p. 445ary, 1876, why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt in disobeying the order to pay the money to the clerk. The trustee, on the first day of March, 1876, petitioned the supreme court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the defendant Dwinelle, as judge, from adjudging him guilty of contempt. The defendant demurred to the petition.
Wilson & Wilson, for the Petitioner.
The Code of Civil Procedure (sec. 572 el seq.) relates in one part to the depositing of money in court, and “establishes the law” in that respect. It limits such payments in several particulars as follows:First, as to time, such orders can only be made before final judgment.Second, they can only be made where it is admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the examination of the parties, that he has in his possession, or under his control, any money or other property capable of delivery, which is the subject of litigation. In this case it was not admitted by the pleadings, nor found by the court, that the sum directed by the order to be paid was ever in the petitioner’s hands. (State v. Conklin, 19 Cal. 512 : Pierpont v. Crouch, 10 Cal. 316 ; Sacramento v. Bird, 15 Cal. 294 . A writ of prohibition will be granted in such a case. (State v. Ridgell, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 561; 3 Bl. Com. 112.)Doyle, Barber and Scripture, for the Defendant.
The interpretation of the Code given by the petitioner is too narrow. The District Courts derive their jurisdiction as courts of equity from the Constitution, not the Code. The latter only regulates their mode of proceeding, and if it can limit their powers, is not to be so construed, save when the language is unequivocal. The power to take possession of the subject-matter of the action and deal with it specifically is one of the distinctive and essential attributes of equity jurisdiction. It is just one of the points where the plaintiff was “remediless at and by the strict rules of the common law, and could only have adequate relief from a court of equity.”
p. 446Prior to the Code, there was no mode in which, at law, a plaintiff could obtain pendente lite immediate relief on an admission of a part of his cause of action. The rule was otherwise in equity; and the sole object of the provision in question was to extend it, in substance, to all classes of actions. It left unimpaired the power of the court to deal appropriately with all matters which had been ascertained by judicial investigation. (Gordon v. Rothley, 3 Vesey, 572; Russel v. Meacham, 16 How. Pr. 193 ; Merritt v. Thompson, 10 How. Pr. 428 ; Meyers v. Trimble, 3 E. D. Smith, 607; Quintard v. Secor, 3 E. D. Smith, 614; 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 319, and notes 320.)C. T. Rotts, also for the Defendant.
The writ of prohibition will not be granted in cases when an appeal or writ of error lies, and it is so held in the cases cited for the petitioner.
It did not appear by the pleadings or the findings that the entire sum of money directed to be paid into court, was at the time, or ever had been, actually in the hands of the trustee; on the contrary, it appears that the sum is made up in part of moneys which, in the opinion of the court, the trustee ought to have received, but had not received as interest. It is clear that the order was not within the class of orders provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure (Sees. 572, 3, 4.) And conceding that the power of the court is not limited by the provisions of the Code, no such authority appears to have been exercised by the Court of Chancery, unless the money was, at the time, actually in the hands of the trustee, or having been in his hands and improperly been paid out by him, as for example, paid out under such circumstances as would involve a breach of trust. (3 Danl. Ch. Pleading and Practice, 1822.) The demurrer to the petition for the -writ of prohibition is, therefore, overruled, and the respondent is allowed the period of ten days from and after the service of a copy of this order in -which to make such answer to the petition as he may be advised.