Majority
This is an appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment entered in an action to recover damages for the flooding of their land. The verdict of the jury was for defendant J. J. Simpson.
In 1932 and 1933 plaintiffs and defendants were in possession of adjoining tracts of land in Yuba County. Plaintiffs held their property under a contract of purchase, a forty-acre tract which they had improved and were operating as a dairy farm. The adjoining tract of five hundred acres, in possession of defendant J. J. Simpson, as lessee, was largely farmed to rice and was irrigated and flooded during the rice season with water imported from an outside source.
Plaintiffs charged that in August and September, 1932, and again in September, 1933, defendants “wilfully, negligently and carelessly caused water to be diverted from their said land onto, overflowing and flooding the land of plaintiffs” and carelessly allowed the water to remain upon the land of plaintiffs for a period of about eight days until the same became stagnant, menacing the health of plaintiffs and their family, causing the air to become foul, dairy cows to become diseased from drinking stagnant water, crops to be destroyed
The lease of defendant J. J. Simpson was not renewed in 1934 and therefore the issue of injunction was dispensed with. Plaintiffs dismissed the action against all defendants except J. J. Simpson, and the case went to the jury on the question of liability for damages alone. After denial of their motion for a new trial plaintiffs prosecuted this appeal.
The evidence was conflicting as to the cause of the overflowing of the rice water in 1932. In that year defendant had a border check, or levee, along the southern border of his land, which lay to the north of plaintiffs’ land, this levee being between the two properties, it having been constructed by defendant to prevent water from flowing onto plaintiffs’ land during the time defendant was draining the rice lands. The evidence showed that during this year and at various times prior to the release of the rice waters by defendant, plaintiff Karl Rozewski cut holes in this border check and took water from defendants’ land onto his own for the purpose of irrigating his lands. One of defendant’s sons testified: “In 1932, we was draining the water off the rice field to let the rice get a start and that is when he (Karl Rozewski) came and asked me if he could have some of that water because his ditch wasn’t fixed to get water and if he could take that water he wouldn’t have to pay for it.” This witness tol,d plaintiff he could have such water as he needed, as it was only spill water anyway. Defendant produced evidence to show such damage as resulted in this year was caused by water flowing onto plaintiffs’ land by the openings plaintiff Karl Rozewski had made. One witness testified that in 1932 a little water might have got on plaintiffs’ land from the draining but that it was not enough “to hurt anything”, and also that Karl Rozewski did not complain to defendants about
As to the flooding in 1933, it was shown that defendant caused to be erected a solid, substantial levee, about four feet high, between his land and plaintiffs ’, to keep the water from flowing upon the land of the latter during the unwatering season; that plaintiff Karl Rozewski cut a large hole in this levee, at the northeast corner of his land and took water through it from defendant’s land onto his own, from time to time during the summer, and that later in the summer and about the time defendant was preparing to drain his rice lands this plaintiff installed a check box, with removable board, in the hole made by him in the levee in order to facilitate the release of water from defendant’s land onto his own. It appeared that a highway ran along the east side of plaintiffs’ land up through and intersecting that of defendant, and that on each side of this highway there was a drainage ditch through which, it appears, both parties had the right to drain water from their land. Defendants drained their rice land immediately to the north of plaintiffs’ land without any water getting onto plaintiffs’ land, the board being in place in the check box during this time. It was shown that defendants spent a much longer time draining this parcel of land than would have been necessary ordinarily, because the drainage ditches on either side of the highway were grown up with weeds and tule, and would permit only .the flow of a limited amount of water at a time. It also appeared that a day or so before Labor Day of 1933, defendants having finished the draining of the land immediately to the north of plaintiff, began to drain their rice land on the east side of the highway, to the north of plaintiffs’ land; that before so doing, they inspected their levee thoroughly, saw that the check box belonging to plaintiffs had its board in place, and closed and sealed the box with mud to ensure its safety; that during the night of Labor Day someone (the record does not disclose who it was) removed the protecting board from the check box and in the morning plaintiffs’ land was covered
Upon this evidence, in some particulars of which there was a sharp conflict, the jury returned their verdict in favor of the defendant J. J. Simpson. But plaintiffs contend that defendant was liable on the theory that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects there anything likely to do mischief, keeps it at his peril, and if it escapes, is prima facie liable for any damages which are a natural consequence of its escape. (Fletcher v. Rylands. 3 H. L. 330.) We do not find it necessary to now determine whether or not the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands, supra, is applicable in this state. The doctrine was apparently repudiated in the case of Sutliff v. Sweetwater Water Co., 182 Cal., 34 [ 186 Pac. 766 ], in reference to a factual situation somewhat similar to the case here involved; it was apparently followed in the eases of Parker v. Larsen, 86 Cal. 236 [ 24 Pac. 989 , 21 Am. St. Rep. 30 ]; Kall v. Carruthers, 59 Cal. App. 555 [ 211 Pac. 43 ]; Nola v. Orlando, 119 Cal. App. 518 [ 6 Pac. (2d) 984 ]; and in the late case of Green v. General Petroleum Co., 205 Cal. 328 [ 270 Pac. 952 , 60 A. L. R. 475 ], the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands, supra, was apparently approved. (See generally: 17 Cal. L. Rev. 188 ; 20 Cal. L. Rev. 665 ; 5 So. Cal. L. Rev. 263-272; 2 So. Cal. L. Rev. 90.) However, in the present case, whether the defendant’s liability is that of an insurer or whether it is predicated upon negligence is immaterial, for the reason that the evidence is clearly susceptible of the interpretation that the injury was caused solely and exclusively by the acts of the plaintiffs themselves. Here it is shown that plaintiffs’ land would not have been flooded but for their own acts in cutting holes in defendant’s levees and installing the check box in one of the openings. The levee having been erected by defendant for the sole purpose of protecting plaintiffs’ land from the overflowing of the water and plaintiffs having 'installed the check
Plaintiffs also complain of the giving of two instructions on the theory of negligence. While these instructions are not compatible with the theory of absolute liability upon which plaintiffs rely, they were not improper on the theory of negligence. Furthermore, instructions were given on the doctrine of absolute liability. Considering all of the instructions, as a whole, they were manifestly fair to plaintiffs and they cannot complain now, that the jury has found against them upon issues framed by themselves, that these two instructions on negligence should not have been given.
The jury having found in favor of defendant upon conflicting evidence, and there being substantial evidence in the record to sustain such finding, the judgment is affirmed.
Cases cited
- Parker v. Larsen 86 Cal. 236 p. 520
- Kall v. Carruthers 59 Cal. App. 555 p. 520
- Nola v. Orlando 119 Cal. App. 518 p. 520
- Green v. General Petroleum Corp. 205 Cal. 328 p. 520