Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael

In these two consolidated actions plaintiff appeals from a judgment quieting title in defendants, city of San Rafael and city (sometimes in the record called town) of San Anselmo, for a strip of land claimed by plaintiff which is within the respective corporate limits of one or the other of the defendants and decreeing that plaintiff has no right, title, interest, claim or estate whatsoever in any part of such land. We have concluded that plaintiff’s construction of a deed executed by a common predecessor in interest of the parties to this litigation is correct, that essential findings and conclusions of the trial court cannot be sustained, and that the judgment should be reversed.

The actions were instituted in May, 1951, by plaintiff’s complaints to quiet title to the strip of land, formerly used as a railroad right of way. Each city answered with a general denial, and also pleaded 10 affirmative defenses, including claims of ownership in fee simple and by adverse possession under color of title, and of dedication of the land as a public highway. The trial court found that plaintiff had no ownership of any nature in the land, that defendants

In 1873, and for some years prior thereto, Patrick Hayes was the owner of a tract of land known as the Hayes Ranch and situated in San Rafael Township, Marin County, which township later became, in respective parts, the incorporated city of San Rafael and the incorporated city of San Anselmo. The Hayes Ranch contained some 150 acres, including the strip of land here involved. At that time the North Pacific Coast Railroad Company, hereinafter called the railroad, was a railroad corporation organized under the laws of the State of California (Stats. 1861, pp. 607-627). In January or February, 1873, the railroad commenced an action in eminent domain against Hayes and others seeking to condemn certain of their property. The strip involved in the present case was brought into the condemnation action by an amended complaint (hereinafter called the complaint), filed June 23, 1873, which alleges “V. That the taking of the lands hereinafter described is necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of said Railroad. That said lands are needed for tracks, side-tracks, depot grounds, and the permanent use of said corporation. VI. That the following are descriptions of each piece of land sought to be taken and condemned to the use aforesaid of plaintiff by this action. That all and each of the said pieces of land so sought to be taken are severally located in the County of Marin, in the State of California: . . .

“2d A right of way for the construction and use of said Railroad upon, over, and along a strip of land . . . described as follows: [Here appears a metes and bounds description of the strip of Hayes’ land presently involved].”

An order authorizing the railroad to take possession, issued by the court on July 11, 1873, also describes the property as “A right of way for the construction and use of said Railroad upon over and along a strip of land . . . described as follows. ’ ’

Hayes filed an answer to the complaint, but thereafter and prior to trial of the action, he conveyed the property to the railroad, by deed dated February 8, 1875, which states that he “doth grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the [railroad] . . . and to its successors, heirs and assigns forever,” the property involved. Such property is described, in the language of the railroad’s eminent domain complaint and of the order to take possession, as “all that right of way for the construction and use of said railroad upon, over and along a strip of land . . . described as follows: [Metes and bounds].” The deed recites a consideration of $4,500, and that “this conveyance is subject to mortgage on said land executed contemporaneous herewith by the [railroad to Hayes] . . . for $2000 of the purchase money which mortgage shall be and constitute a lien on said premises prior to all others.” The deed further provided that Hayes would have the right to open streets, avenues or crossings “across the right of way and connecting his land with the County Road,” (the old San Rafael-Olema road, Fourth Street in San Rafael and Redhill Avenue in San Anselmo). In the

The $2,000 mortgage mentioned in the deed was executed by the railroad on the same day, and both deed and mortgage were thereafter recorded. The railroad dismissed the eminent domain action so far as Hayes was concerned, and in October, 1875, the mortgage was released of record as having been fully paid.

In March, 1902, the railroad (North Pacific Coast Railroad Company) sold "its entire railroad system,” including its interest in the Hayes property here involved, to the North Shore Railroad Company. In January, 1907, the North Shore consolidated with other companies to form the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company.

Meanwhile, following the death of Patrick Hayes the Hayes Ranch was distributed to his widow, Mary Hayes; and on January 5, 1893, Mary Hayes conveyed the ranch by grant deed to Martin B. Magnesen "subject to the right of way of the North Pacific Coast Rail Road Company, conveyed by deed from Patrick Hayes to said Company, dated February 8th, 1875.” (Italics added.)

Magnesen began subdividing the ranch, and recorded two subdivision maps' of San Rafael Heights. He reserved on these maps an area 15 feet in width abutting for its entire length the southerly side of the strip of land here involved. The remainder of the subdivision was divided into numbered lots.

In January, 1913, Magnesen sold and granted to the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company, "A tract of land ten (10)

In February, 1923, Bacigalupi conveyed by grant deed to Davis, and in August, 1925, Davis conveyed (with certain lots excepted) to Highland Realty Company, the plaintiff in the present litigation. So far as here material the description in the deed from Bacigalupi to Davis and in that from Davis to plaintiff is the same as that in the deed from Magnesen to Bacigalupi • that is, the northerly boundary is stated to be the Olema Road, sometimes called Fourth Street, and the railroad right of way.

On March 1, 1941, the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company discontinued suburban service, and on November 9, 1942, was issued a permit authorizing abandonment of the portion of the line which included the right of way here involved. The dismantling of the railroad line on this portion of its right of way was completed on March 31, 1943.

On February 1, 1945, the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company executed two quitclaim deeds, one to the city of San Rafael and one to the city of San Anselmo (defendants herein), quitclaiming to the respective cities that portion of its former right of way here involved which lay within the corporate limits of the city. By these deeds the railroad also quitclaimed to the respective cities the portion of the 10-foot strip of land south of and adjoining the right of way, which lay within the appropriate city’s corporate limits. Fifteen other parcels of land were included in the railroad’s deed to San Rafael, and the city paid a total purchase price of $2,650, which it appropriated by means of a “charter ordinance.” The deed from the railroad to San Anselmo recited a consideration of $10.

