p. 22could get dear, and most of the damage was caused by their grinding one against the other. We shouted to the Carib to give chain and drop astern; but they had no hands and no chain. Had there been a crew on board the Carib, the damage would not have been so great.
J. Naglee. One of the arbitrators, who awarded $1700 for the damages. The Carib had not sufficient chain. She should have had at least 90 fathoms. It appears she had only 65, which was all out; so that she could not pay out to avoid collision. The witness being asked, whether the captain of the Edward, on examination before the arbitrators, admitted that his ship was placed too near the Carib. The defendants objected that it was not admissible to show what the parties said before the arbitrators, and the court sustained the objection.
Boyd, the captain of the Edward, was then called by the plaintiffs, and testified that his co-defendant was owner of the Edward. Being then examined for the defence, he testified that there was no carelessness on board the Edward; that finding.the collision pending, and no crew on board the Carib, he and some of his men went on board to veer out her chain, but could find none. Had there been hands on board the Carib, and 15 or 20 fathoms of chain to veer out, no damage would have been done. I arrived in port on Saturday; went to the harbour master on Monday, when he assigned me a berth at Rincon Point; and I engaged men to assist in moving. The collision took place that evening. We set several sails to avoid the collision by trying to stem the tide. The Carib’s yards were square, and her jib and flying jib boom rigged out.
The Court found for the plaintiffs, and assessed the damages at $1500; and judgment was rendered accordingly.
Burritt and Musson for the appellants, made the following points.
1st. In cases of collision, the plaintiff cannot recover unless he proves that it was caused by the fault of the defendant, without any fault in the plaintiff. 1 Conk. Adm. 300; Abb. on Ship. 238; Story on Bailm. sec. 605; 1 Moody & Mai. 169; 4 Carr. & P. 106; 5 Ib. 421; 2 Hagg. 360; 19 Wend. 399 ; 8 Law Rep. 275 ; 6 Whart. 811 . 2d. The omission to comply with the port regulations raises a presumption of carelessness, ..and throws on the plaintiff the burthen of proving that the col
p. 23lision was not caused by such omission. 6 Law Rep. 117 . 3d. Where a proper pilot is on board, and has charge of the vessel, the owner is not answerable for a collision. 1 Robin. 56; 2 Hagg. 183; Abb. on Ship. 205. 4th. The owner and master were improperly joined as defendants. 5th. The Court erred in overruling the motion to dissolve the attachment.A. Wells, for the respondents.
1st. There was evidence at least tending to show negligence on the part of the defendant’s vessel; and the decision of the Court, sitting as a jury, cannot be disturbed. 2d. The jib-boom of the Carib being out, did not produce the collision; and it is no answer to the action that the damages would have been less, had the boom been in. 38 Eng. C. L. 263, and note. The question is, could the plaintiff, by ordinary care, have prevented the collision; Sill v. Brown, ib. 245; Lock v. Seward, 19 ib. 299; Smith v. Dobson, 3 M. & Grang, 58; Duggart v. Bradley, 8 Wendell. 3d. Having a pilot on board does not exonerate the owner. Abb. on Ship. 230, notes.delivered the opinion of the Court. This case was tried by the judge below without a jury. The main point on which the appellants rely for reversing the judgment, is based upon the ground that the judgment of the Court is not Warranted by the evidence. It has been heretofore decided, that where there was any conflict in the evidence, the appellate Court would not review the facts of a case. Hoppe v. Robb. We not only affirm that decision, but will also decline to review the facts of a case unless the assignment of errors shews that the Court below refused an application for a new trial, made on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence;—and that only because the statute gives an appeal from the refusal of a new trial. In all cases where the judge below tries the facts of a case, the proper mode of reserving the questions of law arising upon the facts, is to ask the Court to decide the law as counsel may desire; and upon a refusal, to have it noted in the bill of exceptions.
In this case, even if the facts as shewn by the record were properly before us for revision, we could not disturb the judgment. We affirm the principle insisted on by the ■ appellant,
p. 24that in a case of collision, the plaintiff must be faultless. We also concede that the regulations instituted by the harbour master under the authority of the statute, are of binding efficacy, and form part of the law of the state. But, nevertheless, we think it sufficiently appears from the evidence, that the neglect of the plaintiffs to observe the rule which required his jib and flying jib booms to be rigged in, was not the cause of the collision. It may have increased the injury; and we must presume that it was so considered by the Court below in assessing the damages, especially as the record does not shew the contrary.
When a vessel is properly in charge of a licensed pilot, the owner is not liable for damages which may ensue from the negligence or misconduct of the pilot. Under our statute, however, the responsibility of taking a position, or berth, for a vessel in port, rests upon the master of the vessel, or upon the harbour master; and therefore the owner is not exempt from liability for injuries committed by taking an improper berth, although such berth may have been selected by the pilot who brought the vessel into port.
There remains but one other point to consider. It seems that,' pending the proceedings in this cause, an attachment was sued out by the plaintiffs below, which was levied on the property of the defendants. A motion was made to dissolve the attachment, which was refused by the Court below; and this refusal is assigned as error. The process of attachment is the creature of statute. It is a remedy only given in cases of indebtedness arising upon contract; and in this case, the resort to it was a gross abuse of that process, and this court must extend to it the remedy which the District Court refused.
The order refusing to dissolve the attachment is reversed, and judgment is here rendered dissolving the attachment. The final judgment of the Court below is affirmed.