Huddleston v. Washington

Plaintiff’s action was to recover from defendant Harriet Washington one half of the taxes paid by plaintiff on certain real property in the city of Los Angeles. Plaintiff had judgment, from which and from the order denying their motion for a new trial defendants appeal.

The court found the following facts: Defendants are husband and wife, and the husband is joined for that reason only; that plaintiff is the owner in fee of the south half of lot 3, block 7, Ord’s Addition, fronting sixty feet on Spring Street; defendant Harriet Washington owns a life estate in the north half of the lot, and the remainder is owned by plaintiff; a building constituting three storerooms, with a common entrance in the house to the second story, occupies the entire frontage, there being a difference in the value of the north and south half of the lot of $900. The entire lot was assessed to plaintiff for the year 1899, and the tax levy amounted to $1,556.76; the first installment thereof became due the second Monday of October, 1899, and delinquent the last Monday in November, 1899, and if not then paid a penalty of fifteen per cent would attach. Prior to said last-mentioned time plaintiff requested defendant Harriet to pay one half of said tax, but she neglected and refused to do so, and to prevent the said tax from becoming delinquent plaintiff was compelled, and did, on November 27, 1899, pay all said first installment,—to wit, $778.18. Because of the un

As conclusions of law, the court found “that defendant Harriet is indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $376.18, with interest from November 27, 1899; that said payment by plaintiff was not voluntary, but she was compelled to make said payment in order to prevent the taxes on her own property from becoming delinquent; that- she was the owner of the-estate in remainder of the property in which said Harriet owned said life estate; that plaintiff is entitled to judgment for said sum, and that said judgment shall be a lien upon the-said life estate of said defendant Harriet Washington, and that said judgment shall provide that said property may be-sold to satisfy said amount.” Judgment was so entered.

Appellants challenge most of the findings of fact as not supported by the evidence; that the judgment is against law and unsupported by the evidence. Appellants contend that; the payment by plaintiff was voluntary and unauthorized; that plaintiff officiously interfered with defendants’ property and caused it to be assessed with plaintiff’s, and is estopped;

It appears from the undisputed evidence that the property came to plaintiff and defendant Harriet by devise of Biddy Mason, their mother, and prior to 1899 the assessment was made to the heirs of Biddy Mason, and each paid one half, except in 1898. It was so assessed as one piece of property in 1898, and at the time the assessment was made for 1899 a suit was pending between the parties to compel defendant Harriet to pay her share of the second installment of taxes for that year. Defendant Washington, husband and agent of his wife in respect of the property, testified that in April, 1899, he had a conversation with R. C. Owens, son and also the acknowledged agent of plaintiff, in which Washington told Owens that he “did not want his mother to interfere with the property of Mrs. Washington,” and that “he did not want his mother nor himself to have anything further to do with the property, and to let the taxes alone and we would pay our taxes. ’ ’ In May following this conversation plaintiff returned the lot to the assessor, under the usual form and oath, as her own property, and caused the entire interest to be assessed to her for 1899. Several days before the first installment became due Owens saw Washington and told birn the taxes ought to be paid, and asked him to pay half of the amount due. Owens testified: “He told me he. would see about it; that he did not know what he would do about the taxes.” The taxes were paid by Owens the day before they became delinquent, and he testified that Washington was present and saw him make the payment, and “that he made no objection and did not offer to pay his part ... or anything on the .part of his wife.” Plaintiff testified that she decided “to have all the property assessed to” herself “as the property before that was assessed to the heirs of Biddy Mason.” She further testified: “Neither Mrs. Washington nor any one else ever requested me to have her portion of the property assessed in my name, nor to pay the taxes on the same.” It

1. The action was for money paid by plaintiff to the use and benefit of defendant—an action at law pure and simple. We know of no statute or principle of law that would entitle plaintiff to a judgment decreeing a lien on the property, and that it be sold to pay the judgment. Like any other money judgment, it became a lien on the property, and could be enforced in the usual way, by execution, but not otherwise.

2. The remaining question, when reduced to its simplest form, is: Can A, a remainder-man, voluntarily cause the property of B, the owner of the life estate, to be assessed to him (A), pay the taxes thereon without the authority of B before they become delinquent, and have his action at law to recover the amount from B as for money paid to his use and benefit? In answering the question it may be admitted that it is the duty of the life tenant to pay the taxes (Civ. Code, see. 840); and if he fails, and they become delinquent, and the property is about to be sold, thus endangering the remainder-man’s estate, the latter may invoke the aid of a court of equity to have the rents applied to the protection of the property. (2 Desty on Taxes, p. 938, and cases cited.) Such is not the case here. The tenant in remainder voluntarily chose to have the property assessed to her against the wish of the tenant for life and without her authority, and before the taxes became delinquent she paid them. There was neither compulsion nor duress here, as the law regards compulsion, and if it can be said, as the court found, that she paid the taxes to prevent the penalty from attaching, it was the result of her own unwarranted and officious inter

We recommend that the judgment and order be reversed.

Gray, C., and Haynes, C., concurred.

For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order are reversed.

Harrison, J., Garoutte, J., Van Dyke, J.

Hearing in Bank denied.

Beatty, C. J., dissented from the order denying a hearing in Bank.