Appling v. Des Granges

Katherine des Granges was declared insane hy the County Court of Brown County, Wisconsin, on October 12, 1911. Thereafter, in a proceeding in the Superior Court of Orange County, California, the appellant herein was appointed guardian of the person and estate of said Katherine des Granges, and is still acting as such guardian. On July 1, 1926, the County Court of Brown County, Wisconsin, entered a judgment and decree declaring Katherine des Granges to be sane. Thereafter the respondent herein, as friend and attorney for said Katherine des Granges, filed a petition alleging that the said Katherine des Granges is now sane and competent, and praying that the court order an investigation into her mental condition,

The court found “that the said Katherine des Granges is now sane and of sound mind and fully capable of caring for herself and managing her property.” The only question involved in this appeal is whether or not the evidence sustains this finding. The ward was not present at the hearing, being then in the state of Wisconsin, and all of the evidence introduced by the petitioner was in the form of depositions. The respondent sets forth in his brief, his own summary of the evidence introduced, and relied on as being sufficient to sustain the finding in question,, as follows:

“Summarized the Witnesses Testify as Follows:

“1. Dr. A. 0. Olmsted—‘She is sane.’

“2. Dr R. M. Burden—‘She appeared to be normal. Is sane. ’

“3. Lorraine Ross, Nurse—‘She was exceptionally bright. Is sane.’

“4. Dora Brown—‘She was sane.’

“5. Arthur Brown—‘She was well enough to be paroled. She is sane. She is all right. ’

“6. Jacob Landenklos—‘She is all right as near as I can tell.’

“7. Emma Luecke—‘I think she is sane. ’

“8. Charles F. Luecke—‘She conversed normally. I judged her sane. ’

“9. Minnie Sehoen—‘She is sane. I have never seen anything wrong with her. Her memory is good. ’

“10. L. M. Sehoen—‘I regard her sane. I never saw anything wrong with the woman. ’

“11. Harrie des Granges—‘She appears to be intelligent. She acted normally. ’ ”

While the parties testified as stated, it is necessary to consider their testimony in the light of the questions asked of them, and the context. Dr. Olmsted was asked as to whether he had examined the ward and whether he had formed an opinion as to whether she was sane. Also, the following: “Q. State whether or not you and Dr. Burdon did determine her sanity?

While the evidence is sufficient to sustain the findings that the ward is sane, that is, of sound mind, we think it is not sufficient to sustain the other essential findings that she is “fully capable of caring for herself and managing her property.” There is a difference between insanity and mental incompetency to handle one’s property. “The words, ‘insane’ and ‘incompetent’ are not necessarily convertible terms, as a person may be incompetent by reason of insanity or from some other cause.” (14 Cal. Jur. 333.) “A weak mind may be sound, and a strong mind unsound.” (14 Cal. Jur. 335, and cases cited.)

This action was brought under section 1766 oi the Code of Civil Procedure. This section relates to the legal restoration to capacity of a person whose capacity to act in matters of business has been legally taken away through the procedure provided for by other sections of the same article of this code. Section 1763, providing the manner of beginning such a guardianship proceeding, reads in part: “When it is represented . . . that any person is insane, or from any cause mentally incompetent to manage Ms property.” Section 1764 provides what must be found by the court before a guardian is appointed. The essential thing to be found is that “the person in question is incapable of taking care of himself and managing his property.” Sections 1764 and 1767 together provide a test by which the condition of the alleged incompetent is to be measured. (In re Cassidy, 95 Cal. App. 641 [ 273 Pac. 69 ].) If, measured by the test, the person in question is found to be incompetent a guardian is appointed, regardless of whether the incompétency is due to insanity or to some other cause. (Matter of Coburn, 165 Cal. 202 [ 131 Pac. 352 ].) It being necessary only to prove such incompetency to secure the appointment of a guardian, this being in the interest Of the person affected and for the preservation of his property, it would be logical that the converse would be true in a proceeding to do away with the guardianship. Not only logic, but the statute dictates this. Section 1766, under which this proceeding is brought, provides also what

Upon the conclusion of petitioner’s ease the appellant moved for a dismissal upon the ground that, irrespective of insanity, there was no proof that the ward was competent. Answering this, the attorney for respondent said, in part: “This court is not going to split hairs to the extent of pleading of this sort when we allege sufficient in our petition and sufficient to have her discharged from the insane asylum; as to how competent she is is another matter; in the evidence it says she is a smart, old woman; there is nothing in the record, your Honor; no evidence offered to show she was incompetent or insane, and we have the record before the court that she is sane, and that court can’t hold people in asylums when they are sane; the Wisconsin courts don’t—” This proceeding bears no relation to the question of confinement or release from an insane asylum. (Sullivan v. Dunne, 198 Cal. 183 [ 244 Pac. 343 ].) When the case was submitted the court said: “I tMnk the only thing we are concerned with is whether or not the woman is sane or insane; it is conclusively shown that J. P. des Granges was

There is no evidence to support the finding of the court as to competency, unless, from the testimony of the witnesses on the question of insanity, an inference may reasonably .be drawn that she was capable of taking care of herself and her property. The ward was about seventy-six years of age, had been in a state hospital for the. insane in Wisconsin for about fourteen years and was not present at the trial. Viewing the evidence as a whole, under the existing circumstances, we think such an inference cannot be reasonably -drawn. The rule is that where there is any substantial conflict in the evidence, the conclusion reached by the trial court, after weighing the evidence and considering the inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, will not be disturbed. Not only is it true that the inferences referred to cannot reasonably be drawn from the evidence here, but the record discloses that the court proceeded upon the theory that the question of the ward’s ability to handle her property was not in issue. It is the duty of the court to zealously guard the property of a person who has been declared to be insane or incompetent (Sullivcvn v. Dunne, supra), and upon a proceeding to restore such a person to capacity, to require proof not only of said person’s sanity, but also of his ability to take care of his property, and that he is not likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons.

Por the reasons given the judgment is reversed.

Marks, J., deeming himself disqualified, took no part in the decision of this case.

I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Barnard. Were it not for the fact that the investigation before the court in the proceeding from which this appeal was taken was obviously confined to the question of the mental sanity of the ward, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment of restoration to capacity to manage her own affairs might be upheld.

The trial court found in favor of capacity, and there were general statements of the witnesses for petitioner as to her general competency. But, as pointed out in the opinion here, the testimony was all directed to the question of sanity, and the statements of the trial judge, as shown in the record, so clearly indicate that the findings were governed by the sole question as to whether the petitioner was sane or insane, that it must be conceded that the further conditions affecting her competency to take care of herself or her property, were not taken into account.

Insanity implies want of capacity, but the mere restoration to sanity, such as justifies a discharge from detention in an asylum, does not determine such a restoration as to terminate the necessity for guardianship.

This is indicated by section 2189 of the Political Code, which provides under the subhead “Certificate of Discharge,” that such certificate of discharge, where no guardian has been appointed, “shall have the same legal force and effect as a judgment of restoration to capacity made under the provisions of section 1766 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (See, as bearing on this point, Aldrick v. Barton, 153 Cal. 488 [ 95 Pac. 900 ].)

Where such guardian has been appointed there is no method of restoration to capacity provided excepting by the procedure under section 1766 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that section distinctly provides for the calling and examination of witnesses on the hearing, and if it is found that the person is of sound mind, “and capable of . taking care of himself and his property, his restoring to capacity must be adjudged, and the guardianship of such person, if such is not a minor, must cease.”

In a case like this, where the person under disability is shown to be seventy-six years of age .and has been for fourteen years confined for insanity, the question not only