Majority
Headnote
Life Insurance Companies — Guaranty Fund—Statute Part of Notes.—The provisions of the act of April 2,1866, relating to the establishment of a guaranty fund for mutual life insurance companies incorporated under that act, requiring such fund to consist of the notes of solvent parties, approved by the board of directors and by each other, and declaring that such notes, or the proceeds thereof, shall remain with the company, and not be withdrawn without substituting another note of equal solvency, nor without the unanimous approval of the board of directors and of all the other parties liable on the rest of the notes, must be considered as if written into each of the guaranty notes, and as giving to each note-maker the right to require their enforcement as to all other note-makers.The appeal is taken from the judgment and also from the order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
The action was brought in the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, by one Joseph E. Shain, for whom the present plaintiff was substituted as plaintiff at the trial. The action is founded upon a promissory note of the defendant, constituting one of the so-called guaranty notes, of which the following is a copy:-—
“ Office of the California Mutual Life Insurance Company. “$5,000. San Francisco, Jan. 6,1868. “ Five days after actual demand, for value received, I promise to pay to the order of the California Mutual Life Insurance Company the sum of five thousand dollars, in United States gold coin, with interest at the then legal rate from and after such demand. A. E. Head.”
The case was heard in the court below on the second amended complaint, filed by the original plaintiff, and the answer thereto, and the supplemental complaint, substituting the present plaintiff.
The California Mutual Life Insurance Company was incorporated in the year 1867, under an act of the legislature of this state, entitled “ An act to provide for incorporation of mutual insurance companies for the insurance of life and health and against accident. Approved April 2, 1866.” (Stats. 1865-66, p. 752.) After obtaining the guaranty fund as provided by said act, the said insurance company engaged in business, and carried on the same during the years 1868, 1869, 1870, 1871,
The appellant contends,—1. That, having made the note in suit on certain conditions, he is not hable, because the conditions have not heen complied with; and, being a guarantor, is discharged from liability, in consequence of the acts and transactions referred to as having been found by the trial court; 2. That the claim, if any ever accrued, is barred by limitation.
1. The note in suit, as already shown, was given in pursuance of and in accordance with the provisions of the statute of 1866. Among the other provisions of that act, it is declared that such notes, or the proceeds thereof, should remain with the company, and should not be withdrawn from the guaranty fund without substituting therefor another note of equal solvency, nor without unanimous approval of the board of directors, and all of the other parties liable on the rest of the notes. These provisions of the law must be considered as having been written into the note, and they are in harmony with the general rules of law for the protection of a surety or guarantor. Each note-maker had the right to require that there should be, in all, fifty solvent note-makers, each of the sum of five thousand dollars, and it was also his right to have that number of such solvent note-makers continue, subject to the same conditions and liabilities as himself. The reason of this provision in the law is very obvious. The corporation and its stockholders are primarily liable for the company’s debts.
It was held in In re California Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. 364 , that this guaranty fund was liable only for the debts of the company, and as an additional security to the parties dealing with said company, over and above the liability of the company and its stockholders; and as • between the makers of these notes and the company and its stockholders, the money paid by stockholders cannot be made a charge upon such guarantors. It is very clear, therefore, that the company could not have maintained an action on this note under the circumstances, and there is nothing to show that the plaintiff is, or that his assignors were, creditors of the company. It is alleged in the second amended complaint on which the case was tried, “ that, pursuant to said decree, the said note was sold to one James H. Dobinson, who transferred and assigned it to this plaintiff,” and in the supplemental complaint, after averring the appointment of the plaintiff as special administrator of the estate of James Laidley, deceased, it is said, “ that since the commencement of this action, to wit, in the month of November, 1895, Joseph E. Shain, the original plaintiff in the above-entitled action, transferred to the plaintiff, as special administrator of the estate of James Laidley, deceased, the promissory note sued upon, and all his right, title, and interest in the above-entitled action.” The title to the note in question passed from the insurance company, to which it was originally given, to Dobinson, by means of a judicial sale, and from him by mesne assignments to the present plaintiff. The plaintiff therefore stands in no better position than the company itself would have stood, had it brought suit on the note. The finding of the court that Dobinson transferred to the executors of Laidley in extinguishment of a
Dissent
One who buys at judicial sale a negotiable promissory note takes it under the rule of caveat emptor, and holds it subject to all equities existing against it in the hands of the original maker or assignor. It is not a transfer in due course. (2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, pp. 46 et seq.; Rorer on Judicial Sales, 474; Civ. Code, sec. 312; Code Civ. Proc., sec. 368.) The small price paid for the note at such sale would indicate that the purchaser so understood it.
