Majority
Headnote
Negligence—Master and Servant—Failure to Repair Defective Machine—Assumption of Risk—Attempt to Make Repairs.—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries occasioned to an employee while operating a dangerous and defective machine, the defects of which the employer had negligently failed to repair, it is held that the evidence, as matter of law, did not preclude the plaintiff from recovery under the doctrine of the assumption of risk, as the accident occurred after the employer had inspected the machine, had actual knowledge of the defects, and had undertaken to repair it in the very particular which had theretofore made its operation dangerous.Plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries.
The complaint alleged that plaintiff was employed on or about the twenty-fifth day of May, 1910, by defendant in its factory to operate a dangerous and defective machine; that said defect therein—the operation of a lever—was known to the defendant and made it dangerous for plaintiff to work at such machine; that defendant was notified of such defect by plaintiff and asked to repair it, which defendant promised to do; that relying on said promise plaintiff continued to operate such machine; that defendant negligently failed to remedy such defect, and while plaintiff was working at the machine, relying on said promise and without any fault on his part, he was injured thereby by having portions of the fingers' on his right hand cut off.
The answer of the defendant denied all the allegations of the complaint except that plaintiff was employed by defendant ' and the fact that he was injured, and as special defenses defendant set up contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, and also assumption of risk by him.
There was a verdict and judgment thereon in favor of plaintiff for five thousand dollars. A motion of the defendant for a new trial was denied and this appeal is taken by it from both the judgment and the order denying its motion.
The evidence produced on the part of the plaintiff shows that the machine in the operation of which he was injured, was a second-hand one when it was installed in the factory of the defendant. It was designed for the manufacture of sausages, and is constructed of steel and operated by steam. It has a steel bucket sixteen inches in diameter and about two feet deep into which the operator places the sausage meat. Into this bucket, when the machine is in actual operation in the manufacture of sausages, works a close-fitting plate or head which presses down upon the ground meat in the bucket and forces it through a spigot into the sausage casing. This plate or head is on the end of a piston which is within the steam cylinder and its operation is controlled by means of a lever. Frequently during the day it is necessary to open the machine so that the bucket may be replenished with meat, and it is equally necessary for the operator daily at the close of work on the machine to open it and clean out the bucket. The ma
Many times before plaintiff was put to operating this machine it had gotten out of order and repairs had been made on it by defendant. It was out of order in the same particulars that had necessitated the previous repairs when plaintiff was put in charge of it. Bolts were loose and the steam box needed packing. As a result of this the machine leaked steam a great deal. It was further defective as to the operation of the lever. As originally constructed and when in good working order the lever when fully raised was designed to be kept up by steam pressure. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff shows that when plaintiff commenced working on it this machine was defective as to the operation of the lever and this proceeded from the fact that there was such a leakage of steam from the steam box that at times no sufficient steam pressure would be exerted on the lever to keep it up. When lifted to its full height it would sometimes remain up, sometimes fall slowly and sometimes suddenly, depending on the degree of steam pressure exerted on it.
Plaintiff was twenty years of age when put in charge of this machine, and had operated it about a month when the accident complained of occurred. During the first week that he operated the machine the lever dropped suddenly once or twice after he had raised it and opened the machine, and on both of these occasions he complained to the foreman about it, who told him that he (the foreman) knew the machine was defective; that he knew that the lever had dropped before and that he would have it fixed. • The foreman thereupon reported its condition to the superintendent, as he had previously done, and was assured that the machine would be repaired right away. No repairs, however, were then made or attempted to
In addition to this showing, made on the part of the plaintiff, he himself testified that he knew while he was operating the machine that when the lever came down the plate or head closed down tight inside the bucket, and that if anything was caught between them it would be crushed; that the lever was just as liable to drop one time as another and that if it dropped and caught his hand he would be hurt, but that he never gave the matter any thought; that “I just took my chance on it; it was just as liable to drop as not”; and that he knew that if it dropped down and caught his hand he would get hurt.
