p. 349The defendant demurred to the complaint, because it appeared on the face of the complaint that the Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of said action, or of the parties thereto, and because the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The Court overruled the demurrer.
The Court below gave judgment that the plaintiff was entitled to purchase the land. The defendant appealed.
The other facts are stated in the opinion.
George A. Nourse, for Appellant.
The Court derives its jurisdiction from the proffer of the certified copy of an entry to be made by the Surveyor General or Register, as the ease may be, in a book kept for that purpose.But that entry is to be made only in certain cases, prescribed in section seventeen (p. 511 of the Laws of 1867-8) of the Act under which this action is brought. The complaint does not show that this is either of the cases contemplated by the statute for a reference of the dispute to a Court.The complaint alleges that “ a contest arose involving questions of law and fact,” but it does not allege, as required by the statute, that “ in the judgment of the Surveyor General a question of law is involved.” hi or does the complaint allege, as required by the statute, that “ the party protesting” (plaintiff) made a “sufficient ex parte showing to warrant, in the judgment of the Surveyor General or Register, further proceedings in the matter.”It does not appear by said complaint, that “ the acceptance of the Register of the United States Land Office ” of the location of the land applied for by plaintiff, in lieu of any school section land, otherwise appropriated by the United States, had been obtained before this suit was brought. But this is required by section twelve of the Act aforesaid,
p. 350(Stats. 1867-8, p. 510), before the State Surveyor General can give his certificate, authorizing the County Treasurer to receive payment for the lands. This certificate is the only certificate of approval given by the State Surveyor General in the case of an application to purchase lieu lauds from the State. This certificate, as we have shown, is not to be given until the acceptance of the Register of the United States Land Office is obtained. Consequently, any suit like the present, brought before the State Surveyor General has obtained such acceptance, is premature; for until the State has thus a prima facie title to the land applied for by the two parties, the State Surveyor General cannot approve either application to purchase it;, and it would be extremely absurd to allow a suit to compel the State Surveyor General to do that which, by law, he is not yet allowed to do. .Albert Hagan and J. H. Logan, for Respondent.
Aside from the certified copy of the order of transfer, the District Court, by virtue of its general jurisdiction, had power to try and determine all the issues presented by the complaint.Without any Act of the Legislature, the same Court had full power to adjudicate upon the claims of plaintiff and defendant in or to the lands in controversy. The section (17, Laws 1867-8, p. 511,) was enacted in order that the officer of the State Land Office might transfer any contest to the proper Court for final adjudication, and put at rest in a judicial tribunal the various petty contests over the right to purchase lands from the State. It was an enabling Act, and had its origin in a desire of the Legislature to more readily settle these disputes, and free the office of the Surveyor General and Register from the appearance of a judicial tribunal.The plaintiff in this case was not bound to wait the action, of the Surveyor General in the matter, but could have in-
p. 351yoked the aid of a Court of equity to remove all obstacles in his way to perfect his title to any lands, under the laws of the State.It was not necessary for plaintiff to state the facts spoken of in defendant’s brief, as those facts were merely subjects of proof at the trial. All such facts should be avoided in pleading. A
fact must be stated, but not the
evidence of the fact.
(Green v. Palmer, 15 Cal. 413 ;
1 Cal. 359 .)
The applicant is not presumed to know whether the United States has accepted the lands described in his application or not, in part satisfaction of any grant.By reference to the statutes of 1869-70, p. 875, Sec. 12, it will be seen that the applicant for the purchase of lands from the State has nothing to do with the United States Land Office; nor does the application placed on file by plaintiff in the Surveyor General’s office ever get into any other office.The Surveyor General, on the part of the State, asks that certain lands (mentioning them) be accepted in part satisfaction of a certain grant (mentioning it).The sale of the lands of the State is committed to the executive department of the government; and the judicial department has no jurisdiction of controversies arising between applicants for the purchase of the lands, except in such matters as are expressly provided for by the statute. In order to give a Court jurisdiction of a controversy of that character, the facts conferring jurisdiction must be stated in the complaint. It is not enough that there are contesting claimants for the purchase of the same, lands, but the proceedings required by the statute before the Surveyor General and other officers concerned with the sale of the land must be had, and must be stated in the complaint.
p. 352The defendant-demurred to the complaint on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, and that the complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. In argument he points out that the complaint does not allege that, in the judgment of the Surveyor General, a question of law is involved, nor that either party demanded a trial in the Courts of this State, as required by section seventeen of the Act of 1868. (Stats. 1867-8, p. 511.) It sufficiently appears that there is a contest between the parties in respect to the right to purchase the same tract of land, and it is averred that the Surveyor General, at the demand and request of the plaintiff, made and entered tlie requisite order, that the contest be referred to the proper Court for decision. This averment, when tested by a general demurrer, must be regarded as a sufficient averment that the plaintiff demanded a trial of the contest in the proper Court, as pi’ovided by section seventeen of that Act.
It is provided by section twelve of the same Act, that whenever application is made for the purchase of lieu lands, the Surveyor General shall apply to the proper Land Office of the United States to have such lands accepted in part satisfaction of the grant under which it is sought to be located, and that when such acceptance shall have been obtained, he shall give to the applicant a certificate which shall authorize the proper County Treasurer to receive payment for the land. It requires no argument to show that it was not intended by the Act to authorize the sale of lieu lands until the selection by the State had been approved by the Register of the proper Land Office, nor to show that it was not intended that a contest should be brousht on to a hearino- before the Courts, to determine which party had the better right to purchase the lands from the State, before the State had taken the first step towards the acquisition of the title to the lands. The complaint fails to state that the Surveyor Gen
p. 353eral had made the application to the Register, as provided for by that section of the Act, and therefore does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action or to give the Court jurisdiction of the contest.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions to sustain the demurrer.