Baird v. Monroe

This is an action to quiet title to certain real property, described in the complaint as lot five in block “K” of the Pellissier tract in the city and county of Los Angeles, state of California, as per map recorded in book 15, page 70, miscellaneous records of said county. Defendant Harlan had judgment, and plaintiff appeals from such judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff’s testator was the owner of the land involved at the time of his death, January 7, 1899, and his estate is still the owner thereof unless title has been divested by either of two deeds. The first of these is a tax-deed from the tax-collector of Los Angeles County to the state of California of date July 6, 1900, for state and county taxes for the year 1894, followed by a deed from the tax-collector, dated July 20, 1901, purporting to have been made upon the authorization of the state controller, to one Monroe, whose title is vested in defendant Harlan. The second deed is a deed dated July 24, 1903, from the street superintendent of the city of Los Angeles to defendant Harlan, based on an assessment for the opening and widening of Pico Street in said city.

It appears that the street superintendent’s deed was made in proceedings for the opening and widening of Pico Street, under and in accord with the general law of March 6, 1889, (Stats. 1889, p. 70,) instead of under and in accord with the

The question then is as to the validity of the tax-deed.

1. The sale to the state was made July 3, 1895, under the provisions of section 3771 of the Political Code, as amended March 28, 1895, (Stats. 1895, p. 327,) requiring the sale to the state by the tax-collector of all property delinquent for taxes. The deed to the state was made July 6, 1900, under section 3785 of the Political Code, as amended March 28,1895, (Stats. 1895, p. 328). That section provided: “If the property is not redeemed within the time allowed by law for its redemption, the tax-collector, or his successor in office, must make the state a deed of the property, reciting in such deed the name of the person assessed (when known), the date of sale, a description of the land sold, the amount for which it was sold, that it was sold for delinquent taxes, giving the assessed value and the year of assessment, the time when the right of redemption had expired, and that no person has redeemed the property in the time allowed by law for its redemption.” Section 3780 of the Political Code provided that a redemption might be made “within five years from the date of the sale to the state, or at any time prior to the entry or sale of said land by the state.” The tax-collector’s deed to the state did not recite in terms “the time when the right of redemption had expired,” but did recite “the date of sale,” and further: “And whereas no person has redeemed the property aforesaid within the time allowed by law for its redemption; . . . and whereas, the time for redeeming said property has expired, and the same has not been redeemed, nor any part thereof.” The recital as to what the certificate of sale stated as to when the purchaser would be entitled to. a deed, we regard as immaterial in this connection. As we have seen, section 3785 of the Political Code requires in the deed not only a recital of “the date of sale,” and a recital that “no person has redeemed the property in the time allowed by law,” but also a recital of “the time when the right of redemption had expired,” and the first two recitals thus required cannot be taken as also answering the requirement as to the additional recital

There can be no doubt that it was the well-settled doctrine in this state prior to the amendment of our tax-laws providing that all property delinquent for taxes shall be declared sold to the state for the taxes and penalties due, instead of to the best bidder at public auction, that a tax-deed not containing any recital required by law was void. (See Grimm v. O’Connell, 54 Cal. 522 ; Hubbell v. Campbell, 56 Cal. 527 ; Anderson v. Hancock, 64 Cal. 455 , [ 2 Pac. 31 ]; Hughes v. Cannedy, 92 Cal. 382 , [ 28 Pac. 573 ]; Simmons v. McCarthy, 118 Cal. 622 , [ 50 Pac. 761 ].) The decisions proceed upon the theory that it is competent for the legislature to prescribe the form of instrument which, as the result of a proceeding in invitum, can alone divest the citizen óf his title, and that where the particular form of the tax-deed has been prescribed by statute the form becomes substance, and must be strictly pursued, and it is not for the courts to inquire whether the required recitals are of material facts or otherwise. (Grimm v. O’Connell, 54 Cal. 522 ; Simmons v. McCarthy, 118 Cal. 622 , [ 50 Pac. 761 ].) This may appear to be an extremely technical ruling when applied in the case of such a recital as that here involved. We are unable to see how a recital in the deed to the state as to the date when the right of redemption had expired could be of any substantial benefit to the property-owner, especially where there is a recital as to the date of sale, which, when considered in connection with the law as to the time after a sale when the state will be entitled to a deed, is sufficient to enable any one to determine exactly when the time had expired. The legislature has seen fit, however, to require that the time shall be expressly stated in the deed, and that nothing in that regard shall be left to be determined from one’s knowledge of the law. If the decisions already cited as to the effect of a failure to include in the tax-deed all the recitals required by statute, however immaterial an omitted recital may appear to us, are to be followed, it must be held that the tax-deed in question was originally void.

