Majority
In this cause that portion of the opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson, heretofore rendered by the Honorable District Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District, which contains a statement of the facts and issues involved, as well as its disposition of appellant’s contentions with reference to admissions of alleged prejudicial evidence and insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, has our approval and is hereby adopted as a portion of the opinion of this court herein as follows, to wit:
“This is an appeal from a judgment against the defendant for damages resulting from malpractice in the extracting of a tooth.
“The defendant was a licensed dentist practicing his profession at Modesto. At the request of the plaintiff, W. D. Barham, he extracted the left lower first molar tooth of said plaintiff. For the purpose of the operation a local anesthetic was administered by means of a hypodermic injection of novocaine. The needle was twice inserted in the gum oí the patient at a point over the ramus or ascending prong of the left lower jaw bone near the
“The complaint charged the defendant with negligence in extracting the tooth and in the use of the hypodermic needle which was employed in that operation resulting in an infected jaw and the sustaining of the injuries above referred to. No demurrer to the complaint was filed. Subsequently, upon motion of the plaintiff, and before the trial, over the objection of the defendant, an amendment to the complaint was permitted to be filed charging the defendant with negligence in connection with the extracting of the tooth in ‘thereafter treating and caring for the same.’ This amendment was filed more than a year after the operation had been performed and the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations to this last specific charge of negligence. During the trial evidence respecting the treatment of the jaw, on the part of the defendant, after the tooth had been removed, was adduced over the objection of appellant. Before the conclusion of the trial the court struck this evidence from the record and instructed the jury to disregard it.
“The appellant contends that (1) the admission of evidence regarding improper treatment of the patient after the operation of extracting the tooth had been completed, was prejudicial error in spite of its subsequent elimination from the record, since it constituted a separate cause of action which was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the judgment is not supported by the evidence since there is a total absence of medical expert testimony to the effect that the operation and treatment of the patient in the extracting of the tooth did not conform to the standard accepted method of the profession in that vicinity; (3) the court erred in giving and refusing certain instructions to the jury.
“ Under the original pleadings in this case there was no error in admitting evidence of the defendant’s treatment of the patient immediately after the removal of the tooth.
“ In this case it is apparently the theory of the appellant that the fatal infection did not occur from the use of an unsterile needle or from contaminated fluid used in administering the anesthetic, but that it developed on account of the patient’s tendency to bleed profusely as a result of extracting a tooth. It is claimed he is what the profession commonly terms ‘a bleeder,’ and that the dentist was, therefore, unable to control the hemorrhage. Evidence was adduced to show that during the first day-following the operation the socket from which the molar had been removed was not sterilized or packed with gauze and that this omission left the inflamed and sensitive socket subject to infection from food or foreign matter. Certainly this evidence was competent to" rebut the appellant’s theory of a defense. The evidence is uncontradicted that the defendant did not pretend to treat the patient for a period of time longer than five or six days after the operation was performed. Moreover, he consulted Dr. Morgan regarding the hemorrhage on the day following the operation and Dr. Morgan promptly took charge of this feature of the ease. Aside from the evidence of failure during the first day to pack the socket with sterilized gauze, our attention is called to no evidence of improper treatment on the part of the dentist following the operation. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the court to have stricken this evidence from the record. Moreover, the jury were clearly instructed that they were not permitted to render a verdict against the defendant based upon alleged improper treatment subsequent to the operation of extracting the tooth. The facts of the case of Wetzel v. Pius, 78 Cal. App. 104 , upon which the appellant relies, is readily distinguishable from those of the present case. That case contains nothing which we deem to be in conflict with the foregoing statement of the law.
