Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp.

Mr. and Mrs. Hayes brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when Mrs. Hayes fell into the grease pit of a gasoline service station operated by defendant Scavone and leased by him from defendant Richfield Oil Corporation. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs, judgment was entered accordingly, and defendant.Richfield has appealed.

The principal contentions are that the evidence is not sufficient to show that Richfield violated any duty which it owed to plaintiffs, that there was a material variance between pleadings and proof, that there were errors in the giving and refusal of instructions, and that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Mr. Hayes was a regular patron of the station and had taken Mrs. Hayes there on several occasions. He purchased gasoline, oil and accessories from Scavone, and for approximately a year he had been parking his private car on the premises while making business trips in a truck which was kept at a storage place across the street. Scavone had told him he could leave his car at the station while making these trips as long as he continued to trade there. Hayes’ work

At about 2:30 a. m. on the night of the accident Mr. and Mrs. Hayes left their car at the rear of the station, intending to take a trip in their truck. No attendant was present at the time, and all lights had been turned off except two lights inside the station building. Mr. and Mrs. Hayes walked along one side of the building following a course which was partially illuminated by a street lamp. They crossed the street to where the truck was parked but discovered that it was not in operating condition. They then started to return to their car by a shorter route which led along the other side of the station building where the illumination was not as good and objects could be only vaguely distinguished. Mr. Hayes walked ahead of his wife, and in the darkness she fell into the grease pit. She testified that she was not aware of the existence of the pit, and her husband stated that he knew of its location but did not think about it prior to the accident.

The pit was parallel to the rear wall of the station building, and it protruded on both sides about 5 feet beyond the extended lines of the building. It had concrete abutments 4 inches high at the ends and steel rails of the same height along the sides. There were sockets for guardrails, and the inventory attached to the lease listed chain guards for the pit, but no such protective devices were ever given to Seavone, and none had been used at any time prior to the accident.

When the accident occurred the pit was in the same condition as it was when Seavone took possession under his lease from Richfield. The lease recited that the property was designed for the operation of a gasoline service station and required Seavone to use it “primarily for such purpose,” to make no material alterations without the lessor’s consent and to maintain the premises in good order. In the event of a failure to repair, the lessor reserved the right to enter and make repairs. The lease could be terminated by either party on 24 hours’ notice.

About once a week a Richfield employee called at the station, inspected the grounds and made suggestions with respect to methods of increasing sales. On two occasions, when equipment was in need of repairs, Seavone called the company’s maintenance service, which did the necessary

The first question involves the sufficiency of the evidence. Plaintiffs urge that the judgment may be supported on any one of the following theories: (1) that Richfield retained joint control with the lessee over the property and was liable for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions thereon; (2) that Richfield assumed the duty of inspecting the property but performed that duty in a negligent manner; and (3) that the premises were in a dangerous condition when leased, that they Avere leased for a purpose involving admission of the public, and that the lessor was under a duty to see that they were safe for the purpose intended. We are of the opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to show that Richfield retained joint control or that it assumed the duty of inspecting the property but we need not discuss these contentions in detail since we have concluded that there is ample evidence to support a recovery on the third theory.

A lessor who leases property for a purpose involving the- admission of the public is under a duty- to see that it is safe for the purposes intended and to exercise reasonable care to inspect and repair the property before possession is transferred so as to prevent any unreasonable risk of harm to the public who may enter. (Burroughs v. Ben’s Auto Park, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 449 , 453 [ 164 P.2d 897 ]; King v. New Masonic Temple Assn., 51 Cal.App.2d 512 , 515 [ 125 P.2d 559 ]; Boothby v. Town of Yreka City, 117 Cal.App. 643 , 649 [ 4 P.2d 589 ].) There is authority that a lessor is not liable if the land is used for a public purpose not contemplated by the lease (see Prosser on Torts [1941] p. 655), but Richfield cannot amid liability on this ground. The lease to Scavone required him to use the premises “primarily” as a gasoline service station, and not only does this purpose involve admission of the public, but it appears

Although the premises were in the same condition at the time of the accident as they were when possession was delivered to Scavone, Richfield argues that they became dangerous only because Scavone had turned off all the lights at midnight without putting up any protective device around the pit. We cannot say as a matter of law, however, that the premises were safe even when fully illuminated. As we have seen the grease pit was open and unguarded, and while the lease listed chains for the pit as part of the equipment, and there were sockets for guardrails, no such means of protection were furnished to Scavone or placed in use prior to the accident. But if we should assume that the premises were safe when illuminated, there is nothing in the lease which required Scavone to. operate the station on a 24-hour basis or to keep it fully lighted throughout the night. In the absence of such requirements, the jury could have concluded that Richfield should reasonably have anticipated that Scavone might not wish to keep the station open day and night, that he might leave the lot dimly lighted when gasoline. was not being sold, and that customers might use the parking facilities when the station Avas not open for the sale of gasoline.

