p. 361The District Judge instructed the jury that the 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th of the foregoing instructions were correct and given. That the remaining ones, the 3d, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th, are refused, and not given.
For* refusing the last-designated instructions, the plaintiff excepted. Verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.
[The Reporter begs to -remark, by way of apology for the length of the foregoing detail of the evidence in this case, that in the generality of the concluding part of the opinion of this court, the whole evidence appears to be embraced, and he did not venture materially to abridge it.]
Mallack, Peachy, Billings, and Park, for appellant.
The questions of plaintiff’s counsel excluded by the court were evidence. If plaintiff improved the ranch, on which the cattle ran, branded the old and young ones the same spring they were taken, and paid the taxes, they were facts from which possession might be inferred. Cal. Rep. 264, 5, and 6.The questions asked on the cross-examination of Lindsey Carson, that were designed to show that his possession was limited to the 200 acres, were improperly rejected.The defendant was a mere stranger, and had no right to take the cattle; and the questions concerning the witness Henry acting as executor, &c., were improper.Ho evidence was offered to prove that Henry was the agent of his mother, with power to consent to a sale, &c. It was, therefore, error to permit the question, “ Did you at the sale say you would deliver the cattle to the buyer ?” The effect of this is seen in the verdict.So the offer of plaintiff to prove that the whole cattle and not a part were sold, it was error to reject. If the sale had been otherwise valid, the sale of the whole, when Carson claimed but a part, would have invalidated it. 2 Hill Ch. 47 , 15 Mass. 82 .It was error to refuse the said instruction. The contract will not admit of any other construction. See Hurd v. Darling, 16 Tr. Rep. 381.By the contract M. B. Carson became the major domo, or
p. 362overseer of Fitch, for a term of years, and was to receive his compensation in cattle, and a portion of the crops. He was on the ranch, not in his own right, but as the servant of Fitch. He was to take the ranch under his charge, and take care of it, &c., for its better improvement, &c., and in recompense of his services, Fitch was to give him one-fourth of the increase of the cattle, &c.Fitch was bound to perform at the proper time, or would have been liable in damages. But Carson was no tenant in common, in any part of the property, and could only acquire a title to such portion as should be set apart for him.,The contract was personal with Carson, had relation to his skill, judgment, &c., in the premises, and could not be assigned.So the 12th and 13th instructions it was error to refuse.The verdict was against law. The defendant was a mere trespasser, and his proceedings were void, even as against Lindsey Carson. The cattle were not in view at the sale, and were without the mark of the execution debtor. See Cal. Statutes, 1850, p. 445.Lindsey Carson, it is not urged, had more than one-fourth of the increase, yet the whole were sold, including the old stock, in which he never had any interest.So defendant did not sell the cattle taken, hut so many in number, including old work oxen and milch cows.All the evidence shows possession in the plaintiff.There is no brief filed for respondent.
delivered the opinion of the court. Murray, Chief Justice, concurred.
There are many very palpable errors pointed out in the record. The various questions asked by the plaintiff, which might have produced answers showing acts of ownership on the part of the plaintiff, and thereby tending to prove her possession of the property, were all proper, and should not have been excluded.
The 8th, 10th, 11th, and 12th instructions, which were asked by the plaintiff and refused, ought to have been given.
The true construction of the contract between Fitch and Carson gives to the latter no present interest in the live stock, hut
p. 363only the right to acquire a determinate interest, after the performance of all the stipulations on his part, and these could not be completed until the expiration of five years from the execution of the contract.
Furthermore, the undertaking on the part of Carson was strictly personal, the result of the confidence which Fitch had in his integrity, skill, and capacity. It entered into the spirit and meaning of the contract, that he, Carson, should do the duty required, and that no other should be substituted for him.
It is, however, too clear for further argument, upon a proper view of the whole case as presented by the record, that Lindsey Carson, the assignee of Moses Carson, had no right whatever in the cattle which could be made the subject of levy and sale.
The court therefore erred in refusing the instructions mentioned, for which, and the error of improperly excluding the evidence referred to,
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.