That on the trial of any action against such corporation for a violation of the provisions of this act, such corporation shall not be allowed to set up any defense for a failure to pay monthly any employee engaged in transacting or carrying on its business the wages earned by such employee during the preceding month, other than the fact that such wages were not earned, except a valid assignment of such wages, a setoff or counterclaim against the same, or the absence of such employee from his usual employment at the time of the payment of the wages so earned by him.....

“Sec. 5. jSTo corporation shall require, and no employee of such corporation shall make, any agreement to accept wages at longer periods than as provided in this act as a condition of employment.

“Sec. 6. All wages earned by any employee engaged in the service of any corporation in this state shall be paid in lawful moneys of the United States, or in checks negotiable at face value on demand.

“Sec. 7. Any corporation violating any of the provisions of this act shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or less than fifty dollars, for each violation, the same

to be imposed by any court in this state having jurisdiction of offenses in which the penalty does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars; said fine to be paid, by the judge or magistrate before whom a recovery may be had under the provisions of this act, into the general fund of the treasury of the county in which said conviction may be had.”

The plaintiff claims the benefit of the provisions of said act applicable to this case, and the defendants contest the said provisions and every part of said act as being unconstitutional. The statute is said to contravene the following provisions of the constitution aLihe_sia¿es=sl. “No person shall he deprived of life, liberty, or property without-due-proee^s of law” (Const., art. I, sec. 1, subd. 13); 2. “Nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges _nr immu-nities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens” (Const., art. I, sec. 1, subd. 21); 3. “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation” (Const., art. I, sec. 1, subd. 11); 4. Section 25, article IV, providing that the legislature shall not pass local or special laws in the following cases: “3. Eegulating the practice of courts of justice; .... 24. Authorizing the creation, extension, or impairing of liens; .... 33. In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable”; 5. Fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United SjgfgsW “Nor shall any state deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” In the decision of this case the constitutionality of the sections of the statute herein set forth is necessarily involved, and it is with a deep sense of the importance of the subject that we enter upon its discussion. We must determine whether the law-making power of the state has in this instance gone beyond the limits of the constitution adopted by the people. This is always a question of great delicacy and one which this court approaches with reluctance, but one in ivhieh the duty of the court is plain and which must be met squarely when presented. The same constitution that lays down the fundamental law of our state and prohibits legislatures from going outside the powers and limitations therein contained created the courts, and 'provided that they should stand as the guardians of the people and lay their restraining hands upon the legislature in all cases where it has plainly violated the provisions of the people’s charter of rights.

The rule is admirably stated in the Railway Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 743 , as follows: “Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but, with the exception of a sole corporation, with which we are not concerned, they consist of aggregations of individuals united for some legitimate business. In this state, they are formed under general laws, and the Civil Code provides that they ‘may be formed for any purpose for which individuals may lawfully associate themselves.’ Any five or more persons may, by voluntary association, form themselves into a corporation. And, as a matter of fact, nearly all enterprises in this state requiring for their execution an expenditure of large capital are undertaken by corporations. It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states should cease to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. We cannot accept such a conclusion. On the contrary, we think it is well established by numerous adjudications of the supreme courts of the several states that whenever a provision of the constitution or of a law guarantees to persons the enjoyment of

The case was afterward taken to the supreme court of the United States (Railway Tax Cases, 118 U. S. 396 ), and on the opening of court, before argument, the chief justice said: “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.” In discussing the provisions of the statute in question it will, therefore, be regarded as settled that the word “corporation” refers to the members who constitute the corporation, and that the rights of a corporation are to be measured by the same laws as the rights of a person. The law should be made for all alike, for the rich as well as the poor, for the corporation as well as the laborer. In Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, sixth edition, page 483, it is said: “But everyone has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute which, without his consent, singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law from that which is applied in all similar eases would not be legitimate legislation, but would be such an arbitrary mandate as is not within the province of free governments. Those who make the laws are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough. This is a maxim in constitutional law, and by it we may test the authority and binding force of legislative enactments.” In Wally v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554 , 24 Am. Dec. 511 , it is said: “The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every other member of the body politic, or land, under similar circumstances; and every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and void. Were it otherwise, odious individuals and

