Majority
This is a proceeding in mandamus to compel the chairman of the board of supervisors of Los Angeles County to execute certain bonds alleged to be authorized by the electors of the Los Angeles County Flood Control District. The matter is submitted on a general demurrer to the petition and on a stipulation of facts made by agreement a part of the petition. The facts are therefore undisputed.
The Los Angeles County Flood Control District was created by an act of the legislature in 1915 (Stats. 1915, p. 1502), and comprises, territorially, all of Los Angeles County except those portions thereof generally known as the Antelope Valley and the islands of Santa Catalina and San Clemente. The objects and purposes of the act, as set forth in section 2 thereof, are to provide, by the creation of the district, for the control of the flood and storm waters
On March 26, 1924, the board directed J. W. Reagan, who was the then chief engineer of the district, to make the investigation required by the statute and to submit a report which should show (a) a general description of the work to be done; (b) general plans, profiles, cross-sections and general specifications of the work to be done; (c) a general description of the land and property to.be acquired; (d) a map showing the location of the proposed work and improvement, and' other information deemed to be necessary or useful, and (e) an estimate of the cost of the work.
A special election was called by the board of supervisors and was held on May 6, 1924, for the purpose of submitting to' the qualified electors of the district the proposition of incurring a bonded indebtedness in the sum of $35,300,000. The objects and purposes for which the indebtedness was proposed to be incurred were set forth in the title, preamble and section 2 of the ordinance calling the election, and were as follows: “For the control of the flood and storm waters of said Los Angeles County Flood Control District, for the conservation of such waters for beneficial and useful purposes,' by spreading, storing, retaining and
The board caused to be printed and furnished to voters who might apply for the same so much of "the report of the chief engineer as covered a general description of the work to be done and also a map showing the location of the improvements to be made. The election Avas held and the proposed bond issue received a favorable vote. Thereafter bonds were issued and sold to the extent of several millions of dollars and the acquisition of property and construction work went forward. A dam in Pacoima canyon was built, the estimated cost of which was $1,720,000. Construction work in connection with the control, of the Tujunga River, involving the expenditure of some $1,600,000, is well under its way to completion. Numerous other improvements at different locations in the district have been undertaken and completed under this authorization of bonds. The major item of the proposed improvement was the construction of a dam at the Forks site in the San Gabriel canyon. As originally proposed this dam was to be constructed to a height of 425 feet, providing thereby a reservoir capacity of 240,000 acre-feet of water and estimated in round numbers to cost $25,000,000. The purpose of the improvement was to control the flood waters of the 200 square mile San Gabriel watershed so as to relieve the lands in the San Gabriel Valley, and below as far as Long Beach and the ocean, from their deAmstating effect; to protect the harbors of Long Beach and Los Angeles, and also to conserve such waters for irrigation and other uses. Preliminary to such work the board sought and obtained reports from numerous engineers of wide reputation, includ
In December, 1926, upon the request of certain local organizations, the board, upon the recommendation of the Los Angeles Chapter of the National Engineering Society, employed F. H. Fowler of San Francisco, C. D. Marx of Stanford University, and C. H. Paul of Dayton, Ohio, engineers of wide repute, to investigate all matters connected with the feasibility and necessity of the construction of a dam at the Forks site and also the possibility of the construction of a dam at the Granite Dyke site. In March, 1927, those engineers submitted to the board a report condemning the Granite Dyke site as unsafe and recommending the Forks site for the construction of the
In 1929 the legislature adopted an act entitled, “An Act providing for the supervision of dams by the department of public works through the state engineer for the purpose of safeguarding life and property, etc.” (Stats. 1929, p. 1505.) This statute became effective on August 14, 1929, and before the cessation of work under said contract. Section 5 of the act provides that after the effective date of the act the construction of a new dam or the enlargement of any dam shall not be commenced, and dams (as in the present case) not more than ninety per cent completed on August 14, 1929, shall not be completed until the owner has applied for and obtained from the department written approval of plans and specifications. The application was required to set forth the area of the drainage basin, rainfall and stream flow records and flood flow records and estimates. The department might require data concerning subsoil and foundation conditions, etc. By section 2 of the act the word owner was defined to include the state and any of its agencies or districts. A violation of the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and in addition the department is authorized to commence an action in the superior court to compel observance of the terms of the act or to enjoin violations thereof.
