Majority
In this proceeding in mandamus an alternative writ was issued. On the return thereof the controversy was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts.
The Nevada Irrigation District was organized in 1921 under the California Irrigation District Act. Its principal revenue
Petitioner, a nonconsenting bondholder, contends that he is not bound by the terms of the 1937 modification. He presented to the respondent treasurer the coupon maturing July 1, 1937, in the amount of $20, originally attached to his bond. Although there are funds in the treasury of the district available for the purpose, the treasurer refused to pay any amount in excess of $15, on the ground that the interest owing on the bond was reduced from 4 per cent to 3 per cent after January 1, 1937. To avoid a multiplicity of suits by other nonconsenting bondholders, petitioner seeks a determination by this court, under sections 1138-1140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of the following questions: Whether or not the modification of the 1931 plan is valid, legal and effective; whether such modification is binding upon petitioner and any other bondholders who did not, by their affirmative acts, assent to the modification; and whether the respondents are not under a duty to pay the petitioner the full face amount of the fixed interest coupons attached to his bond. If the court shall find in petitioner’s favor, he asks that a peremptory writ issue ordering the respondent treasurer to pay to petitioner the amount of the present coupon and of all subsequent coupons at the rate of 4 per cent per annum.
Petitioner urges that, inasmuch as there was no provision in the California Irrigation District Act of 1931, supra, authorizing a district, adopting the plan therein provided for the refunding of its outstanding indebtedness, to subsequently modify that plan, section VIII of the 1931 plan above referred to, and which permitted such modification, was without authority of law, and the modification made pursuant thereto is null and void. Section 32a of the act adopted in 1931 declares that the board of directors of any irrigation district which desires to refund its outstanding indebtedness
The validity of these refunding bonds of the Nevada Irrigation District was the subject of consideration by this court in Mulcahy v. Baldwin, 216 Cal. 517 [ 15 Pac. (2d) 738 ], a proceeding to compel the secretary of the board of directors of the district to countersign the bonds. An objection to the bonds in that case was based upon the contention _ that the contract rights of the holders of outstanding bonds who might not elect to convert their holdings into refunding bonds, as well as the rights of contract with the landowners upon the organization of the district, would be impaired by certain provisions of the 1931 Irrigation District Act. The court there stated (p. 526) : “It is elementary that there can be no impairment of a contract by a change thereof if the change is effected with the consent of the contracting party affected thereby.” (Italics added.)
Petitioner claims there is no express or implied provision in the bonds for modifying the interest rate of bonds after their issuance. Section 32d of the Irrigation Act provides that if interest on the bonds of the district is subject to any limitation with respect to its payment, a statement of such limitation must be contained in the bond. Since the
Petitioner further contends that the California districts securities commission had no authority to give consent to such a change in the interest rate of the bonds. The approval of the commission was required by the Irrigation District Act as a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the plan provided for in section 32a. Accordingly, such a plan (containing a proviso permitting a subsequent modification of its terms and conditions without limitation) having been submitted to and having received the required approval of the commission, and having been voluntarily approved by the electors of the district and the bondholders, it cannot now be urged that the commission had not the right to consent to that to which all the parties involved had agreed it might consent—a modification of the plan. As an indication that such a provision for modification was regarded by the legislature as reasonable and lawful, that body, at its 1937 session, passed an emergency measure amending section 32a (Stats. 1937, p. 457), by expressly declaring that a provision for modification may be inserted in a plan adopted under the act as amended in 1931, and if the proposed modifications meet with the approval of the commission, the directors of the district shall call an election to authorize such modifications, a majority vote only being required for such authorization. The urgency clause attached to this amendment recites that certain of the districts “have reserved as a condition to said plan so approved [by the Commission and the electors] the right to modify such plan prior to its consummation and thereafter have found it necessary to modify such original, proposed plans in one or more respects”, the purpose of the 1937 amendment being to immediately clarify the former
Petitioner states that the “statutes will be searched in vain for any authority to give the holders of three-fourths of outstanding bonds authority to bind the other bondholders to a modification of the terms of the bond”, citing in support of his contention the decision of this court in County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal. (2d) 192 [ 44 Pac. (2d) 340 , 100 A. L. R. 149 ], That ease is not in point. The refunding proceedings there involved were instituted pursuant to the provisions of the Refunding Special Assessment Bond Act of 1933 (Stats. 1933, p. 1915), providing (sec. 15) that the refunding could take place when 75 per cent of the holders of the outstanding bonds consented. The court held that the act did not adequately safeguard the rights of the 25 per cent of dissenting bondholders, and was therefore unconstitutional, saying: “There can be no doubt that it is indispensable, from a constitutional standpoint, so far as bondholders are concerned, that either 100 per cent consent to the change or that the dissenting bondholders be so taken care of that no impairment of their contract ensues.” That ease is clearly distinguishable from the present proceeding, where the refunding plan was adopted and assented to by all of the bondholders. A sufficient answer to petitioner’s contention is that he did deposit his original bond for cancellation and accept in its place the refunding bond specifically incorporating in its terms the provision for modification of the 1931 plan with the “approval of the . . . holders of seventy-five (75) per cent in principal amount of the Refunding Bonds then outstanding”, such modification to be “binding upon the holders of the then issued and outstanding Refunding Bonds”. Upon this acceptance of the refunding plan and the cancellation of the original bonds, a change was effected in the affairs of the district, and its board of directors was justified in relying upon the agreement of the bondholders, including petitioner, that the plan might subsequently be modified, “if it should be deemed desirable”.
