Rhinock v. Price

This action was instituted for the purpose .of recovering the possession of a Lincoln automobile.

Plaintiff, at the commencement of said action, and for a long time prior thereto, was the owner of said automobile. During all the time herein mentioned E. L. Butler was the agent of the defendant Parisian Motors, Inc. (a corporation), as a salesman, under an agreement with said corporation that he was to receive one-half of the profits on all automobiles sold by him for said corporation. The Parisian Motors, Inc., had the agency for the Hispano Suiza automobile. The defendant H. Lew Zuckerman was the secretary-treasurer of said corporation. He has no personal interest in this action. The same may be said concerning the other defendants in said action, with the exception of the Parisian Motors, Inc. The plaintiff and the Parisian Motors, Inc., are, therefore, the only parties in interest herein and when we refer to defendant or appellant we mean the Parisian Motors, Inc. As the agent and salesman of the Parisian Motors, Inc., Butler apparently approached the plaintiff in an endeavor to sell to her an Hispano Suiza car. At least, in January, 1929, Butler came to Zuckerman, at the office of the corporation, and stated that he had a good prospect to sell one of the Hispano Suiza automobiles, and that it would be necessary in order to make said sale for him to buy a Lincoln -car that belonged to the daughter of the proposed purchaser, and that he might need $500 to close the deal. Zuckerman gave Butler two checks for $250 each, to be used on the purchase of said Lincoln car. A few days later Zuckerman gave Butler $100 and finally another $100, for the same purpose for which he had given him the $500. In the meantime Butler had the Lincoln car in his possession, evidently endeavoring to sell it for the plaintiff. On February 15th Butler wanted more money from Zuckerman and offered to give the Lincoln car as

As a ground for reversal of the judgment, appellant contends that the respondent was estopped from asserting any claim to said car prior or superior to that of the Parisian Motors, Inc. This contention is based upon the fact that the respondent had parted with the “pink slip”, or indicia of ownership, together with the possession of the car, and, as against an innocent purchaser or pledgee, she was estopped from asserting her ownership of said car. In support of this contention, appellant relies upon the case of Rapp v. Fred W. Hauger Motor Co., 77 Cal. App. 417 [ 246 Pac. 1067 ], which holds that an owner of an automobile who has clothed another with the indicia of ownership of his automobile is estopped, as against an innocent purchaser or encumbrancer thereof, from asserting his ownership or right of possession to said automobile. The principle enunciated

The trial court made no specific finding as to whether the appellant was or was not an innocent encumbrancer of the Lincoln car at the time it acquired possession thereof. It made, however, a general finding that the plaintiff was at the time of the commencement of said action, and at all times thereafter, the owner of and entitled to the immediate possession of said car. This finding must be accepted as at least an implied finding that appellant did not acquire possession of said car without notice, either actual or imputed, of the plaintiff’s ownership thereof. There is evidence in the record that might warrant the conclusion that the appellant through its secretary-treasurer, Zuckerman, had actual notice of respondent’s ownership of said ear, or at least had sufficient knowledge of facts to put it on inquiry as to Butler’s claim of ownership. Zuckerman testified that Butler first came to him and told him that he had a good prospect to sell a Hispano Suiza car, provided he could buy the Lincoln car. Later he said that Butler told him he had purchased the car and still later Butler asked for a loan to close the deal and Zuckerman advanced money for that purpose, and later, when Butler • asked for an additional loan, Zuckerman demanded the certificate of' ownership and possession of the car as security. This additional loan was made upon the conditions imposed by Zuckerman. Zuckerman also testified that Butler told him that he must sell the Lincoln car in order to make the deal for the Hispano Suiza car. Why was it necessary for Butler, if he had purchased the Lincoln car from the respondent, to sell it in order that the respondent might purchase a Hispano Suiza car from the appellant? The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this testimony was that the respondent still owned the Lincoln car, or at least had a substantial interest therein. If the trial court from this evidence drew the conclusion that appellant was put on notice that Butler was not the real owner of said car, we think it was warranted in arriving at such conclusion, and we feel bound by its determination of that matter. We think any reasonably prudent person, acting in entire good faith, with this knowledge in his possession, would have made inquiry of the

There are other questions raised by respondent in support of the judgment, but inasmuch as we are of the opinion that the appeal is without merit for the reasons hereinbefore stated, it is not necessary to discuss these further questions.

The judgment is affirmed.

Seawell, J., Thompson, J., Preston, J., Langdon, J., Waste, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.