Mack v. Younger

lied, inter alia, on Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.^[1] Rather than delay finality, we followed prior practice (see, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728 , 111 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 557 P.2d 929 ]) and modified our opinion to reserve jurisdiction to determine the motion in due season. (21 Cal.3d at p. 120.) We then deferred acting on the motion until we had rendered our decision in Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 593 P.2d 200 ]. In Woodland Hills we held that section 1021.5 is applicable to all cases not yet final at the time the statute became effective (Jan. 1, 1978). {Id. at pp. 930-932.) Concluding that petitioner was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under this statute, we granted his motion for such an award on August 9, 1979. Because the underlying proceeding was a petition for original writ in this court rather than an appeal, however, we were unable to follow our practice of remanding such motions to the court in which the trial was held for the purpose of taking evidence on, and fixing, the reasonable amount of fees to be awarded. (See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 , 50 [141 CaLRptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 ].) We therefore appointed a referee to perform that duty.

Counsel for the parties thereafter negotiated a settlement of petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees and executed an agreement and release to that effect. The referee has now filed his report, submitting this settlement agreement to us with his approval. We adopt the terms of the agreement as our decision on the motion. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees against the State of California in the amount of $14,992.40, without interest.

Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.