Majority
Headnote
Workmen’s Compensation Act—Blood Poisoning Following Abrasion op Skin—Proximate Cause op Injuries.—Blood poisoning resulting from a germ infection which entered the body of an employee through an abrasion of the skin accidentally suffered by him in the course of his employment, is an injury of which the accident was the proximate cause, within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.This is an original application to this court, under section 84 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, to review the award of the industrial accident commission directing the petitioner to pay to one Ernest Dreyer the sum of $78.97, and the further sum of $9.37 each week beginning September 17, 1914, until the termination of the disability.
Dreyer was injured while in the employment of the petitioner and in the course of said employment. The only point made against the award is the claim that the accident was not the proximate cause of the disability for which the award was made.
Dreyer was engaged in shaving and painting poles for the petitioner. On July 1, 1914, while at work, he accidentally caught his left hand between one of the poles and another piece of timber thereby bruising the flesh and knocking a small piece of skin off the back of the hand. For the next two days, July 2d and July 3d, he continued his work, but used the other hand only. On the third day the injured hand began to pain him severely. The 4th came on Saturday and
We perceive no merit in the claim that this disability was not proximately caused by the injury and abrasion of the skin. Such results do ensue from such abrasions, and they are brought about by the operation of what are ordinarily considered natural forces, that is, by the intervention of infectious germs usually, or at least frequently, present in the air or on the surface of substances with which any person may come in contact, and which are invisible to the eye and imperceptible to the senses. The accident was the proximate cause of the injury within the definition of the term “proximate cause” as elaborately stated by Justice Henshaw in Merrill v. Los Angeles etc. Co., 158 Cal. 503 , [ 139 Am. St. Rep. 134 , 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 559 , 111 Pac. 534 ]. We need not here repeat the definition or the discussion of the subject given in that opinion. It follows that the award of the commission must be affirmed.
It is, therefore, adjudged that the award of the industrial accident commission herein be affirmed.
Sloss, J., Melvin, J., Lorigan, J., Lawlor, J., and Angellotti, C. J., concurred.
Rehearing denied.