Majority
Guy B. Chandler died intestate in 1928. His heirs at law and next of kin are a son and daughter by a former marriage, who are appellants in this matter, and his widow, who is administratrix of his estate and respondent herein. A return and report having been filed by a duly appointed inheritance tax appraiser and appraiser for the estate, these appellants filed objections thereto. They also filed a petition for a partial distribution, and in addition objected to the making of a family allowance. The respondent having filed an answer to the
It is apparent, and it is virtually conceded by the appellants, that if the court’s finding that these parties were legally married on November 22, 1909, is sustained, the property involved would be community property. Under our view of the record before us, the determination of that question is decisive of this appeal. The respondent testified that she was married to Guy B. Chandler on November 22, 1909, in Tiajuana, Mexico. She testified in considerable detail as to exactly what occurred on that occasion in Tiajuana, describing the parties present, including one man who knew Mr. Chandler; that an interpreter told them to write their names, which she and her husband did; that certain things were repeated that she did not remember; and that the interpreter repeated, in closing, that “Ton are now pronounced man and wife under the Mexican law.” She further testified that at that time a marriage certificate was given to Mr. Chandler; that the following day they returned to her mother’s home in Los Angeles, where she •introduced Mr. Chandler as her husband; that he then showed her mother the marriage certificate which she read; that her mother read Spanish, having formerly lived in South America; that they remained at her mother’s home
“Every intendment of the law leans to matrimony. When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of proof, the law raises a strong presumption of its legality,—not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout, in every particular, to make plain, against the constant pressure of presumption, the truth of law and fact that it is illegal and void.”
Not only is this presumption evidence, in itself, but it has been held that a presumption may, under certain circumstances, even outweigh positive evidence to the contrary. (Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., (Cal.) 287 Pac. 343 ).
In addition to this positive testimony and to the presumption referred to, the record discloses some evidence which tends to corroborate the respondent’s testimony. One of respondent’s sisters testified that she was present at her mother’s home when respondent and Mr. Chandler came there in November, 1909; that they told her mother they had been married in Mexico and gave her a paper to read; that her mother read the paper and said “I am sorry you had to go to Tiajuana to get married”; that they remained there that night and left the next day. Another sister of respondent testified that before these parties went to Tiajuana, they told her they were going down there to get married; that she was present at her mother’s home the following night when they returned, and Mr. Chandler told them that they were married. The evidence is absolutely uncontradicted that from 1909 until Mr. Chandler died,
The marriage of these parties having been shown in evidence by some proof, the burden in attacking the validity of that marriage was upon the appellants. (Wilcox v. Wilcox, supra.) The record is absolutely devoid of any direct evidence to the effect that the marriage of these parties did not take place in 1909. Appellants, however, make a determined attack upon this marriage in' two respects, which will now be considered. They first rely upon certain evidence that no record could be found that such a marriage took place at Tiajuana in November, 1909. There was introduced in evidence the deposition of a person who described himself as “Judge of the Civil Register of Ensenada, Lower Cal.” He testified that Tiajuana was in his district during the year 1909, but was not now; that he had, in his possession the records of the marriages performed within the district of Ensenada during the year 1909; that he examined these records and did not find any record of a marriage between Guy B. Chandler and this respondent on November 22, 1909, or on any other day of that year. He further testified that he himself took office in August, 1927; that he had all of the records of his office up to the year 1916; and that the law required that the births, marriages and deaths be registered in separate books. Opposed to this was the testimony of a witness who testified that he visited Tiajuana and Ensenada on two occasions and searched through these records; that the records were separate for each month, and in each file there was a record of births, marriages and deaths; that each
It is next urged by the appellants that a subsequent marriage of these parties conclusively proves that they were not married in 1909. The record contains evidence that these parties were married at Ventura, California, on August 30, 1918. This is conceded by respondent, who explains that fact by stating that a number of newspaper articles appeared about that time to the effect that the governor of Lower California had asserted that such marriages in Tiajuana were void, and that he had advised such parties to be married again. She further testified that when this appeared, Mr. Chandler thought it would be best for them to be married again, and that through his suggestion they did so. The effect of this evidence was to be determined by the trial court, and if the evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding as to a prior marriage the court’s
No other evidence was offered by the appellants in any manner contradicting or attempting to contradict the validity of the marriage in 1909, it being even conceded by them that the parties lived together and were reputed to be husband and wife from that day until the husband’s death. To rebut the positive evidence of the fact of a marriage in 1909 shown by the record before us, and the presumption above referred to, it was necessary for the appellants to introduce evidence which carried conviction to the mind of the trial court. (Dierks v. Newsom, 49 Cal. App. 789 [ 194 Pac. 518 ].) In this they apparently failed, and no evidence is shown which is sufficient to upset the finding of the trial court in that respect. The most that' can be said of the matters relied on by appellants is that they create a conflict. Not only are the findings sustained by the evidence, but, we think, by a preponderance thereof. When two people have lived together as man and wife for nearly twenty years, under the circumstances here disclosed, the validity of their marriage should not be easily set aside. Not only is there no direct evidence to the contrary, but the only evidence relied upon to upset the marriage contains inherent weaknesses which are fully apparent.
The views we have expressed upon the principal question involved render it unnecessary to consider the other points raised.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Marks, J., and Jennings, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on May 19, 1931, and a petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1931.
Cases cited
- In re Estate of Richards 133 Cal. 524 p. 633
- Budd v. Morgan 187 Cal. 741 p. 633
- Landsrath v. Industrial Accident Commission 77 Cal. App. 509 p. 633
- Wilcox v. Wilcox 171 Cal. 770 p. 633
- Dierks v. Newsom 49 Cal. App. 789 p. 636