It further appears from the testimony of the foreman that at one time while engaged to operate this machine plaintiff for awhile refused to work on it. Also that on the morning of the accident plaintiff and other employees in the sausage manufacturing room talked about quitting their employment at the end of the week; and that after the accident the employees further talked of doing so. It does not appear when,
These are the main facts presented in the case as made by plaintiff.
Evidence was introduced by defendant tending to show that no complaints of the condition of the lever had been made to defendant while plaintiff was employed on the machine or any promises made to repair it; that the lever was in good working order when plaintiff was injured; that the only complaints made respecting the machine were that it leaked steam and water, and that several weeks previous to the accident the engineer of the defendant had tightened up the machine to prevent it from doing so.
' At the close of the evidence on the part of plaintiff defendant moved for a nonsuit, which was denied, and it now assigns
It is insisted by appellant that this evidence shows that the defective condition of the lever on the machine was known to plaintiff as soon as he commenced to operate it; that he then knew and fully understood and appreciated the danger of injury to him incident on its continued operation in its defective condition; that even if a promise to repair was made, as claimed by plaintiff, he was only warranted in relying on it for a reasonable time, and that time having expired before the accident without such repairs having been made, plaintiff, as a matter of law, in thereafter continuing to operate the machine under these circumstances, assumed the risk of injury, and could not assert any liability upon the part of defendant therefor.
There is no necessity of discussing the general rules of law on the assumption of risk. It may be conceded (though we do not so decide) that up to the time when the defendant, as the evidence on the part of plaintiff shows, actually undertook to repair the defect in the lever, if an injury had occurred to plaintiff, he would be precluded from recovery under the doctrine of assumption of risk. But no injury was suffered by plaintiff during that period. It occurred during the operation of the machine by plaintiff after the defendant had inspected it, had actual knowledge of the defect, and had on the Monday previous to the accident undertaken to repair it in the very particular which had theretofore made its operation dangerous—the falling of the lever. It was the duty of defendant when it undertook to repair the machine to exercise ordinary care in seeing that it was accomplished so that the machine might be thereafter safely used by plaintiff. The engineer of defendant was sent by it to do this very thing, proceeded to do it, and when he had finished working on the machine declared that it was in good order with respect to the operation of the lever. The foreman informed plaintiff to the same effect. Plaintiff had a right, under these assurances of actual repair, to assume that the defect had been cured; that the machine was in good working order and to resume his work on it upon this assumption, and unless he knew that the attempted repairs had not remedied the defect and that
The attack of appellant on the verdict of the jury for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain it, in view of what we have already said, needs little consideration. This attack amounts simply to a further renewal of the points made upon the nonsuit, and is based upon what appellant there claims were the facts conclusively shoyn by the evidence. But', as pointed out in sustaining the ruling on the nonsuit, the evidence did not conclusively establish the facts as appellant claims it did. What the facts were in this respect, as we have said, was a matter for the determination of the jury under the evidence. In returning a verdict for the plaintiff, necessarily the jury found that the defendant undertook to make the repairs to the machine; that plaintiff resumed his work with it on the assumption that such repairs had remedied the defect, as the engineer who made them and the foreman of defendant had told him they had; that the lever did not drop on Tuesday, and that after the repairs plaintiff had no knowledge or notice that such repairs had not removed the defect in the lever until it dropped and he was injured thereby. The evidence in the case was such as to warrant this conclusion and consequently the verdict for plaintiff should not be disturbed.
The correctness of some instructions given by the court to the jury and the modification by the court of certain instructions offered by appellant and given as modified are questioned by appellant. An examination of the instructions attacked discloses nothing which constitutes error in the giving or modification of any of them. They are the usual instructions given in this class of cases, and whatever criticism might be directed against any one of them taken singly, still, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law under which the jury was to settle the issues between the parties.
The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.
Henshaw, J., and Melvin, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.