p. 110When this case was called for trial, on the 7th of October, 1853 (the counsel for defendant Booth consenting), the Court, on motion of plaintiff’s counsel, upon the [110] complaint and *answer, without other evidence, ordered that the cause be referred to Wm. H. Sharp, Esq., to ascertain the amounts due on the notes specified in the complaint, and also the taxes paid on the premises since the execution of the agreement, and that, upon the coming in of the report of the referee, judgment be entered up against the defendant Buckelew, in favor of the plaintiff for one thousand dollars, less the amount due on said notes and taxes, and also for costs, and that, as to the said defendant Booth, the action be dismissed without costs.
On the 27th of October, 1853, the referee reported the sum of $238 37 as being due by plaintiff under the order; on the 18th of November, 1853, on motion of plaintiff’s counsel, the Court confirmed the report of the referee, and, without further evidence, entered a final decree, dismissing the said suit, as to the defendant Booth, without costs, and against Buckelew, for the sum of $761 63, and $237 50, costs of suit.
From this decree of the Court Buckelew appealed, assigning as error, 1st, That the Court erred in overruling said demurrer. 2d, That the order of October 7th, 1853, and submission to reference, were without defendant’s consent, and without authority of law. 3d, That the final judgment is erroneous, because it does not appear that a jury trial had been waived; also, for want of evidence to sustain it, and for want of any finding of facts, either by the referee or the Court, to justify it.
Halleck, Peachy, BilUngs & Park, for Appellant.
A party seeking a specific performance of a contract, must show a willingness to perform his part of the contract, and a reasonable excuse for not so doing, otherwise he will be treated as guilty of gross neglect, and not entitled to relief. (2 Story’s Eq. § 771, 776; 1 Johns. Ch. 375 ; 6 Whar. 528 ; 16 Maine, 92; 2 McLean, 562 ; Oooper v. Brown, 2 Lead Ca
p. 111in Eq. pt. 2d, p. 30.) 2d. The plaintiff’s excuses for not-complying are frivolous and insufficient. The liens did not commence until eight months after the plaintiff’s default in making payment; but, even if they had existed before, plaintiff should have made an offer to pay, etc. (
2 Wend. 532 , 534.) 3d. The*order.of October 7th, [111] 1853, was without authority of law. (Pr. Act,
\ 183, also 182; also the final judgment, lb. 179, 180.)
Wells, Haight Gray, for Respondent.
1st. The notes, being commercial paper, were payable on presentment; they were never presented for payment; defendant hereby acquiesced in the delay; the . delay was further excused bythe incumbrances.
2d. The provision that the sale was to be on account of the plaintiff, shows that all subsequent changes in value were to be for his profit or loss. The case of McKay v. Carrington, 1 McLean, 54 , 56, is a case in point.
3d. There was no error in the order of October 7th, or the judgment of November 18th, 1853. (Practice Act, § 183, 2d subdivision.) The presumption from the record is, that the defendant, whether present or absent, waived a trial by jury. (Practice Act, § 179.)
delivered the opinion of 'the Court.
Mr. Ch. J. Murray concurred.
This case may be determined by a simple solution of the question — What was the vendor’s relation to the land after his sale? According to sound principles of equity, sustained by a long current of decisions, he was the vendor with an equitable lien upon the land for the purchase money, and holding the legal title as a security for the enforcement of his lien. (See the case of Haley v. Bennett, 5 Port. 469 , where the question is fully examined; also, Chapman v. Chunn, 5 Ala, 397 .)
The vendor in this case had severrl remedies: He might have recovered possession of the premises, in which case,
p. 112he could only have held until the rents and profits had paid the purchase .money, and then equity would have compelled him to convey to the purchaser.
He might have enforced his lien in a court of equity, and obtained a decree to sell the land, in which case, if the sale had produced more than the purchase money, the surplus would belong to the vendee.
But, under the contract, he had the power of [112] selling, without *the interposition of judicial authority, and having selected this mode as most convenient, can it be reasonably contended that it gives him any greater rights, than if his lien had been enforced by a court of equity ?
It is urged, however, that he did not pursue the plan of sale agreed on in the bond; that, instead of selling at public sale, after advertisement, he treated the contract as a nullity, and sold at private sale. This is certainly an argument against him. The vendee might very well complain of this proceeding as a breach of contract, and might recover for such breach, if he could affirmativey show that the land would have sold for a greater sum, if the mode of selling pointed out by the written obligation had been pursued.
The argument that the length of time which elapsed without payment of the purchase money demands the inference that the contract had been abandoned, is of no force. It was within the power of the vendor to have rendered the time as short as he chose, by a prompt enforcement of his lien.
The decree is affirmed.