A more serious problem is presented by the Acriance betAveen the pleadings and proof. The complaint Avas framed on the theory that Richfield and Scavone were in joint control of the premises, and there Avas no allegation of the existence of a landlord and tenant relationship between them. It was alleged, hoAA'ever, that the injuries were caused by a dangerous condition on the premises and that the property

A variance between the allegations of a pleading and the proof will not be deemed material unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense on the merits, and a variance may be disregarded where the action has been as fully and fairly tried on the merits as though the variance had not existed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 469; Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal.2d 480 , 486 [ 196 P.2d 915 ]; see Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514 , 523 [ 203 P.2d 522 ]; Devens v. Goldberg, 33 Cal.2d 173 , 177 [ 199 P.2d 943 ]; Genger v. Albers, 90 Cal.App.2d 52 , 55 [ 202 P.2d 569 ].) In view of the trial court’s statements and rulings that the ease involved the law relating to a lessor’s duty under a lease contemplating admission of the public, Richfield is in no position to claim that it was misled by plaintiffs’ failure to amend their complaint. If anything, Richfield’s continued insistence that the issue was not presented by the pleadings indicates that it was fully aware that the court’s rulings would permit recovery under that theory. It does not appear that Richfield has been in any way prejudiced by the variance, and it may therefore be disregarded.

The last sentence of the instruction, as requested, was based on the decision in Burroughs v. Ben’s Auto Park, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 449 [ 164 P.2d 897 ], It obviously does not apply here since this case does not involve the renewal of a lease, and the trial court attempted to make the instruction fit the facts by deleting some of the language. Rich-field contends that the modification resulted in imposing upon it an absolute duty to enter and inspect for dangerous conditions arising after the transfer of possession. When the whole instruction is read, however, it is clear that the words “any such dangerous condition” in the last sentence necessarily refer to conditions existing on the leased premises at the time possession was transferred to the lessee. Moreover, any doubt in the minds of the jurors must have been removed by the next instruction in which they were again told that the lessor of property which is to be used for a purpose involving admission of the public “is required to exercise only reasonable care to inspect and repair the premises before possession is transferred to the lessee.”

Complaint is also made that the court should not have given the following instruction: “Even though a lessor is not bound to inspect the premises under the terms of the lease entered into with the tenant, if, despite this fact, he undertakes to make such inspection, he must exercise ordinary care in the making of such inspection.” It is argued that the instruction imposes upon a lessor a duty to remedy a dangerous condition which an inspection would reveal. The instruction, however, is not subject to that interpretation and imposes no such duty. Instead it sets forth one aspect of the general rule that a volunteer who undertakes to proceed affirmatively when he is not under a duty to do so must use reasonable care. (See Prosser on Torts [1941] pp. 194-197; cf. Janofsky v. Garland, 42 Cal.App.2d 655 , 657 [ 109 P.2d 750 ].)

The trial court properly refused to give instructions requested by Richfield which misstated the law relat- ' ing to the doctrine of assumption of risk. These instructions were to the effect that one assumes a risk “when he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care would know, that a danger exists” and voluntarily places himself within the area of danger, and that, to bar recovery, plaintiff must have actual knowledge of the danger “or the conditions must be such that he would have such knowledge if he exercised ordinary care. ’ ’ The doctrine of assumption of risk is based on the theory that there has been a voluntary acceptance of a risk, and such acceptance, whether express or implied, requires knowledge and appreciation of the risk. (See Rest.,

Finally, Richfield contends that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is argued that Mr. Hayes, who knew of the location of the pit, was negligent in failing to warn his wife of its existence and that his negligence must be imputed to her. As to Mrs. Hayes, it is argued that she was negligent in proceeding over unfamiliar ground in the darkness instead of returning to the car over the better lighted route by which they had left the premises. • The question of contributory negligence, however, was one of fact for the jury, and we cannot say that either plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. Under the evidence the jury could have concluded that Mr. Hayes was not negligent in failing to keep in mind the existence of the pit or in failing to warn his wife. It could also have found that Mrs. Hayes was not aware of the hazard and did not act unreasonably in assuming that there was nothing of a dangerous character on the premises. (See Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647 , 656 [ 122 P.2d 576 ]; Meindersee v. Meyers, 188 Cal. 498 , 502-504 [ 205 P. 1078 ].) The cases of Medcraft v. Merchants Exchange, 211 Cal. 404 [ 295 P. 822 ], and Powers v. Raymond, 197 Cal. 126 [ 239 P. 1069 ],

The judgment is affirmed.

Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 6, 1952. Schauer, J., did not participate therein.