Majority
Headnote
Criminal Law—Assault with Deadly Weapon with Intent to Murder-Instructions as to Verdict—Presumption.—Where the evidence upon a charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder fully showed such assault with intent to take life, and the only question rejated to a controversy as to whether the assault was without provocation or was in self-defense, an instruction that the jury might find a verdict of guilty of a simple assault would be unwarranted. An instruction to the effect that the verdict must be either guilty of the charge made, or guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon, or not guilty was proper and not harmful to the defendant, since if he were guilty of a simple assault only, he must be acquitted; and it must be presumed that they heeded the instruction, and discharged their duty thereunder.The defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to murder, and two previous convictions, one of burglary in the second degree, under the name of Theodore Mendez, the other of petit larceny, under the name of Frank Deas. He confessed the previous convictions, and was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to ten years in the state prison.
1. For a reversal, the defendant contends, first, that the court erred in instructing the jury that their verdict must be either guilty of assault with intent to murder, guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, or not guilty, and that the court should have instructed the jury that they might return a verdict finding the defendant guilty of assault.
The defendant, as a witness, testified, in substance, that he cut the. prosecuting witness with his ‘ ‘ little knife, ’ ’ but claimed that he did so in self-defense, and testified to facts in support of that theory. There is no conflict in the evidence showing that the cutting done by defendant with his “little knife ” was of a very serious and dangerous character. The prosecuting witness’s face was laid open to the bone, with
Again, the instruction complained of was not harmful to the defendant. The jury were fully instructed as to the ingredients of the offense of an assault with intent to murder and of an assault with a deadly weapon, and were then, in effect, told that if they were not satisfied that defendant was guilty of one of these offenses they must acquit him altogether. It will be presumed that they heeded this instruction and performed their whole duty in accordance with it. If they had not been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of either of the higher crimes, but were satisfied that he was guilty of assault, under the instructions they would have acquitted him. The error, then, if any was committed, was favorable to defendant, and the ease should not be reversed on account of it.
2. Counsel for appellant is mistaken in his assumption that the trial judge excluded from the consideration of the jury the question as to the deadly character of the weapon used. The jury were instructed as follows: “A deadly weapon is one likely to produce death or great bodily injury. As to whether an instrument or weapon alleged to be a deadly weapon is in fact such, is for the jury to determine from all the evidence in the case, considered in connection with the definition of a deadly weapon as given by the court.”
The judgment and order denying a new trial should be affirmed.
Smith, C., and Cooper, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.
McFarland. J., Temple, J., Henshaw, J.
Cases cited
- People v. McNutt 93 Cal. 658 p. 25
- People v. Guidice 73 Cal. 226 p. 25