The supreme court of the state in Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 437 , held the act unconstitutional and in the opinion said: “The first, second, third, and fourth sections of the act of June 29, 1881, are utterly unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do what in this country cannot be done; that is, to prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts. The act is an infringement alike of the right of the employer and the employee; more than that, it is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage which is not only degrading to his manhood but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States. He may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or coal, and any and every law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an infringement of his constitutional privileges and consequently vicious and void.”

In 1887, the legislature of the state of West Virginia passed an act declaring that all persons engaged in mining coal or other minerals, or in manufacturing them, should not issue for the payment of labor certain orders therein described. The supreme court of the state in State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179 , 45 Am. St. Rep. 863 , declared the law unconstitutional and in the opinion said: “The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the

The Revised Statutes of Missouri in 1889 made it unlawful for any corporation, firm, or person engaged in mining to issue in payment of wages any order or check payable otherwise than in money unless the same was negotiable or redeemable at its face value in cash or goods at the option of the holder. The su

The legislature of Texas provided by statute that a railroad company refusing to pay an employee within fifteen days after demand shall be liable to such employee in a sum equal to twenty per cent on the amount due. The statute was held unconstitutional. (San Antonio etc. Ry. Co. v. Wilson (Tex. App., June 15, 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 910 .) In the opinion it is said: “If the legislature desires to interfere at all in the enforcement of labor claims, it must do so by laws equal in their operation, and protecting alike the interest of the employer and employee, for the law knows no favorites.”

The supreme court of Nebraska, in Atchison etc. R. R. Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37 , 29 Am. Rep. 356 , held unconstitutional a statute of 1867 giving to owners of livestock double the value of such property injured or destroyed on a railroad track.

In Michigan, a statute was passed in 1885 authorizing the taxing of an attorney’s fee of twenty-five dollars in actions against a railroad company for damages for cattle killed, and the supreme court of the state held it unconstitutional. (Wilder v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 70 Mich. 382 .) And the supreme court of Arkansas held a similar statute of that state unconstitutional (St. Loids etc. Ry. v. Williams, 49 Ark. 492 ); and the same ruling was made on a similar statute by the supreme court of the state of Washington (Joliffe v. Brown, 14 Wash. 155 ; 53 Am. St. Rep. 868 ); and by the supreme court of Ohio (Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio, 12 -24; 53 Am. St. Rep. 622 ). Cases almost without number could be cited to the same general effect. Among others, see Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464 ; 9 Am. Rep. 500 ; Grand

This court in Bank held that a statute of the state prohibiting bakers from following their vocation between the hours of 6 o’clock P. M. on Saturdays and 6 o’clock P. M. on Sundays was a special law and void. (Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 551 ; 36 Am. Rep. 47 .) And the same was held as to a similar statute in relation to barbers. (Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 469 .)

The question is very ably considered and would seem to be finally put to rest by the supreme court of the United States in Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 . The statute of the state of Texas allowing owners of stock killed by a railway corporation ten dollars attorney’s fees as additional costs was held unconstitutional. In the opinion it is said: “The act singles out a certain class of debtors and punishes them, when for like delinquencies it punishes no others. They are not treated as other debtors or equally with other debtors. They cannot appeal to the courts as other litigants under like conditions and with like protection. If litigation terminates adversely to them, they are mulcted in the attorney’s fees of the successful plaintiff; if it terminates in their favor, they recover no attorney’s fees.....They do not stand equal before the law. They do not receive its equal protection.” The reasoning of the highest court in the land in the case cited applies to this case. There is no reason why a different rule as to defenses that may be pleaded and proven and as to the nature of the lien of a judgment should obtain against a corporation than that which applies to other litigants. In Cullen v. Glendora Water Co., 113 Cal. 503 , it was held that a part of the fourth section of the act generally known as the Wright act, which provided that, in a proceeding to confirm the organization and bonds of an irrigation district, “a motion for a new trial must be made upon the minutes of the court,” was a special law regulating the practice of courts of justice and unconstitutional. In Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238 , it was held that section 870 of the municipal corporation act of 1883, requiring cities of the fifth and sixth classes to make an effort to agree before instituting condemna

