Majority
This is an automatic appeal from a judgment imposing the death penalty for murder in the first degree, and from an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
The defendant, William Sanford, came to San Francisco from Ben Lomond about the 14th of June, 1948. He lived in various cheap hotels in the Mission District for a period of about a week, but then decided he would rather live in a private home. He walked about the district until he saw a sign advertising rooms for rent in a flat at 719 Capp Street. On either June 18th or 19th, 1948, he rented a room in the flat from Mrs. Felippa Griffiths, the victim. The rent receipt for $5.00 for the first week, which he paid in advance, was made out by one of the other roomers, a Mr. Cohn, at the request of Mrs. Griffiths. During the period of time that he resided in the flat he was not working and spent most of his time in his room. In order to explain this, he informed Mrs. Griffiths that he had been in the service, that he had a bad heart and that he was under medical treatment at Oak Knoll Hospital in Oakland. With the exception of some service in the Coast Guard, the other statements were untrue.
The defendant, a man about 20 years of age, gained the confidence of Mrs. Griffiths (a woman about 55 years of age) by telling her of his war service. Mrs. Griffiths’ son had been killed while serving in the armed forces overseas, and his body was being sent back to San Francisco for burial. It appears that the defendant endeared himself to her by telling her that he had been present and knew that the boys who had been killed while in the service had been given proper burials and that a priest had been in attendance. Mrs. Griffiths, by the defendant’s own admission, treated him like a son.
After leaving the house he called a man by the name of Fisher who, apparently, was a dealer in stolen property. He then left the articles at a restaurant on Mission Street where Fisher was to pick them up.
The body was not found until Tuesday by the daughter of the deceased. After the defendant had completed his ransacking of the flat he had locked both the kitchen and the back door so that when the daughter arrived to visit her mother she was unable to gain access to the premises, and it was only when the lock on the door was broken that she found her mother. When the police arrived they found the current rent receipt book with the one missing stub. The other roomers were questioned, and it was finally discovered that Mr. Cohn, who was then on a vacation trip to Oregon, was the one who had made out that particular receipt. Upon being questioned by the Oregon police, he remembered to whom it had been made out—a young man by the name of William Sanford. The police, having the description and name of the defendant, discovered that there were Sanfords living at No. 12 30th Street in San Francisco. These premises were watched for approximately eight hours. At about 2 o ’clock in the morning they saw a man leave, go to a restaurant and buy some pie and a newspaper. They then entered the house and found the defendant in one of the bedrooms under the bed. He was at once placed under arrest, and when he was searched, the police officers found in his pocket the stfib of the rent receipt which had been missing from the book. When the defendant was informed that he was being arrested for a murder which
At all times during the search for the articles the defendant was present with the officers. He talked voluntarily and replied freely when questions were put to him. The officers testified that the defendant readily admitted the crime and his other actions; he said that he expected the extreme penalty for his act, and that he was familiar with the fact that murder committed in the act of a robbery or burglary was murder of the first degree; he also said that he wanted the extreme penalty.
The jury, after deliberating one hour, found the defendant guilty of murder of the first degree without recommendation. After the verdict was in, defendant’s counsel expressed to the court the desire of defendant, evidently formulated after the jury retired to deliberate, that his plea of “not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity” be withdrawn, and that this was his wish regardless of what the verdict might be. The court inquired of defendant if that was what he wanted, and he answered that it was. Permission was then granted that the plea of “not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity” be withdrawn. At the request of the assistant district attorney, to which no objection was made by counsel for defendant, the report of three alienists appointed by the court to determine the sanity of defendant was incorporated in the motion. This report set forth the defendant’s family background ; a report of various crimes, arrests and sentences served by defendant; the details of the present crime; his manner,, his physical condition; his purpose of robbery in
The defendant, in his motion for a new trial upon all of the statutory grounds, further contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict, and assigned as error an instruction given to the jury that the only possible finding under the law would be that this was murder of the first degree. The motion for a new trial was denied. There was no instruction which could possibly be construed as defendant’s counsel contends. After the verdict was in, and the jurors were polled, the court made the following statement: “Ladies and Gentlemen, I know you have had a serious and very important decision to make. I think you made the only possible decision you could make in this case. I want to thank (you) for your attention and for your excellent service which you always render in this Court. You will be discharged now until further order. ’ ’
The defendant contends here that the provision of section 1126 of the Penal Code, which provides that questions of fact are to be decided by the jury, was overlooked by the trial judge when he gave the following instruction to the jury:
“Although there are two degrees of murder, the evidence in this case is such that either the defendant is innocent of the charge of murder or he is guilty of murder in the first' degree, for murder which is committed in perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery or burglary is murder in the first degree, whether the killing was intentional, unintentional or accidental.” It is contended that this instruction constitutes reversible error in that it, in effect, deprived the defendant of a jury trial by taking from the jury the determination of questions of fact.
There is no merit in defendant’s contention. Instructions are to be given with reference to the facts in evidence. The evidence presented at the trial by the People pointed indisputably to a homicide committed in the act of committing a felony—robbery or burglary, and no defense whatsoever was offered by the defendant. It is proper in such a case for the court to advise the jury that the defendant is either guilty or innocent of first degree murder. People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177 [ 148 P.2d 627 ]; People v. Perkins, 8 Cal.2d 502 [ 66 P.2d 631 ]; People v. Johnson, 219 Cal. 72 [ 25 P.2d 408 ], The instructions as a whole correctly stated the law and it is
The judgment and order are, and each of them is, accordingly affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Sehauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Alcalde 24 Cal.2d 177 p. 595
- People v. Perkins 8 Cal.2d 502 p. 595
- People v. Johnson 219 Cal. 72 p. 595