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Criminal Law—Homicide—Review Upon Appeal—Bill op Exceptions— Recitals op Evidence not Introduced.—Upon an appeal from á judgment of conviction of murder, recitals made in the bill of exceptions of the contents of a; dying declaration of the deceased used on the preliminary examination, and of other evidence and facts stated by the judge when he pronounced sentence, which do not appear to constitute part of the evidence introduced at the trial, cannot be considered by this court.By the information the appellant Brooks and one Tony Bice were jointly charged with the murder of Don Donelly. Brooks was tried separately and convicted of murder in the second degree. He appeals from the judgment and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
The record is in a very loose and unsatisfactory condition. The hill of exceptions, after showing that certain witnesses were examined at the trial and certain evidence taken, contains a statement of the contents of a certain alleged dying declaration of the deceased which was used at the preliminary examination before the magistrate, hut the record does not show that said declaration was introduced in evidence at the trial. There is also a statement of a recitation of certain evidence and facts made by the judge at the time he pronounced sentence; but the
The record, as we must consider it, presents only two contentions of appellant which need be noticed: 1. That the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty; and 2. That the court erred to appellant’s prejudice in refusing to give certain instructions to the jury which appellant asked.
1. We cannot say that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The main facts of th'e case are these: On the morning of June 27, 1899, shortly before daylight, appellant was in the Favorite Saloon, in the city of Fresno, where he was employed as a barkeeper, and after some conversation through the telephone, in the saloon, he went out and remained away about ten or fifteen minutes, when he returned. When he left the Favorite he went to another saloon across the street and in the immediate neighborhood called the Golden West, to which place he had been summoned through the telephone. He had there a whispered conversation with a Mr. Ardell, and after remaining in the Golden West a minute or two he went out of the side door behind certain “cribs” or houses of prostitution. That part of the city is known generally as Chinatown and is occupied to a great extent by prostitutes. It does not appear where he went immediately after leaving the Golden West, but, as before stated, in about ten or fifteen minutes he returned to the Favorite Saloon and appeared to be in a state of great ’excitement. He hurriedly went behind the bar and got a pistol and went to the rear door of the saloon. At that time Eice, who was a police officer and was in or at the threshold of the saloon, followed the appellant to the back door and said to him something like: “This is my business,” or, “If there is going to be any shooting I will do it.” Eice looked out of the glass door, and seeing the deceased, Donelly, with a pistol in his hand, went out and said to him, “Throw up your hands”; but Donelly immediately fired one shot, either at
2. We do not think that appellant was at all prejudiced by the refusal-of the court to give certain instructions asked by Ms counsel. The court did, at the request of defendant, give to the jury some fourteen instructions, and these instructions, together with others 'given by the court of its own motion, correctly and fully stated the law applicable to the case; and these instructions were certainly very favorable to the appellant. We think that all of the instructions refused which were correct were substantially included in the instructions given. /The rejected instructions most insisted upon by appellant as correct refer to the right of a citizen to assist a police officer when called upon to make an arrest; but as to this matter the court instructed the jury at the request of the appellant as follows:
“A citizen must assist in the arrest of a person when called upon by any peace officer so to do, and when so called upon the law clothes such person or citizen with the rights and duties and immunities of such officer.
“While an officer, or citizen requested by an officer to assist in mating an arrest must use as little violence as possible, if resisted he may use sufficient force to effect his purpose, even though it go to the extent of taking life. Resisting arrest does not always constitute the use of physical force; a person may resist arrest by fleeing from an officer attempting to arrest him.
“If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant had a right to believe, as a reasonable man, and did believe, that
the deceased had unlawfully shot at or mortally wounded the officer, Tony Bice, in resisting arrest, before giving pursuit and the firing of the fatal shot, then the defendant not only had the right, but it was his duty, to so pursue and arrest the deceased and use all necessary means of effecting his arredt.”
Under these instructions the jury were fully informed as to the law on this subjeot, and the appellant was not prejudiced by the refusal of the court to give the instructions refused.
There is nothing in the point that the court had no authority to sentence the appellant to imprisonment for life. Section 671 of the Penal Code expressly provides that where the punishment is imprisonment for a -term not less than any specified number of years, and no limit to the duration of the imprisonment is declared, the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment during his natural life. There are no other points requiring notice.
The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.
Temple, J., Henshaw, J., Van Dyke, J., Garoutte, J., Harrison, J., and Beatty, C. J., concurred,
Behearing denied.