p. 98George Frazer in 1855. On the 13th day of April, 1867, Frazer and his wife executed a deed of the demanded premises to the defendant Pine, for the consideration of twenty-five dollars per acre. The plaintiff, Gallagher, claimed under a conveyance from Burnett, made for a valuable consideration. This suit was commenced April 19, 1872. The plaintiff recovered judgment, and the defendant appealed.
Archer & Lovell, for the Appellant.
The papers by which it is claimed the legal title was conveyed to Hoppe, Marvin and Burnett, or some one of them, bear date in 1849. Their claim was never confirmed. The granting part of the instrument of August, 1849, contains no words of inheritance, nor contemplates even assigns. The other instrument has no words of conveyance whatever. Marvin thereby abandoned the enterprise, and Burnett was substituted for him in December, 1849. Hoppe died in 1853, and Burnett discontinued all efforts to establish the town in 1854. The attempt to build a town then having proved a failure, and the only object of, or consideration for said agreements to lay off town lots and sell them and build up a town having been abandoned, we submit that under such circumstances the agreement between Barselisa Bernal and Marvin and Hoppe, in 1849, does not convey the after-acquired legal title to Burnett or his assigns.Neither of the papers of 1849 was ever acknowledged by Barselisa Bernal (who, at the time, was a married woman), so as to be effective. The second one of substitution was not acknowledged by her at all.The first of the two instruments, if construed to be a conveyance, only vested in Marvin and Hoppe a life estate. No words of inheritance are used. Hoppe died, and neither he nor Marvin ever conveyed to Burnett. Burnett, by substitution, had not title, but only a power with Hoppe; when Hoppe died, the power without title did not survive. (Perry on Trusts, Secs. 284, 504, 505.)The conveyance of title (if such at all), to Hoppe and Marvin was in trust. The trust was expressed in the same instrument, to wit, to sell the property as town lots. The
p. 99conveyance from Burnett to Love and plaintiff was not in execution of the trust or the power, but in violation thereof, and therefore of no effect. (See Civil Code, Sec. 870, and eases there cited.)The power given to Marvin and Hoppe, and afterwards to Burnett, was personal; it could not be exercised by one, nor by assigns nor survivors. (Perry on Trusts, Sec. 504. See Cole v. Wade, 19 Vesey, 27.)J. H. Campbell, for the Respondent.
The property granted in the trust deed of August, 1849, was the separate estate of Mrs. Martin, which, under the Mexican law, she had the power to dispose of as freely (the bare assent of her husband having been first obtained) as if she had been a feme sole “by any informal instrument, or possibly without any writing.” (Ingoldsby v. Juan, 12 Cal. 575 .)Through an excess of prudence the husband in this case joined in the conveyance, and the instrument by which the conveyance was effected was more than sufficient to pass the title at the civil law, under which transfers were so easily accomplished. (Schmidt, Laws of Spain and Mexico, Arts. 596, 598; White’s New Recopilación, I, 193; Domat (Cushing’s Ed.), paragraphs 259, 260; Escriche (Paris Ed. 1852), title Venta, p. 1529.It cannot, we think, be successfully contended that the laws which gave to Mrs. Martin the right freely to dispose of her separate property, gave her at the same time immunity from the obligations usually attending such disposition under the same laws. No authority can be found to sustain such a position. One of these obligations, employed in every transfer of property, was that of warranting and defending the title of the property transferred, and this obligation was necessarily as binding upon married women who had aliened their separate property with the consent of their husbands, as upon others, and estopped the grantor and the heirs of the grantor from setting up an after-acquired title, or in any manner disturbing or contesting the title of the grantee, and further bound them to defend
p. 100against all suits brought to dispossess the grantees of such property. (Schmidt, Laws of Spain and Mexico, Art. 445; White’s New Recopilacion, I, 193; Partidas, V, Title V, Law 32; Domat, paragraphs 268, 376, 390; Schmitt v. Giovanari, 43 Cal. 621 .)The instrument substituting Burnett in the place of Marvin, vested in Burnett the title which Marvin held under the original trust deed. That such was the intent of the parties, however apparent the inaccuracy of the language employed, a careful reading of the document in conjunction with the prior trust-deed leaves no doubt. It was, in effect, an assignment made with the written consent and participation of all the parties interested, by Marvin to Burnett, of the title and obligations of the former under the original trust-deed, and the court below so found. That Marvin so intended it is sufficiently obvious from the instrument itself. Such an assignment it is thought would, under the present law, be held to pass the title to land, and not merely to create an equity of title, and under the more liberal doctrine of transfer at the civil law the correctness of this proposition can be little doubted.No words of inheritance were necessary in a conveyance, under the civil law, to pass the fee-simple titles to lands. In the case of deeds in trust, for the purpose of selling land, it was not necessary to insert words of inheritance even at common law, since, without the transmission of the fee the trust could not be executed, and the courts presumed that to have been intended, without which the grant would have been inoperative. (Perry on Trusts, Sec. 315.)The instrument made on the 4th of August, 1849, between Barselisa Bernal Martin and John Martin, her husband, of the one part, and J. D. Hoppe and C. B. Marvin of the other part, was sufficient under the law then in force to pass the title of a married woman to real estate. The instrument, as we construe it, transferred her title to the lands therein mentioned, to Hoppe and Marvin.
The purpose of the instrument executed by and between
p. 101the above-named parties and Peter H. Burnett, on the first day of December, 1849, was, in our opinion, to place Burnett, both in respect to the title to lands, and the covenants to be performed by Hoppe and Marvin, in the place of Marvin. The parties intended by that instrument to vest in Burnett the title then held by Marvin, and to accept from Burnett a covenant to perform the services which Marvin had covenanted to perform. Such performance on the part of Burnett would not be possible, unless he occupied Marvin’s place in respect to the title—unless the title was vested in him. Our conclusion is, that the instrument executed on the 1st day of December, 1849, vested in Burnett the title then held by Marvin.
The conveyance subsequently made by Barselisa Bernal and her then husband, G. W. Frazer, to the defendant, of a portion of the lands, did not transfer any title, for after her conveyance to Hoppe and Marvin, no title, either legal or equitable, remained in her. She or her husband was entitled, under the instrument of the 4th day of August, 1849, to the one-half of the proceeds of the sale, and to have the property managed and disposed of according to the covenants therein contained; and a failure on the part of Hoppe and Burnett would give a right of action to Barselisa Bernal, if she is entitled to the benefits of the covenants; but her deed to the defendant of a portion of the lands did not vest in the latter any estate in the land, either legal or equitable.
The other points do not require any notice.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Wallace did not express an opinion.