The next, assertion of petitioner is that the 1937 modification, by its terms, would become effective and binding on all the bondholders only when an election was held in the district for the purpose of approving the modification, and that there was no authority for such an election when the modification was drawn and the bonds were issued. The
Petitioner attacks this amendment as special legislation, and violative of article IV, section 25, subdivisions 11 ■and 19 of the Constitution. In Mulcahy v. Baldwin, supra, a similar objection was made to the validity of the 1931 amendments to the Irrigation Act. The objection was overruled by the court. The 1937 act is merely an amendment
The next complaint of petitioner is that the facts allegedly justifying the urgency feature of the statute “do not show any necessity for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and therefore the act did not go into effect until the regular time in August”. Authority is conferred upon the legislature to determine when urgency measures are necessary, and when such necessity has been determined as provided by the Constitution, the judgment of the legislature is final, and will not be interfered with by the courts unless no declaration of facts constituting such emergency is included in the act or unless the statement of facts is so clearly insufficient as to leave no reasonable doubt that the urgency does not exist. (Hollister v. Kingsbury, 129 Cal. App. 420 [ 18 Pac. (2d) 1006 ].) We see no reason, in the present instance, for interfering with the legislative determination that an emergency existed.
The final contention of petitioner is that the reduction of interest on bonds already issued was not such a “modification” as was contemplated by section VIII of the 1931 plan. Under that plan the original rate of 5% per cent interest was changed to 4 per cent, with a 1% per cent contingent interest. In the 1937 plan, now under attack, there
J. R. Mason, one of the interveners in this controversy, was the owner of a number of bonds of the Nevada Irrigation District. He exchanged eleven bonds of the original issue for refunding bonds under the 1931 plan, and subsequently purchased additional refunding bonds in the open market. Gilbert Moody, the other intervener, is the holder of certain interest coupons detached from one of the refunding bonds. "On the face of all these bonds appeared the following: “This refunding bond is one of an authorized issue of refunding bonds of Nevada Irrigation District . . . known as its First Refunding Issue, . . . and all issued under and subject to the provisions of a Refunding Plan dated June 1, 1931, to which Refunding Plan reference is hereby made for a statement of . . . the rights of the holders of the refunding bonds and of interest coupons in respect thereto, and the terms and conditions upon which the re
Interveners further allege that the district’s obligation to pay interest at the rate of 4 per cent was “to be absolute and unconditional”. A reading of the 1931 plan fails to disclose the use of the words “absolute and unconditional”. The 4 per cent interest was therein referred to as “fixed interest” to distinguish it from the “contingent interest” provided for. In any event, interest was to remain at the rate fixed unless and until there was a modification of the terms and conditions of the plan. The rate of interest to be paid on the bonds was but one feature of the plan which the directors of the district “deemed it desirable” to modify.
The principal contentions made by the interveners and amicus curiae have already been disposed of. We do not deem it necessary to discuss other points raised by them.
The legality of the refunding bonds issued under the 1931 plan having been established in the case of Mulcahy v. Baldwin, supra, and the 1937 modification, having been prepared in accordance with the terms of that plan and having received the approval of the directors and of a majority of the electors of the district, as well as the California districts securities commission and of more than the required 75 per cent of the holders of the refunding bonds issued under the plan, such modification is valid, legal and effective. The non-consenting bondholders, by their agreement lawfully expressed, are bound thereby. The 1937 modification properly relates, among other things, to a change in the rate of interest on the bonds already issued. Petitioner, therefore, is entitled to but 3 per cent interest on his bond, together with the 2% per cent contingent interest, from and after Janu
The peremptory writ is denied.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Langdon, J., concurred.
Rehearing denied.
Cases cited
- Mulcahy v. Baldwin 216 Cal. 517 p. 736
- In re Weisberg 215 Cal. 624 p. 740
- Wores v. Imperial Irrigation District 193 Cal. 609 p. 740
- In re Girard 186 Cal. 718 p. 740
- Hollister v. Kingsbury 129 Cal. App. 420 p. 740