p. 314defendant then moved the Court that the complaint be dismissed, on the ground that the pleaded and admitted facts in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action, or entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded in the complaint, or to any relief in the action.
The Court denied the motion, and held and decided that the complaint did state facts sufficient to give a Court of Equity jurisdiction, and to entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded in the complaint, to which ruling and decision defendant, by his counsel, duly excepted, and the Court ordered judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant, as prayed for in the complaint.
Wm. Irvine, for Appellant.
1. The Court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint. If upon the facts alleged by the plaintiff the rule caveat emptor does not apply, then the mode and measure of redress is under the provisions of sec. 708, Code of Civil Procedure. (C ross v. Zane, 47 Cal. 602 ; Boggs v. Hargrave, 16 Ibid. 562, 565-6; Freeman on Executions, sec. 352.)2. The Court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, and in rendering judgment for the plaintiff. (Rorer on Judicial Sales, pp. 289, 293; Branham v. San José, 24 Cal. p. 608.)
Independent of Code provisions, in cases where the rule caveat emptor was not applied, the remedy by motion in the same suit in which the original judgment was rendered was the only recognized mode of proceeding for relief against a sale by a purchaser; and especially was this the rule where the plaintiff in the execution was the purchaser. (Rorer on Sales, p. 303.)But for the decision of this Court in Zane v. Cross, we would insist upon the authority of Boggs v. Hargrave, Branham v. San José, and Sargeant v. Sturm, ( 23 Cal. 359 )—in the absence of circumstances of actual fraud or mistake, such as equity would relieve against—that a purchaser at a judicial sale under a judgment rendered in an action at law would purchase subject to the rule of caveat emptor. The following are a few of the
p. 315cases holding this rule: Rorer on Sales, p. 168, and cases cited; Bingham v. Maxey, 15 Ill. 295 ; Walden v. Gridley, 36 Id. 523, 532; Miller v. Finn, 1 Neb. 254 , 292; Thompson v. Munger, 15 Texas, 523-527 ; Lynch v. Baxter, 4 Id. 431; England v. Clark, 4 Scam. 486 ; Truman v. Caldwell, 10 Watts, 9 ; Miller v. Fitch, 7 W. & S. 366 ; Bostwick v. Winton, 1 Sneed, 524 ; Lang v. Waring, 25 Ala. 625 .George & Loughborough, for Respondent.
1. A sale under execution, of land in which the parties to the judgment had no estate or interest whatever, and which had been bid in by the plaintiff under a misapprehension of the fact, should not be considered as payment of the judgment to the extent o; such bid; and the plaintiff has a well established ' remedy by suit in equity. (Schumerhorn v. Baryhydt, 9 Paige, 28-40; Meyer v. Craig, 3 Blackf. Ind. 295; Slocum v. Freeman, 6 Abbott Pr. N. S. 443; Lansing v. Quackenbush, 5 Cowen, 38; Rorer on Judicial Sales, p. 302, sec. 903.)3. Belief in such cases may be granted either by suit in equity or by special motion. (Schumerhorn v. Baryhydt, 9 Paige, 40; Mulks v. Allen, 12 Wend. 253 ; Rorer on Judicial Sales, p. 303, sec. 905.)4. The Code recognizes the plaintiff’s right to a summary remedy ; but the remedy there given is cumulative, and not exclusive. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 708; Cross v. Zane, 47 Cal. 602 .)5. A judgment revived on motion under sec. 708, Code of Civil Procedure, “ has the same force and effect as would the original judgment of the date of the revival.” The defendant, then, was not injured by the plaintiff choosing a less summary remedy.The plaintiff having recovered a judgment against the defendant for a sum of money, and having caused an execution
p. 316to be issued, which was afterwards levied upon a tract of land as the property of the defendant, purchased the land for the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars, and that sum was credited upon the execution; but the defendant, as' is alleged in the complaint, had no right, title, or interest in the land, nor the possession thereof, although there appeared of record a deed of conveyance purporting to grant the land to him. The plaintiff delivered ’to the defendant a conveyance of all the right, title, and interest acquired by his purchase at such sale, and demanded that the amount bid for the land be returned to him, or that the credit on the execution be cancelled. The defendant retains the deed of conveyance delivered to him by the plaintiff. The action is an action in equity, to set aside the credit on the execution, and have the original judgment revived for the sum so credited on the execution.
Cross v. Zane, 47 Cal. 602 , was a suit in equity to revive the judgment under circumstances quite similar to those in this case, and objection was taken in that case, as in this, to the effect that proceedings by motion was the only remedy; but this Court reversed the judgment of the Court below, rendered upon the order sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. Upon the authority of that case we hold that the demurrer was properly overruled, and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment upon the admission by the defendant of the facts alleged in the complaint.
Judgment affirmed.