By act approved February 28, 1903, taking effect immediately, entitled “An act to confirm, validate, and legalize cer

We are fully aware of the rule that a statute should not be construed to operate retroactively, unless the legislative intention that it shall so operate is clearly apparent. (San Francisco Sav. Union v. Reclamation District, 144 Cal. 639 , 647, [ 76 Pac. 374 ], and cases there cited. See, also, State v. Harman, 57 W. Va. 447 , [ 50 S. E. 828 ].) It is impossible to read carefully the statute in question, however, without coming to the conclusion that it was intended to so operate. It is essentially a curative act, intended to give effect to past acts or transactions which are ineffective because of neglect to comply with some requirement of law. No other object for its enactment can reasonably be suggested. If it had been simply intended to dispense with the necessity in future cases of the requirement that the certificate and deed should correctly recite the date when the right of redemption would expire or had expired, the obvious and simple method would have been to amend in those particulars the statute with reference to certificates and deeds, or to simply provide that the' omission to correctly recite such date would not invalidate the certificate or deed. Retaining those provisions in their original form, the legislature, however, enacted this statute, which in every line

The statute by its terms covers the-case before us. At the date of the approval of the act, the deed had been executed to the state, and the defect therein was that it failed to recite any date when the right of redemption had expired. The only question remaining in this connection is as to the power of the legislature to cure such a defect in the manner here attempted. The act of February 28, 1903, is not a “local .or special” law within the meaning of those words as used in section 25 of article IV of our constitution, and is therefore not within the 14th or 18th subdivisions of that section, whereby the legislature is prohibited from passing local or special laws giving effect to invalid deeds, wills, or other instruments, or legalizing, except as against the state, the unauthorized or invalid act of any officer. It applies to all certificates and deeds having the defects stated, and the certificates and deeds constituted a class characterized by such qualities as indicated the propriety of such legislation. (Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476 , 481, [ 98 Am. St. Rep. 73 , 74 Pac. 28 ].) The only remaining objection to the act is that it operates to deprive the property-owner of his property without due process of law. This objection, we are satisfied, is not well founded. Assuming in the discussion of this question, as we must, that the assessment upon which the deed was founded was valid, and that all the requirements of the law relative to the enforcement of the taxes thereunder up to the time of the execution of the deed had been fully complied with, the omission of the tax-collector to insert in the deed the recital in question, though sufficient perhaps under our decisions to render the deed ineffectual as it then stood, was really more in the nature of a mere irregularity, not affecting any substantial right of the property-owner. Under the law requiring that all property delinquent “shall by operation of law and the declaration of the tax-collector be sold to the state” (Pol. Code, sec. 3771), the property, more than five years before the deed, had been sold to the state for the taxes, penalties, and costs due thereon. At the time of the execution of the deed, the five years from the date of sale within which the

2. It is further claimed that the deed was invalid for failure to recite “the amount for which it [the land] was sold” to the state. The objection in this behalf is most technical and wholly without merit. The recital is “was, by operation of law and the declaration of said tax-collector, sold to the state of California, as purchaser, in pursuance -of law in such cases made and provided, to pay said taxes of every kind charged against said property, together with the penalties, costs, and charges due thereon, to wit: the sum of two and 92-100 dollars.” Plaintiff contends that this recital does not show the amount for which the property was sold to the state, but shows only the object of the sale, and the total amount due for taxes, penalties, costs, and charges. As, under the law, there could be a sale to the state only for the 'precise amount so due, it appears very clear that what the legislature intended as to this particular recital was simply

■ 3. The assessment is assailed upon several grounds. The assessment was introduced in evidence. The description of property therein was as follows: “In Los Angeles County, in Pellissier Tr.,” and in the column headed “City and Town Lots,” under the subheading “Lot,” the figure “5,” and under the sub-heading “Block” the letter “K.” No city or town was named, and it does not appear whether or not at the time of the assessment the property was included in any city or town. It was stipulated that a map of the Pellissier tract was recorded in the year 1887 in the recorder’s office of Los Angeles County, and that it showed said lot 5 in block K to be 'fifty-four feet front by one hundred and twenty-one feet deep. The valuation of the property was placed in the column headed “Value of City and Town Lots.” In the assessment the word “Rosedale” was written across the line dividing the column headed “School District” from the column headed “Road District, ’ ’ thus:—

" School District Road District Ros edale

The principal contention against this assessment is that the description of property is insufficient. It is apparent from the face of the assessment that the property assessed is lot 5 in block K in the Pellissier tract in Los Angeles County. Although we are not prepared to commend the abbreviation of the word “tract” to “Tr.,” we think that such abbreviation used in the connection in which it here appears could not be reasonably supposed to indicate, as suggested by plaintiff, either “trustee,” “transcript,” or “treasurer,” or anything else than the word “tract.” The use of abbreviations in assessments appears to be permissible, if thereby the property “may easily be known.” (Rollins v. Woodman, 117 Cal. 516 , 519, [ 49 Pac. 455 ].) Except, therefore, for the reference to the map, we have in the assessment the same description as that contained in plaintiff’s complaint.

