Rideout v. City of Los Angeles

The two above-entitled eases are taxpayers’ actions in the nature of equity proceedings to annul two special municipal elections held in the city of Los Angeles on June 3, 1919, and practically take the form of election contests. (Gibson v. Board of Supervisors, 80 Cal. 359 , [ 22 Pac. 225 ].) Being identical in nature and in points raised, the two cases were consolidated for trial. The present appeals are taken by plaintiff from judgments in favor of defendants.

At the special election attacked in the first above-entitled case, the question submitted to the voters involved the authorization of the issuance of bonds to the amount of thirteen million five hundred thousand dollars, for the purpose of raising money to be expended partly in constructing and acquiring works for supplying the city with electricity for light, heat, and power, and partly in purchasing an electric distributing system; the proposition presented at the special election assailed in the second case was that of selling to the Southern California Edison Company, for a period not exceeding fifteen years, surplus electric energy which said city might generate in excess of its own requirements, and

Alleged defects in the form of the ballots are the reasons assigned by appellant for the attempt to obtain the annulment of the special elections. According to the provisions of the Municipal Improvement Act, pursuant to which the bond election was held, that election was governed, in all particulars not recited in the ordinance calling the election, by the law covering and controlling the holding of municipal elections in the municipality. (Gen. Laws 1915, p. 1151.) The power sale election was held pursuant to the charter of Los Angeles (Charter of City of Los Angeles, sec. 2, subd. 4), and was likewise subject to the laws governing the holding of municipal elections. The ordinance calling the elections also expressly stated that the provisions for holding municipal elections applied. The charter of the municipality in question provides that all elections, except as otherwise provided in the charter, shall “be conducted and held in accordance with the provisions of the laws of the State for the holding of general elections in effect at the time.” (Charter of City of Los Angeles, secs. 199, 202.) The form of the special election ballots here under consideration was, therefore, prescribed by section 1197 of the Political Code, which comprises the general law of the state upon the subject.

[1] The omission to print the words “Municipal Ticket” on the back of these ballots and the heaviness of the type and size of the space occupied by the printed instructions to voters are the particulars wherein the special election ballots are claimed to have been defective. Subdivision 6 of

It is appellant’s contention that the fact that the ballots in controversy varied in the particulars stated from the prescribed statutory form in and of itself invalidated the election. [2] It is a primary principle of law as applied to election contests that it is the duty of the court to validate the election if possible. That is to say, the election must be held valid unless plainly illegal. (People v. Prewett, 124 Cal. 7 , [ 56 Pac. 619 ]; State v. Board of Supervisors, 35 N. J. L. 269 , 277.) [3] Accordingly, a distinction has been developed between mandatory and directory provisions in election laws; a violation of a mandatory provision vitiates the election, whereas a departure from a directory provision does not render the election void if there is a substantial observance of the law and no showing that the result of the election has been changed or the rights of the voters injuriously affected by the deviation. (Russell v. McDowell, 83 Cal. 70 , [ 23 Pac. 183 ] ; Tebbe v. Smith, 108 Cal. 101 , [ 49 Am. St. Rep. 68 , 29 L. R. A. 673 , 41 Pac.454].) [4] Whether or not a provision, the observance of which is not expressly declared by law to be essential to the valid

[5] There is no proof of fraudulent intent on the part of the officials having charge of the printing of the ballots in the instant case, and the deficiencies in the ballots under consideration were no more vital than in the instances enumerated. Section 1197 of the Political Code requires that the form prescribed must be “substantially” followed. The words “Municipal Ticket” on the back of the ballot are intended primarily for the convenience of the election officials. Section 1257 of the Political Code provides that, “At

[7] However, while ballots which fail to comply with directory provisions may fulfill legal requirements in the sense that they are not lacking in fundamentals, it may still be true that the departure from the directory provisions was of such a nature that it precluded a considerable number of electors or voters from expressing their will at the polls, thus preventing a free and fair election. If the defects in the ballots actually produced that result, the elections cannot, stand. (Tebbe v. Smith, supra; Dennen v. Jastro, supra.) Appellant claims that the violations in the instant case were the direct cause of confusing a considerable number of electors so that they refrained from voting.

[8] We do not think the violations of the directory provisions were so gross or radical as to give rise to a presumption of unfairness. (Atkinson v. Lorbeer, 111 Cal. 419 , [ 44 Pac. 162 ].) The burden was, therefore, upon appellant to

[9] Furthermore, still considering the question of confusion, there was no direct evidence that the defects in the ballots complained of were the cause of the misunderstanding of some of the electors. As previously stated, three bal

The judgment is affirmed.

Sloane, J., Olney, J., Shaw, J., Wilbur, J., Angellotti, C. J., and Lawlor, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.

All the Justices concurred;