Dreyer v. Cyriacks

While the plaintiff Faust, accompanied by two companions, named Richardson and Kempin, were leaving the home of the defendant Cyriacks in an automobile following a quarrel which had taken place there, Cyriacks fired three shots from a rifle at the automobile. One of the bullets embedded itself in the spare tire, another hit Kempin’s hat and the other penetrated the rear of the automobile and struck and killed a dog belonging to plaintiffs, which, unknown to Cyriacks, was riding on the rear seat with Kempin. Thereafter plaintiffs brought this action for damages for the killing of the dog and upon trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County a jury awarded them $100,000 actual and $25,000 punitive damages. The trial court set aside the verdict and granted a new trial, one of the grounds therefor being that the verdict was excessive.

The dog was of the breed known as German police dog, and the scene of the shooting was in or near Hollywood, the dog being worked in the moving picture industry and known as “Peter the Great”. All of the interested parties to this controversy are connected with the same industry. The circumstances leading up to the shooting are sharply conflicting, and it would be unnecessary to inquire into them except that under section 3340 of the Civil Code exemplary damages may be awarded “for wrongful injuries to animals being subjects of property, committed wilfully or by gross negligence, in disregard of humanity”; and the jury awarded plaintiffs an extra $25,000 to cover such element. It appears from the evidence that on the night of the shooting all of the parties had been drinking, and that there was considerable animosity existing between Faust and Cyriacks which arose over the fact that several days previously Faust had called at Cyriacks’ home while he was away and as he claims insulted his housekeeper.

The shooting took place shortly after dark. Late that afternoon Richardson and his wife were making a call at Faust’s house and a quarrel took place between Richardson and his wife, because she persisted in petting Peter the

The well-settled rule is that the matter of granting or refusal to grant a motion for a new trial is largely within the discretion of the trial court (Work v. Whittington, 61 Cal. App. 302 [ 214 Pac. 474 ]); that in passing upon such motion the trial court is not bound by the rule of conflicting

Even where the evidence is not conflicting and all the proof seems to be favorable to one or the other of the parties litigant, the question of the probative force or the evidentiary value of the testimony is nevertheless within the ■ determination of the trial court in a proceeding on motion for a new trial. (Otten v. Spreckels, 24 Cal. App. 251 [ 141 Pac. 224 ]; Roberts v. Southern Pac. Co., 54 Cal. App. 315 [ 201 Pac. 958 ].) It may be conceded that the rule controlling in cases where the reviewing court is asked to reverse a judgment upon the ground of excessive verdict, after the trial court has refused to set aside the same, is that the verdict must stand unless it is so grossly disproportionate to any reasonable limit of compensation warranted by the facts as to shock the sense of justice, and raise at once a strong presumption that it is based on prejudice, passion or corruption, rather than sober judgment. (Szasz v. Joyland Co., 84 Cal. App. 259 [ 257 Pac. 871 ]; Reneau v. Hirsch, 88 Cal. App. 1 [ 262 Pac. 1100 ] ; Morris v. Standard Oil Co., 188 Cal. 468 [ 205 Pac. 1073 ].) But where, as here, we are asked to review the act of the court, where in the exercise of its discretionary power it has seen fit to set aside the verdict on this ground, a very different rule prevails. Every intendment is to be indulged here in support of the action of the court below, and it will not be disturbed if the question of its propriety be open to debate. (Harrison v. Sutter Street R. Co., 116 Cal. 156 [ 47 Pac. 1019 ].)

Furthermore, where a trial court grants a new trial upon the ground that the verdict is excessive, the declaration of the court that it is excessive does not necessarily mean that the trial court was of the opinion that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice. It is susceptible of the interpretation that the trial court was not satisfied that the

In the present case several witnesses estimated the value of the dog to be from $150,000 to $200,000, but in view of the other testimony in the case showing the amounts the dog had earned, etc., it is obvious the estimates fixed by these witnesses were fabulous, and based entirely on fanciful speculation. ° Consequently, under the authorities above cited the trial court was not bound to accept the same and was more than justified in holding that the award of $100,000 was grossly excessive. Moreover, it would seem to require no discussion to point out that under the circumstances under which the shooting took place, the award of $25,000 as punitive damages was likewise grossly excessive.

With reference to the question of the amount of the verdict plaintiffs have cited us to an array of cases from thirty states of the Union and from England and Canada. But not one of them relates to the destruction of an animal. They all concern the death of or injury to human beings, and it is absurd to argue that in fixing damages the value of human lives and the value of dogs are to be measured by the same standard. As declared in section 491 of the Penal Code, “Dogs are personal property, and their value is to be ascertained in the same manner as the value of other property,” but certainly the value of a human life is not to be so determined.

Plaintiffs say in their brief: “. . . it must be remembered, that Peter the Great was a motion picture star, he was a gift to humanity. ‘Peter the Great’ is a name that will go down in history as the most human like dog that ever displayed its skill in a film drama. His name was a symbol of loyalty, devotion, nobility, and heroic exploits. Peter the Great, king of the silver screen, was the playmate of mankind. He lived and struggled, suffered and sacrificed, to make countless thousands happy and cheerful. He made the multitude laugh and cry, wonder and admire. Peter the Great sent them to their homes with pictures of high ideals and unselfish service; the clean, and pure, the good in thought, example and action. Peter the Great was a by-word

The conclusion we have reached upon the action of the trial court in granting a new trial upon the ground that the verdict was excessive makes it unnecessary to consider the second ground upon which the order was based, namely, erroneous instructions.

The order appealed from is therefore affirmed.

Tyler, P. J., and Oashin, J., concurred.