The question, then, is as to whether the description here given was1 ‘ sufficient to identify ’ ’ the land. It may be assumed that it was of such a nature as to indicate that it could only be exactly' located by reference to some map or plat, and that as it referred to no such map or plat it did not prima facie sufficiently identify the land (Miller v. Williams, 135 Cal. 183 , [ 67 Pac. 788 ]), as would a description by name, such as “Forks House Ranch,” or a description such aa “house and lot on the north side of Main Street, Michigan

It was, however, permissible to show, in aid of this description, that it was in fact sufficient to identify the land, and, in this behalf, to show the recorded map of such Pellissier tract, designating with certainty the property referred to in the assessment. If by such evidence it was made to appear that there was such a recorded map, and only one such map, or, if more than one, no difference therein so far as the assessed property was concerned, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conclusion that the assessment sufficiently identified the property. The trial court had the right to assume, in the absence of a showing to the contrary by the person assailing the description, that there was hut one Pellissier tract in the county of Los Angeles, and that this tract and the extent of its boundaries were well known by that name. (People v. Leet, 23 Cal. 161 .)

The rules which should be applied in determining the question as to the sufficiency of a description in an assessment are most elaborately and clearly stated in the opinion in Best v. Wohlford, 144 Cal. 733 , [ 78 Pac. 293 ], the most recent expression of this court upon the subject. It is true that such case involved a question as to the sufficiency of the description of lands outside of a city or town, made under a provision similar to subdivision 2 of section 3650 of the Political Code, but there is no material difference between-that case and this, so far as the question under discussion is concerned. The question there was, as here, as to the sufficiency of the assessment description to identify the property. The description' there was in an irrigation district assessment, and, so far as material to the question we are discussing, was, “Lot four (4) block one hundred seventy-eignt (178) 14.42 acres, Rancho Rincon del Diablo,” which rancho was shown to constitute the.whole irrigation district. No map of said rancho was referred to in the assessment or collector’s deed. The judgment against the claimants under the tax-deed was reversed because the trial court had refused to allow proof

It is said in Best v. Wohlford, 144 Cal. 733 , [ 78 Pac. 293 ], that the provision in the law that the description must be “sufficient to identify” the property implies that evidence may be received, not for the purpose of helping out a defective description, or to show the intention with which it was made, or to resolve an ambiguity in its terms,—none of which things can be done,—but to show the sufficiency of the description and apply the description given to the surface of the earth; and further, that the question as to whether the description is sufficient to identify the land is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence presented upon that issue. The .court further said: “The designation of a tract of land as a portion of a larger tract by number and block, without any reference to a map, may be sufficient to identify it, and if so the omission to refer to a map is not fatal to the description.

The other objections to the assessment require very little notice. It is urged that the name of the 'city or town wherein the property is situated is not stated, as required by subdivision 3 of section 3650 of the Political Code, although the lot is assessed and valued under the head of “city and town lots. ’ ’ But the naming of the city or town is absolutely essential to the validity of the assessment only when the special mode of assessment prescribed by that subdivision is followed —viz. where only the number of the lot and block, according to the system of numbering in the city or town, is given. While the name of the city or.town might advantageously be given in assessments under subdivision 2 of section 3650, it is not essential if the description otherwise sufficiently identifies the property sought to be charged. It is also claimed that the assessment does not show in separate columns “the school, road, and other revenue districts in which each piece of property assessed is situated, ’ ’ as required by subdivision 13 of section 3650 of the Political Code. We have already stated the facts in this regard, and they, in our judgment, show a substantial compliance with this provision, indicating “Rosedale” as the" name of both road and school district. In Knott v.

, It is practically admitted that if the title of plaintiff’s intestate passed to the state by virtue of the tax proceedings, defendant Harlan has regularly succeeded thereto. We are satisfied that such must be held to be the effect of those proceedings, and that the conclusion of the trial court was correct.

The judgment and order are affirmed.

Shaw, J., McFarland, J., Henshaw, J., Lorigan, J., Sloss, J., and Beatty, C. J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.