Majority
Headnote
[l] Statute op Limitations—Acknowledgment op Debt—Section 360, Code op Civil Procedure.—An acknowledgment of a debt, sufficient to take it out of the statute of limitations, under seeAction against an estate to recover for services claimed to have been rendered by plaintiff at the special instance and request of the deceased. There were two demands set up in the fourth amended complaint under which the proceedings involved herein were had. One was for services rendered between the years 1866 and 1876 and the other for services rendered prior to the year 1894. For the purpose of avoiding the statute of limitations, plaintiff set forth in his said pleading a letter dated February 20, 1920, alleged to have been written from San Diego, California, by deceased to plaintiff, who was his brother, which letter contained the following statement: “Now, Andrew, we have been wondering if there was anything that we had or had not done, or if there was anything that had been written that was displeasing to you. We sincerely hope not. Surely there was nothing of the kind ever intended, for you and our brother Lafagat, long since passed on, are the only persons that were of any real assistance to us in my struggle which came on at and after the death of our father, and
In the letter written by deceased to his brother there is no direct unqualified admission of any debt. He refers to certain “assistance” rendered by the plaintiff and his brother, and expresses an intention on his part sooner or later that plaintiff be repaid. There is no admission or statement as to the nature of the assistance rendered and whether or not it resulted in any obligation of a financial nature due from the deceased. It is just as reasonable to suppose that this assistance consisted of certain acts of kindness or helpfulness which the brothers had rendered to the deceased during his struggle after their father’s death and which the latter at some time intended to repay. Appellant contends that where the acknowledgment is uncertain as to the particular indebtedness to which it refers parol evidence is admissible to explain this uncertainty and to identify the indebtedness intended to be acknowledged. We may concede this to be true, but when the acknowledgment contains no mention of any indebtedness whatever, we know of no authority, and appellant has called our attention to none, which will permit the introduction of parol evidence to alter the terms of the acknowledgment or vary its meaning and thereby import into it something not otherwise contained therein. The amount of the indebtedness claimed by plain-
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- McCormick v. Brown 36 Cal. 180 p. 600
- Powell v. Petch 166 Cal. 329 at 331 p. 600
- Clunin v. First Federal Trust Co. 189 Cal. 248 at 252 p. 600