“The appellant asserts that the evidence is not sufficient to establish negligence on his part because there is no direct testimony that the needle or solution which was used in administering the anesthetic was unsterile; that a dentist,
“ In the present case the record will not support a theory that the infection which caused the injury to Mr. Barham’s jaw, teeth and health originated in the socket from which the tooth was removed. It is'almost uncontradicted that this was not the seat of the infection. This socket and the suppressing of the hemorrhage from that source were the only objects to which the testimony of appellant’s subsequent treatment was directed. The evidence is conclusive of the fact that this socket was not the source of the infection. We must, therefore, assume the dentist was not guilty of negligence in his subsequent treatment of the case. It is true that an unusual loss of blood might so weaken a patient that his lack of resistance would make him more susceptible to infection than one who was in normal condition. A great loss of blood might, therefore, become a remote contributing cause of the infection. But it may not be said the hemorrhage was the proximate cause of the infection. The judgment in this case must be supported, if at all, upon the theory of appellant’s negligence in failing to sterilize his hypodermic needle and the mouth and gum of the patient before performing the operation of extracting the tooth. It is true that both the dentist and his nurse testified that the usual process of sterilization was followed. It is equally true that there is no direct evidence that he failed to sterilize either the needle or the surface of the flesh where it was inserted. Barham
“Under the circumstances of this case there is a remote possibility that the infection developed from some cause other than the defendant’s failure to sterilize the needle or the gum into which it was inserted, but the evidence is sufficient upon which to warrant the jury in finding that it was caused by his negligence in failing to follow these reasonable precautions in spite of his testimony to the contrary. The jurors were entitled to accept the solution to which these circumstances led them in preference, even, to the positive statements of the defendant and his nurse to the contrary. After the verdict of a jury has been fairly rendered, all the circumstances of the ease, together with every reasonable inference which may be drawn therefrom, will be marshaled in support of the judgment. Because of the very subtleness of the origin and development of disease, less certainty is required in proof thereof. As the court says in the case of Dimock v. Miller, 202 Cal. 668 , 671 [ 262 Pac. 311 , 312] :
“ ‘If ... it is necessary to demonstrate conclusively and beyond the possibility of a doubt that the negligence resulted in the injury, it would never be possible to recover in a case of negligence in the practice of a profession which is not an exact science.’
“It is not necessary in the trial of civil cases that the circumstances shall establish the negligence of the defendant as the proximate cause of injury with such absolute certainty as to exclude every other conclusion. It is sufficient if there is substantial evidence upon which to reasonably support the judgment. (Ley v. Bishopp, 88 Cal. App. 313 , 316 [ 263 Pac. 369 ].)
“In this case no question is raised regarding the professional skill of the dentist. It is conceded that he was reasonably learned and skilful in his profession. But it is asserted that he was negligent in failing to sterilize the hypodermic needle and the gum into which he inserted the instrument. There is no conflict regarding the fact that infection of the jaw caused the injuries to Barham. It is conclusive that this infection developed within a few days after the operation on the ramus of the jaw at just the point where the needle was inserted, and not in the socket
In other words, citing numerous authorities in support of the well-known rule that a so-called “formula” instruction must contain all the elements essential to a recovery and the absence of any one of such elements may not be compensated for nor cured by a reference thereto, in other instructions correctly and fully stating the law (Douglas v. Southern Pac. Co., 203 Cal. 390 [ 264 Pac. 237 ], and cases therein cited), appellant urges that the challenged instruction was fatally defective and incapable of being remedied by other portions of the charge in that it definitely instructed the jury, without reference to the remainder of the charge, that plaintiffs were entitled to recover if they found that defendant “used or employed either an unsterile hypodermic needle or solution” which proximately cause the infection from which the injuries resulted, whereas obviously the fluid used as an anesthetic might have been contaminated or unsanitary in spite of reasonable care on the part of the dentist and his nurse or possibly the needle may have communicated disease to the jaw after the usual precautions had been taken to sterilize it.
When the fact is considered, however, that the entire charge given was exhaustive and covered the subject thoroughly and completely, it is inconceivable that any jury could have been misled by the mere omission of these one or two words in said instruction. Both before and after it was given, the jury time and again received a clear and correct exposition of the law applicable in this case. They were specifically instructed that “plaintiffs can recover, it at all, only upon proof of negligence or carelessness” on the part of defendant; that it must appear from the evidence that the injuries sustained “were occasioned by the carelessness or negligence on the part of defendant as charged in the complaint” and numerous other instructions were given to the same effect. The whole field was gone over not once, but many times, and to our mind there is no possibility that any misconception could have formed in the mind of any juror by reason of the wording of the instruction under consideration. Indeed, the language of the latter portion of the opinion in Douglas v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, wherein the court refused to reverse the case because of the alleged
Furthermore, under the evidence it became apparent that, as observance of the ordinary standards of practice would preclude the use of an unsterile needle or solution, such use could be due only to carelessness or negligence; hence the inclusion of the alleged omitted words was not absolutely essential to a proper charge.
We have also examined the instructions with care in the light of the other criticisms directed against them by appellant. As we find the entire charge to be free from prejudicial error, further discussion is unnecessary.
The judgment is affirmed.
Langdon, J., Curtis, J., Seawell, J., Richards, J., Shenk, J., and Waste, C. J., concurred.
Rehearing denied.
Shenk, J., and Waste, C. J., dissented.
Cases cited
- Wetzel v. Pius 78 Cal. App. 104 p. 213
- Hesler v. Cal. Hosp. Co. 178 Cal. 764 p. 214
- Perkins v. Trueblood 180 Cal. 437 p. 214
- Dimock v. Miller 202 Cal. 668 at 671 p. 215
- Ley v. Bishopp 88 Cal. App. 313 at 316 p. 215
- Douglas v. Southern Pacific Co. 203 Cal. 390 p. 217