p. 278that corresponds to him, to indicate to us the point most convenient to him.
“Witnesses, “Ant. Mae. Peealta,
“Fkancis A. Ieeans, “Jose Dessassiee.
“San Antonio, 21st February, 1851.”
The referee reported that, at the commencement of the action, the sum of $280 was, and still is, due from defendant to plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to have restitution of the premises referred to in the complaint; and that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against defendant only for said sum, with interest from 21st of April, 1852, and costs. Dated, January 15th, 1853.
Plaintiffs, by their attorney, appealed from the above judgment, so far as forfeiture of the leased premises and restitution thereof is denied, and also as to the refusal to give treble the damages, the same having been duly demanded by the plaintiffs.
Chipman, for appellants.
. The finding of the rent due, by the referee, and costs, is conclusive against any tender defendant may have pleaded, and we are entitled to restoration of the premises.After the rent remained due three days, plaintiffs, March 25th, 1852, notified defendant to quit, the notice following the words of the statute, and alleging a breach of covenants generally.April 17th, a second notice was given to quit, for breach of covenants and non-payment of rent, when defendant first tendered $140, with some receipts for rent claimed by him to be due from plaintiffs. If such rents as were claimed by defendant, were due to him, the acquittances were no tender; coin only, and not paper, debts, notes, &c., is good as a tender.
But no such note was due; the lease to plaintiffs, from the assignees of the defendant, of January 23d, 1851, guaranteed a certain piece of ground in said Encinal, “ free from all incumbrances.” In this covenant, the lessors and their assignee, the defendant, failed, as there were prior incumbrances, two leases
p. 279from Peralta, which were retained till transferred by Peralta to plaintiffs in October, 1851.Can the defendant assume an indebtedness, which is totally denied, and apply it, not as a set-off, but as a legal tender, and this upon a debt due the plaintiffs and not denied?Our purchase of the fee, October 1851, from our landlord, merged the lesser title, ended the lease, and stopped the rent. But if the rent was apportioned, and the plaintiffs charged in accordance with the respective interests under the lease of January 23d, 1851, it could not be used as a tender.The payment of $280 with costs was withdrawn ; if good as a tender it was not kept good.Under the statute, it is an unlawful holding, “ where any holder shall hold over after the- rent shall be due, and remain unpaid for the space of three days;” and the justice, after judgment, is directed to give a writ of restitution, as in other cases. See sect. 13, p. 420, statutes of 1850. And if restitution is not to follow the breach of defendant’s covenants, and if a tenant may commit waste, and pay no rent, and continue to enjoy, &c., the summary remedy sought to be provided by the statute is of little avail.The provisions of the statute are entirely independent of the common law, and the directions in the proceeding are plain, without any reference thereto; no ¡provision requires a clause of re-entry, nor demand before sunset on the day the rent falls due, &c.If the proceedings are substantially correct, no objections to form will be regarded; 2 Bibb, 431 ; Barrett v. Chitwood.A tenant holding over, even on a parol lease, is not entitled to notice to quit before the emanation of the warrant; 4 Bibb, 524 ; 11 Wend. 616 ; 6 Hill, 507 .By the same reasoning, a tenant holding over contrary to any other provision of the law, is entitled to notice, before a warrant can emanate, and writ of restitution issue, and our statute fixes, the notice to be three days.A covenant to pay rent is the very basis of the tenure in almost every lease. To say that this covenant is like any other debt to the landlord, is inconsistent.
p. 281On the 16th October, 1851, the appellants, then lessees of Emeric for part of the Encinal, for a term to end the 1st August, 1855, contracted with Peralta to purchase the reversion" upon the term to Emeric, to end the 21st February, 1857, and Peralta, on the 22d October, 1851, executed to appellants a deed of conveyance, and delivered to them his copy of the lease with Emeric.Thus, while the ultimate reversion vested in the appellants, the intermediate reversion of the part underlet to them vested in Emeric.The appellants insist that Emeric has forfeited his lease on two grounds: 1, non-payment of rent; 2, the commission of waste.There was no forfeiture for the non-payment of rent. The lease contains no clause of re-entry for this cause; the payment of rent is not made a condition of the tenure, it is a mere covenant, and no rule of law, statutory or common, works a forfeiture for this more than any other debt owing to his landlord. Such termination of a tenancy can only arise under an express agreement of the parties. Adams on Ejectment, 157, 158, 160, and cases cited.The act gives no remedy unless the tenant holds over;—-failure to pay is not sufficient.There can be no holding over where the term is not ended by efflux of time, or the act of the parties, or when the tenant has committed an act of forfeiture. Norris & Peake, 528, sec. 3;' lb. 531 to 534; 4 Barn. & Aid. 401; 6 Eng. Com. Law Bep. 535; 6 Bar. & Cress. 519; 13 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 238; Adams on Ejectment, 160.If the act be held to impose a forfeiture for rent in the absence of a stipulation to that ef must he made “before sunset,” as at common Harrison, 17 J. R. 66; Adams on Ejectment, 1<| Esp. 106.The strict common law rule is insisted on, wfil been repealed in all cases: Adams on Eject. 162 to 192.In this case, the tender made would prevent a forfeiture, even if the right to re-enter had been reserved. Defendant was in
p. 283tinue digging for his own use, for it is now become the mere annual profit of the land. 2 Black. Com. 282; 22 Vine’s Abr. 439, 440 ; Coke Lit. 54 b.; Coke’s Rep. B. 5; Saunders’ case.The preceding lessees were cutting and charring wood, Peralta consenting, up to the time of their lease to defendant.delivered the opinion of the court. Murray, Chief Justice, concurred.
The appellants say that the estate of the defendant (a term for years) is forfeited, for two reasons: first, for the non-payment of rent; 2d, for the commission of waste.
At common law, there was no forfeiture upon either of these grounds. It was only by the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Ed. 1, that the remedy of forfeiture was given for waste, and it was then expressly confined to the place wherein the waste was committed. 2 Black. 283 . Our statute confines the remedy to the recovery of treble damages. Laws, 566, 52, 59.
In reference to the first point, I can come to no other conclusion, than that, by the 13th section of the act concerning forcible entries and unlawful detainers, it was the intention of the legislature to make the non-payment of rent work a forfeiture of the estate of the tenant. In order to effect this, however, it must be held necessary to pursue tjhe same strictness as is required at common law to work a forfeiture, where there are stipulations in the contract of lease to that effect. The rent must be demanded on the day it becomes due, and at a late hour of the day.
See the case of Jackson v. Harrison, 17 J. R. 66, and the cases there cited. Adams on Ejectment, 160. Gaskill v. Trainer* decided at the present term of this court.
The record in this case discloses no demand whatever of the rent, and it follows there can be no forfeiture.
Judgment affirmed.