Majority
On November 17, 1947, a final decree of divorce was entered dissolving the marriage of Frances Barr and George Barr. The decree awarded custody of their minor child to Frances. On January 10, 1952, upon application by George, the court modified the decree to award him the custody of the child. On January 14th, Frances filed notice of appeal from the modification order, and her appeal is presently pending in this court. Frances also filed a motion in the trial court to stay enforcement of the modification order.
On February 5,1952, upon application by Frances, the court modified the order of January 10th to grant her visitation rights. On March 16th, while the child was with Frances pursuant to the visitation provisions of the February 5th order, she refused to return the child to George and informed him that she intended to keep the child. Later that day George and police officers entered her home and forcibly took the child. Frances commenced the present habeas corpus proceeding in this court on March 21st. She contends that her appeal stayed the January 10th modification order and that she is therefore entitled to custody of the child pending appeal.
The first question presented is whether this court can properly issue habeas corpus in this case. Supersedeas is the usual remedy when an appellant seeks to vacate proceedings taken in the lower court in violation of a stay granted by statute. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. 250 , 252 [ 139 P. 69 ]; Romine v. Cralle, 83 Cal. 432 , 437 [ 23 P. 525 ] ; Holcomb v. Juster, 39 Cal.App. 462 , 463 [ 179 P. 445 ] ; see, also, Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 402 , 411 [ 232 P.2d 481 ].) In child custody actions, however, habeas corpus is an additional remedy to correct violations of stay provisions (In re Lukasik, 108 Cal.App.2d 438 , 446 [ 239 P.2d 492 ]; In re Browning, 108 Cal.App. 503 , 507 [ 291 P. 650 ]; In re Dupes, 31 Cal.App. 698 , 701 [ 161 P. 276 ]), since the writ will lie when a person entitled to custody of a minor child is denied possession thereof. (In re Mathews, 176 Cal. 156 , 158 [ 167 P. 873 ]; see 37 Cal.L.Rev. 455 , 473-474; 13 Cal. Jur. 251-252.)
Turning to the merits of the petition, it is clear that the appeal suspended the power of the trial court to enforce the order modifying the custody provisions of the divorce decree. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 946, 949; Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 676 , 680 [ 242 P.2d 321 ]; Ex parte Queirolo, 119 Cal. 635 , 636 [ 51 P. 956 ] ; In re Dupes, 31 Cal.App. 698 , 700 [ 161 P. 276 ].) “ [A] perfected appeal in an action for the custody of a child automatically constitutes a stay of proceedings and precludes a trial court from interfering with custody as it existed at the time of appeal.” (Foster v. Foster, 5 Cal.2d 669 , 672 [ 55 P.2d 1175 ]; see In re Lukasik, 108 Cal.App.2d 438 , 443 [ 239 P.2d 492 ].)
George relies on De Lemos v. Siddall, 143 Cal. 313 , 315 [ 76 P. 1115 ]. In that case this court held that habeas corpus would not lie when the order appealed from was executed before the appeal was perfected, on the ground that an appeal preserved the status quo at the time of appeal and did not operate to undo action taken before the appeal. In the present ease the order was executed by the trial court some 10 days after Frances perfected her appeal.
Frances’s right to habeas corpus is not affected by the February 5th order granting her visitation rights. Since the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify its order after an appeal had been perfected (Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 676 , 680-681 [ 242 P.2d 321 ] ; Vosburg v. Vosburg, 137 Cal. 493 [ 70 P. 473 ] ; Browne v. Browne, 60 Cal.App.2d 637 , 642 [ 141 P.2d 428 ]), the order of February 5th did not operate to supersede the order of January 10th. Accordingly, Frances is not prevented from obtaining habeas corpus to correct the trial court’s erroneous refusal to stay execution of the January 10th order.
Cases will undoubtedly arise where it would not be in the best interests of the child to remain for the duration of the appeal with the parent previously having custody. For instance, the very reason for modification of an earlier custody award may be that the parent having custody has been mistreating the child. In that situation it would obviously be undesirable to leave the child with the appellant. But this possibility does not authorize extralegal seizure of
The welfare of a child imperiled by remaining with the parent having custody thereof may be adequately protected by application to the court having jurisdiction over the appeal (Gantner v. Gantner, 38 Cal.2d 691 , 692 [ 242 P.2d 329 ]) or to the juvenile court. (In re Lukasik, 108 Cal.App.2d 438 , 445 [ 239 P.2d 492 ].) There is no contention in the present case that the child may not safely remain with the mother pending the appeal.
It is ordered that the child be delivered to the petitioner, who, pending determination of the appeal, is entitled to his custody pursuant to the terms of the final divorce decree.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Southern Pacific Co. v. Superior Court 167 Cal. 250 at 252 p. 27
- Romine v. Cralle 83 Cal. 432 at 437 p. 27
- Holcomb v. Juster 39 Cal.App. 462 at 463 p. 27
- Dabney v. Philleo 37 Cal.2d 402 at 411 p. 27
- Lukasik v. Superior Court 108 Cal.App.2d 438 at 446, at 443, at 445 p. 27, p. 29
- In re Browning 108 Cal.App. 503 at 507 p. 27, p. 29
- In re Dupes 31 Cal.App. 698 at 701, at 700 p. 27
- In re Mathews 176 Cal. 156 at 158 p. 27
- Lerner v. Superior Court 38 Cal.2d 676 at 680, at 680-681 p. 27, p. 28
- Ex parte Queirolo 119 Cal. 635 at 636 p. 27
- Foster v. Foster 5 Cal.2d 669 at 672 p. 27
- Reitano v. Yankwich 38 Cal.2d 1 p. 28
- In re De Lemos ex rel. Siddall 143 Cal. 313 at 315 p. 28
- Vosburg v. Vosburg 137 Cal. 493 p. 28
- Browne v. Browne 60 Cal.App.2d 637 at 642 p. 28
- Gantner v. Gantner 38 Cal.2d 691 at 692 p. 29