Ex parte Hadacheck

A writ of habeas corpus was issued by this court on the petition of J. C. Hadaeheck, who alleged that he was held in custody under a complaint charging him with the violation of an ordinance of the city of Los Angeles, adopted in April, 1910, and designated No. 19,989, new series. The validity of the ordinance presents the sole question to be here determined.

By the terms of the enactment, it was declared to be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to establish, conduct, operate, or maintain, or to cause or permit to be established, operated or maintained, any brickyard or brick kiln, or any establishment, factory or place for the manufacture or burning of brick, whether established prior or subsequent to the passage of the ordinance, within a described district or portion of the city of Los Angeles. A violation of any of the provisions of the ordinance was declared to be a misdemeanor. The district to which the prohibition was applied contains about three square miles. The petitioner is the owner of a tract of land containing eight acres, more or less, within the district described in the ordinance. He acquired his land in 1902, before the territory to which the ordinance was directed, had been annexed to the city of Los Angeles. His land contains valuable deposits of clay suitable for the manufacture of brick, and he has, during the entire period of his ownership, used^the land for brickmaking, and has erected thereon kilns, machinery, and buildings necessary for such manufacture. The land, as he alleges, is far more valuable for brickmaking than for any other purpose.

In the Quong Wo case, the business of a public laundry was held to be “of such a nature that it may be confined, in the lawful exercise of the police power, within defined limits in a city or town.” The same rule was applied in Ex parte Montgomery to a lumber yard. It is not to be doubted that establishments for the burning of brick fall equally within the class of occupations which may properly be regulated by restricting the location in which they may be followed. It is immaterial to the particular point under discussion that the conduct of a brickyard is not a nuisance per se. “The police power granted by the constitution is not restricted to the suppression of nuisances. It includes the regulation of the conduct of business, or the use of property, to the end that the public health or morals may not be impaired or endangered.” (Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 152 Cal. 464 , 474, [14 Ann. Cas. 1080, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260 , 93 Pac. 70 ] ; Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal. 326 , [ 49 Am. St. Rep. 93 , 38 L. R. A. 640 , 41 Pac.

The right of the legislature, in the exercise of the police power, to regulate or, in proper cases, to prohibit the conduct of a given business, is not limited by the fact that the value of investments made in the business prior to any legislative

The power to regulate the use of property or the conduct of a business is, of course, not arbitrary. The restriction must bear a reasonable relation to some legitimate purpose within the purview of the police power. The petition in this case contains allegations designed to show that the district affected by the ordinance complained of was of such a character that the maintenance of brickyards therein could not affect the health or comfort of any one. But the respondent has added to his return various affidavits tending to show that the region surrounding petitioner’s brickyard has become.primarily a residential section, and that the occupants of neighboring dwellings are seriously discommoded by the petitioner’s operations. The evidence thus before us, when taken in connection with the presumptions in favor of the propriety of the legislative determination, is certainly sufficient to overcome any contention that the prohibition was a mere arbitrary invasion of private right, not supported by any tenable belief that the continuance of the business in its present location was so detrimental to the interests of others as to require suppression.

Nor does the petition, read in connection with the showing made by and with the return, support a claim that the ordinance was not enacted in good faith as a police measure, but was designed to discriminate against the' plaintiff and the .proprietor of another brickyard within the limited district. It is alleged that the boundaries of the district were fixed by the city council “for the sole and specific purpose of prohibiting and suppressing the operation and maintenance of the brickmaking business of your petitioner,” and of the other brick manufacturer above mentioned. But if such prohibition

The petitioner avers, too, that in other districts of the city there are brickyards which are quite as injurious to their neighbors as is the petitioner’s establishment, and that the council has not prohibited the maintenance of such yards in these other districts. But this presents a question which is peculiarly for the determination of the legislative body. (Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220 , [ 118 Pac. 714 ].) Granted that there are reasons justifying the prohibition of the business within the area described in the ordinance, the city council, and not this court, is the body charged with the duty of deciding whether the conditions in other parts of the city require like prohibition. Without regard to the fact, shown in the return, that brickmaking is prohibited in a district other than that here involved, we are not authorized to enter into an inquiry with a view of determining whether, in our opinion, the prohibition complained of might not, with good reason, have been made more extensive. There is nothing in connection with the averments on this point to sustain the claim that the failure to apply the prohibition to other districts was due to any intent to discriminate against the petitioner. All that is made to appear is that the council did not share petitioner’s opinion that brickmaking in certain other parts of the city was as objectionable as in the district in which petitioner had his establishment.

The case, therefore, is in no way analogous to those in which an ordinance, although, perhaps, fair upon its face, has been set aside because of a showing that it was administered in such a manner as to discriminate unjustly against a particular race (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 , [ 30 L. Ed. 220 , 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064 ]), or because the facts surrounding the adoption of the ordinance showed that its real .purpose was not to protect the public welfare but to deprive a specific

The writ is discharged and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the chief of police of the city of Los Angeles.

Angellotti, J., Shaw, J., Henshaw, J., Lorigan, J., and Melvin, J., concurred.