For the foregoing reasons, bearing upon the first point relied upon by appellant, we are of the opinion that upon the findings of the court within the issues raised by the pleadings the defendant was entitled to judgment. This view of the case renders it unnecessary to consider the other points made by appellant. Judgment and order reversed.
Harrison, J., and Garoutte, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.
Beatty, C. J., dissented from the order denying a hearing in Bank, and filed the following opinion on June 26, 1901:—
I dissent from the order denying a rehearing of this case.
By the act under which the California Mutual Life Insurance Company was incorporated (Stats. 1865-66, p. 752), it was forbidden to make any insurance until it had a cash capital of at least one hundred thousand dollars fully paid up, and a guaranty fund of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, composed of the promissory notes of solvent parties, approved by the board of directors and by each other,—no note to exceed five thousand dollars. Such notes were required to be payable absolutely and at all events, at the company’s option, and to be negotiable, in order that they might be indorsed and transferred, or converted into cash, or otherwise dealt with by the company in its discretion, without reference to any contingency of losses, expenses, or otherwise. And it was provided that such notes, or the proceeds thereof, should remain with the company as a fund for the better security of its dealers, and should be assets of the company, liable for its
And it was further provided, that until the fixed capital had been so accumulated, and the fact formally proven and published, no guaranty note should be withdrawn from the fund without the substitution of another note unanimously approved by the directors then in office, and by all the other note-makers. (See Stats. 1865-66, p. 752, secs. 8, 9, 10.) By these provisions, and others of similar tendency, the legislature sought to protect the policy-holders and other creditors of such insurance companies by exacting the creation of an inviolable fund, out of which their claims should be payable; but, according to this decision, the whole purpose and policy of the law can be frustrated by the unlawful act of the corporation in surrendering or canceling a single one of the guaranty notes without compliance with the conditions prescribed in the statute: Without any fault on the part of the policy-holders or other creditors of the corporation, five sevenths of the fund which the legislature has been at such pains to create for the satisfaction of their demands is swept out of existence by an act of the directors which is expressly forbidden by law.
It would seem that there is some fault in the logic which can achieve so startling a result, and the fault, I think, is not far to seek. It consists in assuming as the basis of the argument that the corporation can surrender or cancel one of the guaranty notes without observing the conditions prescribed by the act. I think, on the contrary, that any such attempt would be clearly ultra vires, void, and nugatory. The corporation might cancel and surrender the note, but the act, being forbidden by law, would be of no legal efficacy. The maker of the note would remain liable, notwithstanding the attempted release, and notwithstanding the actual surrender of the paper upon which the note was written. In a suit to enforce payment for the benefit of creditors, or contribution for the benefit of his co-sureties, no court would listen for a moment to the plea that the note had
It is also, in my opinion, a fundamental misconception of the-act of 1866 to suppose that the execution of the guaranty notes created the ordinary relation of surety and obligee between the makers and the corporation. They were sureties for the corporation, not to it; and the notes, though payable to- the corporation, were held—or if collected, the proceeds were held—for the benefit of the policy-holders and other creditors. The corporation, as to the notes, was a trustee for the benefit of others; and even if there had been no express statutory inhibition, the makers of the notes, knowing the fiduciary capacity in which the corporation held them, would have been guilty of a fraud in withdrawing them, and could not thereby have avoided their liabilhy to the beneficiaries.
Another distinction between these guarantors and ordinary sureties is that they were not gratuitous obligors. They were,
As to the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action, there can be no doubt upon that point, if the assignee in insolvency could have maintained it.. His vendor purchased the note at a sale made by the assignee in pursuance of an order of court, and whatever title and right of action the assignee had passed to- the plaintiff. The assignee represented the interest of all creditors of the corporation. It was his right and his duty to collect these notes, or under the order of the court to sell them, and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the company’s debts. His vendee stands in his shoes, and in enforcing the obligation is-just as much a representative of the creditors as the assignee would have been if, instead of selling the note, he had sued upon it.
If the foregoing views are correct, the decision in this case is rested upon principles which will constitute a very inconvenient precedent in future controversies, and for that reason it ought to be reconsidered. It may be that upon some of the other grounds urged by counsel for appellant in their briefs a reversal of the judgment and order of the superior court would be necessary, but as these matters have not been adverted to by the court, it would be idle for me to discuss them.
Temple, J., concurred in the dissenting opinion.
Cases cited
- Morrow v. Superior Court 64 Cal. 383 p. 46
- In re California Mutual Life Insurance 81 Cal. 364 p. 46
- Miller v. Stewart 9 Wheat. 680 at 702, 703 p. 46
- Sichel v. De Carrillo 42 Cal. 493 p. 49