p. 19“ In all cases where lands have been, or shall hereafter be granted by any law of Congress, to any State or Territory, and when said law does not convey the fee-simple title of such lands, or require patents to be issued therefor, the lists of such lands which have been or may hereafter be certified by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under the seal of his office, either as originals, or copies of the originals or records, shall be regarded as conveying the fee simple of all the lands embraced in such lists as are of the character contemplated by such act of Congress and intended to be granted thereby; but when lands embraced in such lists are not of the character embraced by such acts of Congress, and are not intended to be granted thereby, said lists, so far as these lands are concerned, shall be perfectly null and void, and no right, title or interest shall be conveyed thereby.” ,
The plaintiff, on the 10th day of July, 1871, applied to prove up his claim and purchase under the third section of said act of 1866, and, on the 15th day of November, 1871, the United States approved the selection by the State, and listed and certified over the land to the State of California. On the 29th of November, 1871, the State issued to the plaintiff a patent. The defendants were qualified pre-emptors, and, on the 29th of June, 1871, filed their declaratory statements as pre-emptioners, and, on the 4th day of December, 1871, tendered to the Register proofs of their settlement and improvements, and offered to pay for the land, but the Register refused to approve of their preemption claims or to receive the money. This action was commenced on the 24th of June, 1873. The court below rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed.
Foote & Carter, for the Appellants.
The Confirmatory Act of Congress passed in 1866 did not confirm the title to lands claimed under a valid Mexican grant. The demanded premises were within the limits of
p. 20land claimed under a valid Mexican grant, and did not come within the granting clause of the act. These lands were at all times, to the 6th day of June, 1871, reserved from disposition. The State was a trespasser when she made her location; the plaintiff was a trespasser when he went upon the land for the purpose of cultivation, and during the whole time of his possession, from 1865 to 1870. (Mahoney v. Van Winkle, 21 Cal. 552 .)It is well settled that a prior possessor may maintain. ejectment against one entering upon his possession without right or title, but not. so when the party entering is in privity with the source of title, and this Court has several times declared that a pre-emptor may enter upon the prior and actual possession of a mere possessor without right. (Page v. Hobbs, 27 Cal. 483 ; Kile v. Tubbs, 28 Cal. 402 ; Tyler v. Green, 28 Cal. 406 .)On the 6th of June, 1871, the survey of the rancho “Los Pocitas ” was finally confirmed. Upon the confirmation of the survey of the grant, and the exclusion of this land therefrom, it became public land, subject to pre-emption. This land having never been granted by the United States to the State of California, the act of the commissioner in listing the land to the State was void, and conveyed no title.Moore, Laine, Delmas & Leib, also for the Appellants.
Defendants were qualified pre-emptors, and the officers of the United States could not deprive them of their preemption rights. (Tyler v. Green, 28 Cal. 406 ; Robinson v. De Forest, 26 Cal. 317 .) The listing of the land to the State did not give any title. The act of Congress of August 3, 1854 (Lester, vol. 1, p. 236, No. 249), says: “Where lands embraced in such lists are not of the character embraced in such acts of Congress, and are not intended to be granted thereby, said lists, so far as these lands are concerned, shall be perfectly null and void, and no right, title, claim or interest shall be conveyed thereby.” The doctrine of prior possession is available in ejectment only in those cases where neither party has title or is in privity with the paramount source of title.
p. 21H. F. Crane, for the Respondent.
By the act of 1856, from and after 1869, when the land was surveyed in the field, plaintiff being in possession and claiming under his purchase (Hodapp v. Sharp, 40 Cal. 69 , and Foscalina v. Doyle, 47 Cal. 437 ) from the State, was, by the act, given the rights of a settler upon unsurveyed land, and protected in such possession until he should have opportunity to present and prove up his claim under the act, and have the same adjudicated, viz., either approved or rejected by the proper officers.The invasion of plaintiff’s possession by defendants in October or November, 1870, and filing of declaratory statements June 29, 1871, was during a period while plaintiff’s possession was legalized by the act, and during a period given him for the presentation and adjudication of his claim. The land was not subject to pre-emption during this period; the defendants were not bona fide pre-emptors, but were, and are, bare trespassers and intruders. The claim of plaintiff having been regularly presented, investigated and approved, and the land certified over to the State, pursuant to the requirements of the act of 1866, and by the State patented to the plaintiff, he has the title.The selection and sale of the land by the State, in 1863, was void, for the reason, among others, that the lands were then unsurveyed. The plaintiff, therefore, relies for title mainly upon proceedings had under the act of Congress of July 23, 1866, to quiet land titles in California. (14 U. S. Stats. at Large, 218.) He made application under the third section of the act, on the 10th day of July, 1871, and the application was approved and the land was certified over to the State, November 15, 1871. The lands were within the exterior limits of the Rancho Los Pocitas, the claim to which had been confirmed, and the rancho surveyed before the passage of the act of July 23, 1866; but by the survey of the rancho, which was finally confirmed June 6, 1871, the lands in controversy were excluded.
p. 22The question arising upon these facts is, whether the act of July 23, 1866, confirms selections made by the State, of lands which at the passage of the act were claimed under a valid Mexican grant, but which were afterwards excluded from the rancho by the finally confirmed survey. A discussion of the question at this time is, for obvious reasons, unnecessary, and we shall only announce the conclusion to which we have arrived, upon a construction of the provisions of the act of Congress, which is, that the act does not confirm such State selections; that is to say, that the purchaser of such lands from the State is not authorized by the act to “present and prove up his purchase and claim” to the lands.
From this construction of the act of Congress, it results that the certifying and listing of the lands to the State was unauthorized and void, and that therefore the patent issued by the State did not convey to the plaintiff the title to the lands. (See Act of Congress of Aug. 3, 1854, 10 U. S. Stat. at Large.)
The plaintiff cannot maintain his action upon prior possession alone, for the lands were public lands of the United States (if not properly listed over to the State), and the defendants, as qualified pre-emptors, were authorized by law to enter upon and hold the possession of the lands as against the plaintiff.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the defendants for their costs.
Mr. Justice Crockett did not express an opinion.