Miller v. Stockburger

Petition for writ of mandate. Petitioners sought to obtain oil prospecting permits under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1921 (Stats. 1921, chap. 303, p. 404), and

However, the respondents contended that neither the 1911 grant to the city of Long Beach nor that of like character to the city of Los Angeles (Stats. 1911, p. 1256), conveyed the minerals, oil, gas or other hydrocarbon substances lying in or under said tide and submerged lands, whether filled or unfilled. Respondents further contended, that although the ownership of such minerals remained in the state, nevertheless such lands were not subject to prospecting permits, or leases thereunder, because of certain prohibitions in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1921, particularly sections 4 and 23 thereof, as amended in 1929 (Stats. 1929, chap. 7, p. 11; chap. 536, p. 944), which, they contended, specifically exempted the said tidelands and submerged lands from the operation of the Mineral Leasing Act. In accordance with these views, the respondents refused to issue the permits sought by petitioners and the latter thereupon sought to compel the issuance thereof by filing in this court a petition for a writ of mandate directed to respondents herein. The alternative writ issued, and respondents have filed a demurrer to the petition, which they contend should be sustained upon numerous grounds, the first of which is that during the pendency of this litigation the decision of this court in the

Since the filing of the decision in the Marshall case, the petitioners have asserted, however, that as to the greater portion of the area involved in the instant case the decision in the Marshall case “makes it inevitable that the petition for writ of mandate must be denied because of the holding that the title to the premises sought is in the City of Long Beach (and in the City of Los Angeles) and not in the State of California”. They contend, however, that certain portions of the lands described in the petition belong to the state of California and are not included in the grants to the city of Long Beach and to the city of Los Angeles, respectively, and ask that the writ issue with respect to such portions. With regard to their contention that certain portions of the lands referred to in their petition did not pass by the grant of the state to said cities, they rely upon the case entitled Strand Improvement Co. v. Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765 [ 161 Pac. 975 ], wherein they assert it was held that the grant embraced only the tide and submerged lands situated below the line of high tide, and which were filled prior to May 1, 1911, the date of the respective acts, or otherwise stated, that by the Strand case it was held that land which was filled and and above high tide at the date of the grant, did not pass by the grant,—and that the portions of the lands they now contend did not pass to the respective cities, and to which they are entitled to permits, were filled prior to 1911, and were above the line of mean high tide, over which the tide did not ebb and flow on said May 1, 1911. They contend also that the language of the respective granting acts supports this

Respondents also point out that the Strand case relied upon by petitioners is not authority for their contention with regard thereto, in that the court in that ease was considering the question of accretion or alluvion, formed by the natural movement of the tides, and not by artificial means such as are alleged to have been used with regard to the lands here involved; and in that regard they contend that the case entitled Patton v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. 521 , at pages 525 and 526 [ 147 Pac. 141 ], decides the question adversely to petitioners’ contention. There the court was considering the question of ownership of tidelands which had been artificially filled prior to 1911, and concluded that such land retained its character as tideland and was included in the 1911 grant to the city of Los Angeles. The respondents further contend that by the language of the granting acts of 1911, the legislature intended that all the lands described in the petition were intended to be granted by the state to the respective cities here involved, by its use of the language, “all of the right, title and interest of the state in and to all of the tidelands and submerged lands, whether filled or unfilled” (emphasis added), and that to hold that the legislature only intended to convey title to lands which lay below the line of mean high tide on May 1, 1911, would be to ignore the qualifying word “filled”; and that in such ease it would have been unnecessary to say anything at all about the lands being filled or unfilled for, obviously, all lands which in fact lie below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean are in fact tidelands or submerged lands; that in expressly

In 26 California Jurisprudence, page 306, it is said, “ . . . accretions caused by railroad embankments cannot operate to divest the title of the state to its tidelands, or to transfer them to the adjoining littoral owners. And so if tidelands are reclaimed, the change in the character of the land does not have the effect of transferring it to the owners of the abutting upland”. (Patton v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. 521 , 525 [ 147 Pac. 141 ].)

Prom the foregoing it follows that by virtue of the language of the granting acts of 1911, the state conveyed “ ‘all’ the right, title and interest . . . held by said state . . . in and to ‘all’ the tidelands and submerged lands, whether filled or unfilled” to the respective cities of Long Beach and Los Angeles, and that the portions of the lands here concerned, having been tide and submerged lands in their former state, passed to the said cities of Long Beach

In view of the conclusions herein reached, it is unnecessary to discuss other questions presented by the record.

The demurrer is sustained; the alternative writ discharged, and a peremptory writ denied.