But the act in question applies not only to the corporations existing under the laws of this state, but to all other corporations doing business in this state and in no wise indebted to the state for their charters. Surely, the legislature of this state could not alter, amend, or repeal the charter of a corporation existing under the laws of another state. Counsel for respondent states that similar statutes have been upheld in Shaffer v. Union etc. Co., 55 Md. 74 , State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802 , and Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366 , 16 Am. St. Rep. 296 .

The statute upheld in Shaffer v. Union etc. Co., supra, was one which provided that every corporation engaged in manufacturing or in operating a railroad in a certain county and employing ten hands or more should pay its employees the full amounts of their wages in legal tender money of the United States, and that every contract for the payment of such wages in any other manner be null and void. The ground upon which the act was upheld was that the legislature had the right to alter or amend the corporate charter. It is evident, in view of the authorities hereinbefore cited, that the ruling upon such ground was clearly incorrect. The decision cannot he regarded as of much value as a contribution to jurisprudence, and an examination of the authorities therein cited does not support it.

The case of State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., supra, upheld the validity of two statutes of West Virginia, one prohibiting the payment of employees in paper redeemable otherwise than in lawful money, and the other prescribing a certain method for weighing coal at the mouth of a mine. The court consisted of four judges, and two of the four can affirm a judgment. The judgment was affirmed by two judges, and two dissented. The opinion of the two affirming the judgment, while lengthy, is not convincing.

Hancock v. Yaden, supra, turned on the validity of a statute of Indiana which forbade the execution of contracts waiving the payment of wages in money. The court sustained the law, and the decision is the most direct authority in favor of plaintiff’s contention of any he has cited. There is no authority cited in the opinion upon which it can legally stand. The court sustained the law upon the ground, “that it protected and maintained the medium of payment established by the sovereign power of the nation.” Even if this be so, it is self-evident that the legislature, in passing the act, did not have in mind the protection of the coinage. The policy of the law in protecting the coin of the country would justify stringent laws against counterfeiting or debasing it, but certainly could not justify a law that precludes persons from agreeing to receive payment of their debts in anything but money. Since the submission of this case our attention has also been called by counsel for plaintiff to a decision of the circuit court of the United States for the ninth circuit of northern California in the case of Skinner v. Garnett Gold Min. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 735 , in which this very statute was upheld. While we have the greatest respect for the able judge who wrote the opinion, yet it is not binding

The court properly overruled the defendants’ demurrer to the complaint. The allegation as to the assignment of the several causes of action prior to the time of the commencement of the action to plaintiff was sufficient when attacked by general demurrer. That portion of the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant corporation for five thousand and thirty-nine dollars and fifty-seven cents, with costs, should be affirmed. The portion awarding the plaintiff four hundred dollars attorney’s fees, and declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to a lien upon the property of defendant corporation and to have a commissioner appointed to sell the property, should be reversed.

Haynes, C., and Chipman, C., concurred.

For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion that portion of the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant corporation for five thousand and thirty-nine dollars and fifty-seven cents, with costs, is affirmed. The portion awarding the plaintiff four hundred dollars attorney’s fees, and declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to a lien upon the property of defendant corporation and to have a commissioner appointed to sell the property, is reversed.

Harrison, J., Garoutte, J., Van Dyke, J.

Hearing in Bank denied.