AI-generated from this judgment's text. It can contain errors and is not the official version.
No AI brief yet. Click to generate.
Majority
Headnote
Husband and Wife—Alienation of Husband’s Affections—Action Against Parents of Husband—Evidence.—In this action by a wife against her husband’s parents to recover damages for the alienation by them of her husband’s affections from her, the evidence is held insufficient to sustain the verdict in favor of the wife.Plaintiff sued defendants, who are respectively the father and mother of her husband, to recover damages for the alienation by them of her husband’s affections from her. The charge was that “The defendants willfully, wrongfully, wickedly, unjustly and maliciously contriving and intending to injure plaintiff and deprive her of the affection, support, comfort, fellowship, society, aid and assistance of plaintiff’s husband . . . alienated and destroyed the affection of said Robert Hall, the husband of this plaintiff for this plaintiff, . . . and did willfully, illegally and maliciously entice, abduct and persuade said Robert Hall from plaintiff, whereby plaintiff has wholly lost and has been deprived of the assistance, comfort, fellowship, society, aid and support of said Robert Hall.” Trial was had before a jury, which, returned its verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of ten thousand dollars. From the judgment and from the order of the court denying their motion for a new trial, defendants appeal.
Upon appeal their principal effort is directed to the contention that the evidence is wholly insufficient to justify the verdict, and this effort, it may be said at the outset, is wholly successful. Seldom, indeed, is it that a reviewing court is called upon to consider a verdict such as this, whose evidentiary foundation is airy nothingness, not even the baseless fabric of a vision.
Plaintiff and her husband, Robert Hall, were married in Los Gatos, Santa Clara County, in November, 1906. At the
The separation between the plaintiff and her husband came as indicated in January, 1911. During all of their married life, as the evidence discloses, he had neither neglected his wife nor been unkind to her in any way. He did not drink. His absences from home were only those upon the short business trips made with his father, or when his labors called him away, or when he stopped at his parents’ home to help them before returning to his own. He contributed all of his earnings to the support of his wife and child. He seems to have indulged his wife in every way, and when the separation came, which was in fact her abandonment of him, he “told her to take her own way. I let her have her own way all the time. ’ ’ In January, 1911, she sold the furniture in their home, took this money, and with her child departed, leaving her husband weeping in the house. To the sum which she received from the furniture he added twenty dollars. He went to his parents’ home. She stayed two weeks in the near-by town of Campbells and then went to Capitola, a summer resort on Monterey Bay, and remained there until the middle of the summer. She returned from Capitola to Los Gatos, and in September secured a position as school teacher in the county of Fresno. She went there and taught until the following May. While at Capitola she wrote to her husband, telling him where she was, and he came down to see her for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation. He met with no success. Upon another occasion he asked her to join him and his father in the town of Morgan Hill, where it was proposed to look at ranch property with a view to settling •the young people. She went, remained with her husband one or two nights, but soon left, as “I wanted to get back to Capitola to attend a meeting of the Young Women’s Christian Association that was shortly to convene down there.” A second time her husband visited her at Capitola, but left when she told him that her father was coming to the house. Her parents disliked her husband very much, and she did not want them to know that she communicated with him. She went to Fresno and did not let her husband know where she had gone, nor for many months was he able to learn,
Certain other facts here merit notice. She charges that the malign influence of her husband’s parents was exercised upon him immediately after the marriage and continuously from that time on. Yet she had no differences, no wordy quarrels with the senior Halls during the six months that she lived in their house. Before she went there to live, it will be remembered, she had been teaching school in San Luis Obispo County, and it was while there she read the letters from Mr. Hall, her versions of which have been given. Yet she writes to “Dear Mother Hall” a chatty and affectionate letter which closes with “Lovingly yours.” When she abandoned her husband in 1911 she wrote to him that, “I want to love you again, but it just seems as though I am groping blindly in the dark trying to find something on which to base that love.” In no one of her letters is there even a suggestion that the unhappiness which darkened their marital relations was occasioned because of the loss of the husband’s love for her, still less by reason of the pernicious activities of these defendants directed to that end. One of these letters to her husband, dated October, 1912, contains this sentence: “Robert, I believe just between you and me that our folks, while not meaning to be, are hindering rather than helping us. I say this with all regard to them for they do not realize it, but we ought to realize it and rise above it.” Her explanation of this sentence, written after all of these difficulties, is neither satisfactory nor illuminating. Notwithstanding the fact that she testifies that her parents disliked her husband, she insists that the language “our folks” had exclusive reference to his parents. For the rest, she asserts that this declaration had nothing to do with the “willful, wrongful, wicked and malicious” efforts which her parents-in-law were, she charges, persistently making in their
This ends a fairly complete resume of the evidence in the case, saving that it should be added that upon its trial, while the wife admitted her loss of affection for her husband, he declared his continued love and devotion to her. It is quite plain that if plaintiff had brought this action because of the alienation of her affections from her husband it would stand, so far as the evidence at least goes, upon a much firmer basis than does the one which actually she did bring. For here is a case where, without hesitation, it may be said that the evidence fails to show either an attempt to alienate the husband’s affections or any success for that attempt, if it were actually made. It would be a work of supererogation to dwell at length upon the governing law of cases such as this. It is sufficient to state it briefly, with due reference to the authorities, when at once the utter inadequacy of this evidence will be apparent, if it has not already become so. Actions for damages against parents for the alienation of the affections of their married child from his or her spouse are frequent in the law, and the principles governing the introduction of evidence and the weight to be given it are well
The jury after it retired to deliberate upon its verdict came into court seeking further light upon the law, as shown by the following questions asked of the judge:
“Question by a juror: The question is, Judge, in the event we should award damages, will that be protecting the child; should we award damages would there be compensation, protection for the child; would the child be sure of protection ? That may be entirely foreign to what we are expected to do, but the argument came up. ’ ’
“Another juror: That may be foreign to what we are asked to come here for, but we seem to want to know about it.”
“Another juror: There has been considerable argument; some of the jurors argue one way, some another, and the question came up, provided any damages were awarded to the plaintiff, would the boy be protected by the court in any respect. The supposition was that probably the plaintiff might marry and the boy would lose any protection which we might accord him.”
This transcript from the record affords the only understandable reason for the verdict given. It is but another exemplification of the power which some juries assume of adjusting, without regard to the evidence or issues, the finances of the litigants in accordance with their views. It is another case like that of Driscoll v. Market St. Cable Ry. Co., 97 Cal. 553 , [ 33 Am. St. Rep. 203 , 32 Pac. 591 ], where, as this court said, “a jury catches at a mere semblance or pretense of evidence for the purpose of simply equalizing financial conditions by taking money from one party and giving it to the other without legal cause. ’ ’ But in this case, no more than in that, has this great and, to the jurors, most inexpensive generosity the sanction of the law.
The judgment and order appealed from are therefore reversed.
Melvin, J., and Lorigan, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Codoni v. Donati 6 Cal. App. 83 p. 727
- Cripe v. Cripe 170 Cal. 91 p. 727
- Driscoll v. Market Street Cable Railway 97 Cal. 553 p. 728