On October 26, 1929, the petitioner herein made an application to the state engineer for his approval of the construction of the dam at the Forks site. The state engineer caused an examination of said dam to be made on his own behalf and also called upon a board of engineers for an investigation and report. The board advised the state engineer and that state official found that a dam of the size and type called for by the contract could not be safely constructed at the Forks site by reason of the existence of certain earthquake faults and insufficiently sound foundation and bedrock at that place and that the construction of the dam as proposed would be unsafe and a severe menace to life and property. The state engineer, on November 26, 1929, denied the application for his approval. On December 2, 192-9, the district canceled and terminated the construction contract and instructed the chief engineer
Upon the filing of said report a hearing before the board was had at which testimony was produced to the effect that a change of conditions had occurred since the bond issue was authorized, in relation to the construction of the dam of the size and design and at the site originally proposed, consisting in and showing (1) that fires occurring over a large portion of the San Gabriel watershed would re-result in an increased quantity of loose material being brought down by floods and require the construction of check dams to aid in retarding the flow and discharge of said material; (2) that the excavation work done by the contractor for the construction of said dam had disclosed large cracks in the rock required as a foundation for the construction of said dam, and that during the course of said construction work a movement had taken place on the west abutment of the proposed dam, evidenced by a large slide which disclosed faulty and unstable foundations; (3) that in the opinion of the chief engineer a dam of the size and design of that originally proposed could not be safely constructed at the Forks site; (4) that since the voting of said
On December 22, 1930, the board of supervisors adopted a resolution, by a vote of four-fifths of its members, in which it was found and determined that the construction of the dam at the Forks site is now prohibited by law and rendered contrary to the best interests of the Flood Control District by reason of a change in conditions in relation thereto, which prohibition by law and change of conditions have occurred since the adoption of the original report and the voting of said bonds, and that the original plans should be changed to conform to the new plans, and that the unexpended balance in the bond fund be appropriated for the work and improvement in accordance with the new plan. The chief engineer was instructed to prepare plans and specifications to that end and the board by a four-fifths vote instructed its chairman to sign bonds in the sum of $5,000,000, the proceeds thereof to be used in the furtherance of said work.
The chairman of said board, respondent herein, aloné voted in the negative on the motion to adopt the resolution above referred to and has declined to sign said bonds on the
The respondent places his refusal to sign the bonds on the premise that the Los Angeles County Flood Control District is in all of its essential elements a special assessment district, whose course in the proceeding to charge the lands in the district with a special assessment must be strictly construed against the district and in favor of owners of the •property assessed; that the work now proposed was not included in the original plan and cannot therefore be made the subject of a special assessment to cover the cost thereof. In support of this contention the respondent cites the case of Los Angeles County Flood C. Dist. v. Hamilton, 177 Cal. 193 [ 169 Pac. 1028 ]. That case held that the statute of 1915 was in essence a local improvement act and that the power of the board to raise funds to discharge the obligations of the district was referable to the field of special assessments as distinguished from that of the general taxing power. Consequently the respondent contends, under established general doctrines with reference to the levy of special assessments, that the rule of strictissima juris must be applied. This may be conceded. But when the rule is applied the statute under which the proceeding is taken must be scrutinized to determine whether there has been a departure from the statutory requirements, having in mind that under section 21 the act and every part thereof must be liberally construed to promote its objects and to carry out its intents and purposes.
The petitioner points to the proviso in section 15 of the act as full justification for the steps pursued. If the statute authorizes the proceedings subsequently taken by the board there is no contention advanced by the respondent that they were not properly taken. The proviso is as follows: “And provided, further, that any improvement for which bonds are voted under the provisions of this act shall
The controversy is then narrowed to the questions (1) whether the doing of the work according to the original plans has been prohibited by law, and if not (2) whether the execution of the work in accordance with the original plans has been rendered contrary to the best interests of the district by some change of conditions in relation thereto. As to the first question the statute of 1929 (Stats. 1929, p. 1505) makes it a penal offense to construct a dam without the written approval of the department of public works. For a violation of its provisions the department of public works is given the right to maintain mandamus and injunction proceedings to prevent any threatened violation thereof. The approval of the department was requested for the construction of the high dam at the Forks site. The application was denied without prejudice to the filing of another application for a dam at this or any other site. No reason has been advanced and none appears why this statute should not be upheld as a valid exercise by the state of its police power. (See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 386 [ 51 L. Ed. 523 , 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367 , see also, Rose’s U. S. Notes] ; Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433 [ 166 Pac. 348 ].) By the terms of the act it is made applicable to such an agency as the Los Angeles County Flood Control District. No claim is made that the department of public works through its state engineer acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the application. On the contrary, the admitted facts in this matter show that such action was wisely exercised. The citation of authorities, which are abundant, is unnecessary to support the statement that the construction of the dam at the original site without such approval would be contrary to law and as such is prohibited by law within the meaning of the statute.
