Reclamation Dist. No. 70 v. Birks

This is an action by plaintiff against a property-owner within the district, to collect an assessment levied for purposes of reclamation. Reclamation District No. 70 is a legislative creation. It came into existence in 1905, and embraces within its limits Swamp Land District No. 70 and other land which it is alleged was territory of Reclamation District No. 763 (Stats. 1905, p. 717).

Judgment pas^A for plaintiff and the defendant Birks appeals.

Certain of the objections which he presents to the enforce

Tarke and Summy were trustees of Swamp Land District No. 70 (“Old 70”). They were also trustees of plaintiff. Appellant undertook to show that Mr. Peck, the engineer, who presented the report and plan of the proposed reclamation operations of plaintiff, was appointed by these trustees; that part of this proposed plan was the payment of eighteen thousand dollars for the rights of way and levees belonging to Old 70; that the board of supervisors having no power to reject, revise, or modify such proposed plan (Pol. Code, sec. 3455; Reclamation District 535 v. Clark, 155 Cal. 345 , [ 100 Pac. 1091 ,]) were compelled to and did adopt the plan which thus embraced an assessment of eighteen thousand dollars for the purchase of this property belonging to Old 70; that Messrs. Tarke and Summy were owners of warrants issued by Old 70 to the amount of many thousands of dollars; that the purpose of the provision for the purchase of the property of Old 70 for eighteen thousand dollars was to enable Messrs. Tarke and Summy to secure the payments of their warrants issued by Old 70, the validity of which was in question and doubtful; that these trustees of Old 70 fixed the price at which the property of Old 70 would be sold by Old 70 to plaintiff, and that these trustees constituted a majority of the board of trustees of Old 70 which was to sell, and of plaintiff which was to purchase; that in furtherance of their design, when the assessment was levied by plaintiff, these trustees surrendered the warrants of Old 70 held by them and received therefor warrants of plaintiff, the exchange being made through their own action as trustees of plaintiff. In addition, appellant sought to show further direct and pecuniary interest upon the part of the trustees Tarke and Summy by establishing that they had deeded rights of way to the plaintiff, for which rights of way they were to be paid by moneys raised under the assess

But this discussion need not be elaborated, for the reason that, regardless of the disqualification of the trustees in fixing the price and attempting to purchase the properties of Old 70, the assessment is invalid, because by the assessment a lien was imposed upon the lands of appellant within plaintiff district for the purpose of' purchasing property which was owned by the district and could not therefore be bought. In People v. Sacramento Drainage District, 155 Cal. 373 , [ 103 Pac. 207 ], the question of the political character of these reclamation districts is discussed in the light of the former decisions of this court, and it is held that they are, in strictness, not cor- . porations at all, but quasi corporations, “rather governmental agencies to carry out a specific purpose, the agency ceasing with

In the case of reclamation districts, the operation of this rule of law works no individual hardship. If the reclamation work which Old 70 did was of value before its absorption into the new district, it became of no less value by the change of management. The property-owners of Old 70 are still receiving all the benefits which may follow the works of reclamation which they constructed, and it is but just that they should be called upon to do what originally they undertook to do,— namely, to pay for those works. Upon the other hand, it would be most manifestly unjust, if not illegal, to impose upon all of the land of the new district the cost of the reclamation works which had been constructed by the old district. The old district -forms but a part of the territory of the new. district. Much of the land of the new district could not be benefited by the reclamation works of the old district, and to declare that the debt of the old district was a debt of the new, or to do, in effect the same thing as the trustees here undertook to do, by purchasing the property of-the old district, would result in imposing a lien upon lands under the guise of special benefits, which lands could, in the very nature of things, receive no benefit from the work. To illustrate: Conceive the case where a reclamation district has incurred an indebtedness for reclamation works which have proved inefficient and abortive ;• the debt remains, and the work is entirely without benefit, even to the district vfiiich ordered it. If by the creation of a new district, embracing the territory of the old, it were sought to be held that the debts oji the old district, by operation of law, became the debts of the new, it would result in imposing a pro rata proportion of that debt upon land never within the scheme of reclamation when the debt was incurred—land which was not in fact benefited, and which it was never in contemplation could be benefited. Thus gross wrong would be perpetrated upon property-owners, in absolute violation of the law which justifies the imposition of this species of tax burden solely upon the theory that their land will derive a commensurate amount of benefit from the work for which the assessment is levied.

There is no denial in this of the power of the legislature

While what has heretofore been said results in the necessary determination that the assessment is invalid, in contemplation of another assessment or like assessments, it is proper to notice a contention made touching the invalidity of this assessment, not as a whole, but as levied upon particular tracts of land. By way of illustration, but not in accordance with the precise facts, the question may be thus stated: A owns a tract of land of 500 acres; the assessment is levied upon his whole 500 acres at the rate of three dollars an acre for the benefits to arise from the proposed work. He undertakes to show that of the 500 acres, 100 acres is of high land of such character that it needs no reclamation work of any kind, and consequently cannot be benefited by any reclamation work which may be done within the district. He contends, therefore, that as all of his land has been assessed for benefits at the rate of three dollars an acre, under these circumstances it necessarily results that certain of his lands, being non-assessable because deriving no special benefit, have been unlawfully assessed and an unlawful lien

In answer to this, it may be freely said, and it is a matter much to be deplored, that inequalities and injustices in individual cases do result, and must necessarily result, from the operation of the general scheme of assessments for special benefits adopted in this state. Since the state, itself, can exercise this power to specially tax only, because in theory the moneys raised by the tax will be expended for a direct benefit to the land equal in value to the amount of the tax, it would logically follow that when the proposed improvement is completed and it is apparent that the property has received no benefit from it, the tax itself should fall. In some jurisdictions this is recognized so that the assessment is collected only after the work is completed and the benefits are actually demonstrated. If by inherent defect in the plan, or from similar cause, the work prove abortive and of no benefit, the state bears the burden. But under our system the collection of the assessment for works of problematical value may be enforced in advance of the work itself, and if the work should prove a failure the property-owner is remediless. Many hardships have resulted, and must result, while the prevailing system is in force in this state. But in the particular matter here the subject of inquiry, the injury is apparent rather than real. All of the land within the limits of the reclamation district created by the legislature is conclusively presumed to be land which will be benefited by works of reclamation. In the case of street work the assessment is upon frontage regardless of the depth of the lot. Thus, a man whose lot is of 50 feet frontage and 50 feet depth is assessed as much as the man whose lot has 50 feet frontage and 500 feet depth. So, in the present instance, in the view of the commissioners, A’s land was benefited to the extent of fifteen hundred dollars. They treated this tract of land as a whole and assessed it at three dollars an acre upon 500 acres instead of assessing it for $3.75 an acre upon 400 acres. We do not think the assessment illegal because of the method adopted.

Section 2 of the act creating plaintiff (Stats. 1905, p. 717) provides that “ the management and control of said reclama

No other propositions seem to call for consideration.

The judgment and order appealed from are reversed and the cause remanded for further action.

Melvin, J., and Lorigan, J., concurred.

Hearing in Bank denied.

Beatty, C. J., dissented from the order denying a hearing in Bank.