In 1943 the public began using the strip of land here in

The briefs of the parties herein comprise some 370 pages and are replete with contentions, arguments, charges and countercharges. For purposes of this opinion, however, the following appear to be the points which are pertinent to resolution of the present appeal:

The first question is whether by the 1875 deed Patrick Hayes conveyed to the railroad only an easement over the strip of land presently involved, or whether the railroad received title to the underlying land itself. For several reasons it appears that only an easement passed.

By the condemnation action the railroad had previously filed against Hayes it could have taken only an easement although by purchase it could acquire the underlying land. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1239, subd. 2; People v. Ocean Shore Railroad (1948), 32 Cal.2d 406 , 415 [ 196 P.2d 570 , 6 A.L.R. 1179 ]; City of Oakland v. Schenck (1925), 197 Cal. 456 , 466 [ 241 P. 545 ]; see also 17 Cal.Jur.2d 758-759; People v. Thompson (1954), 43 Cal.2d 13 , 20 [ 271 P.2d 507 ].) As related hereinabove, the deed, which was given only after the railroad had seemingly already constructed its tracks under the court’s order of possession, followed the language of the railroad’s eminent domain complaint and the order of possession in describing the property as a “right of way for the construction and use of said Railroad upon, over, and along a strip of land . . . described as follows . . .” It thus appears that the deed conveyed exactly that which the railroad sought, and was authorized, to condemn; i.e., an easement, and nothing more. The fact that in his

Defendants argue that Magnesen’s conveyance of a fee in a 10-foot strip of land adjoining the railroad right of way, as described above, indicates that he construed the Hayes’ deed of 1875 to the railroad as having conveyed land rather than an easement. Magnesen was not, however, a party to the 1875 deed, and moreover, his own conveyance of the 10-foot strip was, as already mentioned herein, of “A tract of land ten (10) feet in width adjoining and lying south of . . . the right of way” (italics added) of the railroad. The language of his own deed thus indicates a distinction between the nature and extent of the property interest or right he was conveying and that conveyed by the 1875 deed.

From what has been said, it follows that title to the

Defendants also suggest that they have rights of some nature based upon adverse possession. In the first place, however, as noted hereinabove, the trial court expressly found that plaintiff had no ownership of any nature in the land here involved and that defendants claimed an interest therein “but that such claim was not adverse to” plaintiff in view of plaintiff’s lack of interest in the property, and that fee title to the land is in defendants. Under such circumstances it is clear that defendants’ claims under their affirmative defenses of adverse possession and of dedication of the land

Next, defendants assert that in any event, “inasmuch as the property in question was devoted to a public use, the rights of the owner of the reversion, if any, in such a case will be abridged in the public interest and the remedy of ejectment will be denied because the public use has intervened,” (see Beals v. City of Los Angeles (1943), 23 Cal.2d 381 , 388 [ 144 P.2d 839 ]; Gurnsey v. Northern Calif. Power Co. (1911), 160 Cal. 699 , 711-712 [ 117 P. 906 , 36 L.R.A.N.S. 185 ]), and plaintiff will be relegated to an action for damages. Plaintiff concedes that defendants’ pleadings “show on their face that defendants have entered upon the land, and have in effect taken it by inverse condemnation, for which taking plaintiff must be paid just compensation” if the court finds that defendants’ contentions of devotion to a public use should be upheld. Although plaintiff states that it seeks possession of its land by this quiet title action, and argues the evidence does not show such a public need as claimed by defendants, plaintiff nevertheless suggests that this court has the power to make a finding of intervention of public use under the provisions of section 956a of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s own evidentiary arguments clearly show, however, that the matter should originally be determined by the trial court. (See Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935), 2 Cal.2d 351 , 378 [ 40 P.2d 486 ]; Churchill v. Kellstrom (1943), 58 Cal.App.2d 84 , 90 [ 136 P.2d 602 ]; Peckwith v. Lavezzola (1942), 50 Cal.App.2d 211 , 218 [ 122 P.2d 678 ].)

Defendants further urge that if plaintiff is awarded only damages, rather than possession of the land, then the matter is governed by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to an action in trespass (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 338, subd. 2), rather than by the five-year period applicable to a possessory action, and that therefore any right to damages is barred. Although where the action is brought for the recovery of damages for trespass the three-year statute has been ap

Finally, the parties differ as to whether, in ease plaintiff is relegated to damages rather than to possession, such damages are to be assessed by a jury. Plaintiff insists that inasmuch as this proceeding was commenced as an, equitable quiet title action any issue as to damages is likewise equitable and to be tried by the court alone, whereas defendants urge a jury trial. Although no ease precisely in point has been cited or discovered, the general provision of section 14 of article I of the Constitution that “which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil eases in a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law,” would appear to apply to compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding with the same force as in any other eminent domain matter. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 738; 17 Cal.Jur.2d 596, § 15, and p. 598, § 18, and cases there cited.) In Tyler v. Tehama County (1895), 109 Cal. 618 , 624 [ 42 P. 240 ], it was declared that an inverse condemnation action is clearly within the constitutional provision prohibiting the taking or damaging of private property for public use without the payment of just compensation therefor, and various other rules usually followed in eminent domain actions have been applied by the cases to inverse condemnation proceedings. (See Heimann v. City of Los Angeles (1947), 30 Cal.2d 746 , 753 [ 185 P.2d 597 ] [costs]; Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist. (1931), 213 Cal. 554 , 572 [ 2 P.2d 790 ] [costs]; 18 Cal.Jur.2d 98, §§ 377, 378, and cases there cited.) On this point,

The judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.