Majority
Headnote
[1] Waters and Water Bights—Action to Determine Conflicting Claims—Pleading and Evidence—Title by Adverse Possession.— In an action involving the- respective rights of various persons in the waters of a stream and in a certain ditch by which water is diverted therefrom, the defendants may prove title by adverse possession under the general allegation of ownership, since such an allegation may be supported by proof of ownership acquired by deed, by prescription or in any other lawful manner.The defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The case involves the respective rights of the three parties in the waters of a stream known as Maxwell Creek and in a certain ditch by which water is diverted therefrom. Bach party owns a small parcel of land abutting upon the creek in the outlying limits of Coulterville. Noce’s land is the upper parcel, Cammissiona’s is the next, and that of Garbarino is the lowest upon the stream. The part of Noce’s land for which the water is claimed lies on the northerly side of the creek. The lands of Cammissiona and Garbarino are on the southerly side. The ditch in question is a foot wide at the bottom, eighteen inches wide at the top, and a foot deep. It diverts water from the stream at a dam situated about three-fourths of a mile above the land of Garbarino and about a quarter of a mile above the parcel of Noce. It is wholly on the southerly side of the stream and passes through the parcel of Cammissiona to that of Garbarino. In order to take water therefrom to the Noce land, a cut is made in the ditch so as to let the water run into the bed of the creek from whence it is taken into another ditch, on the northerly side of the creek, to the Noce land. Concerning these facts there is no dispute.
The plaintiff alleged that he is the owner of the entire interest in the ditch and in all the water it carries; that in July, 1916, defendant Noce wrongfully diverted water from the ditch and appropriated the same to his own use and that he threatens to continue to do so. He prays that he be declared to be the owner of the entire interest in the water right and in the ditch and that Noce be restrained from interfering therewith. Mrs. Cammissiona was brought in as a party defendant after the action was begun. The complaint contains no allegation as to her. The question as to her rights is raised, by her answer. The claim of Noce and Mrs. Cammissiona is that the three parties to the suit are equal owners of the ditch and of the right to the water carried therein, as tenants in common, for a certain period of each year. More particularly, their claim is that the right to the common use of the ditch and to the water carried therein begins as soon each
The plaintiff discusses at some length his claim that the defendants cannot prove title by adverse possession under the issues made by the pleadings. The complaint alleges that Garbarino is the owner of the ditch and of the water taken from the creek and flowing therein. The answer of each defendant alleges in general terms the ownership by such defendant of a one-third interest in said ditch and water right consisting of the right to use the same one day in each three days during the irrigating season as above stated. [1] The rule is that such a general allegation may be supported by proof of ownership acquired by deed, by prescription or in any other lawful manner. (Rogers v. Miller, 13 Wash. 82 , [ 52 Am. St. Rep. 20 , 42 Pac. 525 ]; Raymond v. Morrison, 9 Wash. 156 , [ 37 Pac. 318 ]; Cooper v. Blair, 50 Or. 394 , [ 92 Pac. 1074 ]; Gray v. Walker, 157 Cal. 381 , [ 108 Pac. 278 ].)
From this evidence of long-continued, use without interference, if unexplained, the court could have inferred that the use of each party was rightful and adverse and therefrom might have concluded that each had thereby acquired title by prescription to a one-third interest in the water and ditch, as claimed by defendants. But there was other evidence to the contrary. Garbarino also testified that each year during this time the other parties, before beginning to use water from the ditch, asked his permission to do so and that when so asked he gave such permission to each of them to use the ditch and water one day out of each period of three days, that he did this out of friendship and for no other consideration, and that he refused permission in the year 1916 because at that time he needed all the water on his own land. The appellant contends that this testimony is
Other evidence tends to confirm this view. Neither of the defendants introduced any evidence tending to show the acquisition of the right they claim in any other manner than by continuous adverse use under claim of right. There was no direct evidence of the original construction of the ditch, but there was evidence justifying an inference regarding the same. A deed executed on October 6, 1862, for the Garbarino lot by one Comisione to the predecessors in interest of Garbarino, under whom he claims title, purports to convey the lot in question and the “garden thereon,” and it describes the appurtenances thereto as follows: “Two water ditches connected with the garden taken out of Maxwell’s Creek, one opposite of Chinatown and the other below the same, both on the same side of the creek of the garden, made and purchased to supply the garden with water.” It is admitted that the ditch coming out opposite Chinatown is the one now in controversy, although some changes in the place of diversion at the head thereof have been made since that time. A later deed in the chain of title of Garbarino also specifically describes the said ditch as an appurtenance to the lot. None of the deeds in the chain of title of the other lots to the defendants mentions this ditch in any manner. The deed to Noce from Cassacia not only fails to mention the Garbarino
With respect to the Cammissiona lot it further appears from the evidence that water from the ditch was not used on that lot for the period of ten years preceding the beginning of the action. If we assume that by her previous use of tha ditch and water under claim of right for a period of more than five years prior to that time she had acquired the right she claims thereto, the evidence just referred to would show that she subsequently had lost it by disuse. [5] An easement acquired by enjoyment is lost by a disuse thereof for the period of five years. (Civ. Code, sec. 811, subd. 4; Drake Russian River Land Co., 10 Cal. App. 666 , [ 103 Pac. 167 ].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Lennon, J., Wilbur, J., Olney, J., Melvin, J., Angellotti, C. J., and Lawlor, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Gray v. Walker 157 Cal. 381 p. 127
- Weill v. Light 98 Cal. 193 p. 130