p. 392intended to make such an agreement; and that had he not trusted, implicitly in the good faith of his said copartners in incorporating in said instrument the said terms and conditions so as aforesaid agreed upon and none other, he would have examined said instrument carefully before signing the same.”
The Court found that all the allegations of the complaint were true; and further found specially, that the concern was dissolved on the 27th day of March, 1875, by an instrument in writing; that it was not agreed between the parties, as alleged by the defendant, nor were the terms of the dissolution other than those expressed in the written instrument of dissolution, and that the same were correctly set forth in the complaint—the last being the fourth finding, referred to in the opinion.
The other facts are stated in the opinion.
Taylor & Haight, for Appellant.
If the testimony of Hill and Parrott was admissible, (and it was admitted under plaintiff’s objection) then it is perfectly clear this action cannot be maintained; for there was not, and could not have been under the circumstances, any contract between the parties. The minds of the parties never met. Defendant thought he was signing one thing, Williams thought he was signing quite another and a different thing. The mistake between the parties was fundamental, and went to the very basis of the contract. (See the cases collected in the first American Edition of “ Kerr on the law of Fraud and Mistake,” in foot note to page 416.) But all this testimony, admitted for the purpose of showing the. mutual mistake between the parties, was totally disregarded by the Court when it came to make up its decision.The findings do not support the judgment. The mistake of defendant is fully pleaded in his answer; but on this issue—the very one on which defendant rested his whole case—there is no finding whatever.
p. 393G. W. Gordon, for Respondent.
There being a direct and substantial conflict in the evidence, as to the preliminary verbal understanding, the finding on that point will not be disturbed in this Court. Even though the testimony was not conflicting, as to the verbal understanding had prior to the execution by appellant of the instrument of dissolution, still appellant is bound by such execution, resulting from his own negligence in failing to read it, and is not entitled to relief either at law or equity. (Hawkins v. Hawkins, 50 Cal. 559 ; Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Cal. 43 ; Me. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkins, 66 Me. 109 ; New Albany R. R. Co. v. Fields, 10 Ind. 190 ; Craig v. Hobbs, 44 Id. 367; Taylor v. Atchinson, 54 Ill. 196 ; McMillan v. Michigan R. R. Co. 16 Mich. 115 ; Mulligan v. Illinois C. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 188 .)Plaintiff had judgment; defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and defendant appealed.
On the trial in the Court below, plaintiff Williams testified as to the amount duo plaintiff from defendant on account of advances, and that the agreement signed by defendant, ending the joint adventure, was drawn according to their verbal understanding. ■ Defendant testified that it was not according to their understanding. Here was a direct conflict of evidence. The Court below found in favor of plaintiff, and rendered judgment accordingly. In such case this Court Avill not disturb the judg-ment.
The objection that the findings do not support the judgment, in that the Court did not find as to the alleged mistake, is fully answered by the finding of the Court “ that all the facts set forth in the complaint are true; ” and by the fourth finding. The facts set forth in the complaint, (transcript, folios 9 to 11) are entirely inconsistent with the mistake alleged in the answer. If the allegations of the complaint are true, there could be no such mistake.
Judgment and order affirmed.
Thornton, P. J., and Sharpstein, J., concurred.