Majority
Headnote
Wills—Codicils—Construction of Devise.—In this case where the testator had left a will and nine codicils, the final codicils are construed as changing a devise which the testator had made to his wife from a fee simple to a life estate.This is an appeal from that portion of a decree of distribution which purports to distribute certain real estate in Santa Barbara to the appellant for life. The contention of the appellant is that under the will and codicils of the testator she was entitled to have the said property distributed to her in fee simple. The testator, John G. Kelley, was a resident of Pennsylvania, but maintained a home in Santa Barbara upon the property here in question and where he died on May 29, 1911. He left a will and nine codicils which were admitted to probate in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, on June 28, 1911. Ancillary administration was had in Santa Barbara County for the purpose of disposing of the property there. The decedent left surviving him
“June 25, 1909.
“It is my intention that my wife shall have all I am possessed of during her life, except in case of remarriage when I wish it placed in trust for her free from interference of anyone.’’
On May 26, 1910, he added another codicil which is not material, but on September 2, 1910, he framed his final codicil, which was also holographic, and made, as he states, “to 'clear up any possible misunderstanding.” While it is true that in this codicil the testator had apparently the ultimate disposition of his money uppermost in his mind, he makes use of the following words: “I have made my will providing for a share of my estate to go to Anna K. Hornbrook, but if she has no heirs and should predecease my wife Edith S. Kelley, I do not want a dollar of my money to go to any Hornbrook, but first I expect my wife to have and to hold during her life and then Anna K. Hornbrook, and failing her or her heirs of her body, Edward W. Kelley and his heirs, subject to all the provisions of my will.” We are unable to escape the conclu
This being our conclusion, it follows that the decree of distribution appealed from must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Sloss, J., and Shaw, J., concurred.