Majority
Prior to October 20, 1920, the plaintiff was a partner to the extent of a one-eighth interest in the partnership of Otis, McAllister & Co. The other partners, to wit, the defendants Otis and Bee, desired the plaintiff to retire from the partnership, to which the plaintiff consented. To that end the plaintiff entered into an assignment and retirement agreement with the defendants under date of
The foregoing agreement was signed by the plaintiff and all of the defendants individually and by Otis and Bee on account of the partnership.
Three counts are set forth in the complaint. The first count alleges the execution of the contract of October 20, 1920; that the said agreement was executed at the request of the defendants upon representations by and promises of the defendants and each of them that the books of the partnership would be closed as of December 31, 1920, in the usual manner and that the value of the assets, including the value of the accounts, accounts receivable, and the profits for the year 1920 be determined as of the thirty-first day of December, 1920, properly and accurately and in the
The second cause of action, in addition to the allegations of the first count, averred that the defendants had entered into a conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining the sum of $60,000 due him as his share of the profits. The third cause of action, also in addition to the allegations of the first count, set forth that the defendants and each of them had failed, refused, and neglected to make an accounting to the plaintiff as agreed and that the defendant Nich-. olas L. B. Gravem had failed, refused, and neglected to obtain an accounting from the partnership, in violation of his agreement with the plaintiff.
A general and special demurrer was interposed to the complaint and was overruled. The defendant answered separately, denying generally the allegations of the complaint and setting forth in haec veria the contract of October 20, 1920. No affidavit was filed denying the due execution of the contract. The cause came on regularly for trial, whereupon the plaintiff called the defendant Otis as his first witness under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendants objected to the examination of the witness as to the condition of the affairs of the partnership during the year 1920 on the ground that under the agreement of October 20, 1920, on which all parties were relying, the plaintiff had assigned all of his interest in and to the assets and business of the partnership to his defend
The error of the trial court was in concluding that, under the contract of October 20, 1920, the plaintiff had made an unqualified assignment of all of his interest in the property and business of the partnership, including his right as a retiring partner to an accounting. An inspection of the contract discloses that such was not the case. On the contrary the plaintiff assigned his interest in the partnership upon the condition and with the qualification that an accounting be had in the usual manner at the end of the year 1920 and the profits to which he should be entitled be paid to the defendant brother. All of the defendants and the partnership itself agreed to this provisional assignment. It would seem to be quite immaterial that in this instance the profits to which the plaintiff might be entitled should be paid to the plaintiff’s brother and that such agreement had been made between the brothers for a disposition of the fund. If the contract had provided that the plaintiff’s share of the profits be paid to a bank or trust company or to any other stranger to the assignment and retirement agreement it would perhaps be clearer that the plaintiff retained a beneficial interest in the partnership profits for the year 1920. The fact that the profits were to be paid to the brother of the plaintiff would lead to no different result. The fair and we think the only reasonable intendment of the agreement was that the plaintiff was not relinquishing his interest in the profits for the year 1920,
After the ruling of the court on the effect of said contract the plaintiff requested permission to amend his complaint to the end that the plaintiff “would not be foreclosed from some remedy.” This the court refused and such refusal is assigned as an abuse of discretion. In view of the fact that the plaintiff would seem to be entitled to all the relief which he seeks under the allegations of his first cause of action, it is deemed unnecessary to pass on this point.
The judgment is reversed.
Richards, J., and Langdon, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.
All the Justices concurred.