It is next to be considered whether such change of plans would, as respondent contends, violate any contractual rights of the land owners in the district arising by reason of the submission to the voters of the proposition to construct the improvement in accordance with the original plan. If any such contractual right would thus be
It may be assumed that by reason of the proposal on the part of the officers of the district and the approval of the electors therein as to the authorization and issuance of said bond issue a status analogous to a contractual relation came into being which is entitled to protection under the Constitution. The case of Peery v. City of Los Angeles, 187 Cal. 753 [ 19 A. L. R. 1044 , 203 Pac. 992 ], is authority to that effect. But in order to determine whether a contract has been violated it is necessary first to determine what the contract is. In this case it was the proposal to authorize the issuance of the bonds which, in accordance with the statute, set forth the objects and purposes for which the expenditures were to be made and also the assent of the electors of the district to the proposal. In determining the extent and limitations of the contract, the .terms of the statute under which the proceedings were taken must be taken into consideration. The provisions of the statute were a part of the contract and must be held to have been personally known to every elector whose approval was sought and registered at the election. (Peery v. City of Los Angeles, supra; Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 697 [ 280 Pac. 360 ].) Section 8 of the act provides that the fund derived from the sale of said bonds “shall be applied exclusively to the purposes and objects mentioned in the ordinance calling such special bond election as aforesaid, subject to the provisions in this act contained”. The ordinance calling the election specified the objects and purposes for which the proceeds of the contemplated bond issue were to be used and further provided that the indebtedness was proposed to be incurred “in accordance with the provisions of the Los Angeles County Flood Control Act”. Section 23 of the act provides that the act may be designated and referred' to as “Los Angeles County Flood Control Act”, and that such designation and reference shall be deemed sufficient for all purposes. The proposition stated on the ballot did not refer to the statute, but it must be assumed that the ballots were cast by the electors with the terms of the statute in mind which authorized the board of supervisors to change the plans as occasion might
The respondent’s brief sets forth the form of the bonds prescribed by Ordinance No. 14 adopted by the board on June 5, 1924. This form recites that the bonds are issued in conformity with said ordinance adopted June 5, 1924, and “under the authority conferred upon said board by the provisions of an act of the legislature of the State of California designated and referred to as ‘The Los Angeles County Flood Control Act’, approved June 12, 1915, and after a special election held in said Los Angeles County Flood Control District on the sixth day of May, 1924, at which election there was submitted to the qualified electors of said district the proposition of incurring a bonded debt in the said sum of $35,300,000.00 for the objects and purposes as stated in the ordinance of the said Los Angeles County Flood Control District on the 4th day of April, 1924, and in the report of the chief engineer of said ■ district adopted by the board of supervisors of said district on the 1st day of April, 1924, and at which said election a majority of the votes cast were in favor of said proposition”. It is urged that the recital just quoted contains an erroneous statement of fact as to the objects and purposes of the bonded debt, if the fund's are to be used in accordance with the changed plans, and that the writ should therefore be denied under the authority of Municipal Improvement Co. v. Thompson, 201 Cal. 629 [ 258 Pac. 955 ], But there is in reality no misstatement of fact in the recital. It correctly recites the proposition submitted to the voters at the bond election which was “for the objects and purposes as stated in the ordinance” calling the election and “in the report of the chief engineer”. This recital of the proposition so submitted to the voters would appear to be entirely in conformity with the facts as they have heretofore existed and do now exist.
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed.
Waste, C. J., Curtis, J., Preston, J., Seawell, J., Richards, J., and Langdon, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Hamilton 177 Cal. 119 p. 338
- Union Bridge Co. v. United States 51 L. Ed. 523 p. 347
- Gaylord v. City of Pasadena 175 Cal. 433 p. 347
- Peery v. City of Los Angeles 187 Cal. 753 p. 349
- City of Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles 207 Cal. 697 p. 349
- Municipal Improvement Co. v. Thompson 201 Cal. 629 p. 350