People v. Roderick

The defendants were jointly charged with having murdered one Frank Roderick. They were tried together before one jury and separate verdicts were returned finding each defendant guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree and fixing the punishment of each at imprisonment for life. Motions for new trials were made and denied .and judgments were pronounced. Appeals have been taken by said defendants from the judgments and the orders denying their motions for new trial.

Frank Roderick, deceased, lived upon a ranch in San Mateo County with his wife, his children and a hired man. He was last seen alive by others on May 14, 1930. Appellant Minnie Roderick, his wife, and appellant Woodring, the hired man, both admitted seeing him on the morning of May 15, 1930. On that date he disappeared and his body was not recovered until June 27, 1930, when it was found with a bullet wound through the skull buried about twenty-six feet under the ground in an abandoned well on the premises.

Prior to the trial each of the appellants denied any participation in the killing of the deceased and after arrest each made statements showing or tending to show that the deceased had met his death at the hands of the other on the morning of May 15, 1930. The prosecution presented a vast

Appellant Woodring contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict against him and the appellant Roderick conteüds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict against her. In our opinion both contentions are without merit. We will not attempt to set forth in detail all of the evidence upon which the prosecution relied. A summary of some of that evidence covers twenty-eight pages of respondent’s brief, but we do not believe that such lengthy summary is required here.

Appellant Woodring had been living upon the Roderick ranch for some time prior to May 15, 1930, and continued to live there up to the time of his arrest on June 22, 1930. He was thirty-seven years of age and the appellant Roderick was thirty-two years of age. Although both appellants denied any intimacy between them, the evidence showed that the attitude of appellant Roderick toward appellant Wood-ring was not the attitude ordinarily assumed toward a hired man. They were frequently seen together at various places prior to the death of the deceased, sometimes in company with the deceased and sometimes not. They frequently kissed each other, which fact appellants attempt to minimize because on some of these occasions the deceased was present and for the further reason that appellant Roderick had kissed other men. The witness Mrs. Anderson, who was employed by appellant Roderick after the death of the deceased and lived at the ranch, testified that appellants were always together and that she had seen appellant Woodring kissing appellant Roderick about three or four times a week.

The story of the family life at the Roderick ranch prior to the death of the deceased is a sordid tale to relate. We shall not present it in detail. There was abundant evidence in addition to the testimony of appellants showing that each of the appellants had frequently quarreled with the deceased. The evidence showed that the parties had freely indulged in the use of alcoholic liquors, had freely used profane language and that threats and drunken scuffles were not infrequent. In his reply brief, appellant Woodring speaks of these “parties, drunken scuffles and outbursts of

On the morning of May 15, 1930, the Roderick children had gone to school and there were but three people on the ranch, the deceased and the two appellants. The only direct testimony purporting to show what occurred on the ranch that morning was the testimony of the two appellants. Their stories were irreconcilable and it is apparent that the

On May 17th, one Rapley, a neighbor, visited the Roderick ranch and saw appellant Woodring hauling manure in a truck, the truck being fifteen or twenty feet from the abandoned well at the time. When asked what he was doing, appellant Woodring said: “I am moving the manure from the barn—I had to do that or move the barn.” On the same day appellant Roderick had a conversation with Dr. Clattenburg at his office in Redwood City at which she made a statement similar to those previously made about her husband leaving with some woman. On May 20th appellant Roderick appeared before a justice of the peace in Redwood City and swore to a complaint charging Prank Roderick with the crime of battery and advised the deputy sheriff

On May 27th appellant Woodring told one Leslie Simpson that Prank Roderick was in Tia Juana on “one of his little annuals”. On or about the same day he told one George Steinberg that “Roderick had come back and was a dreadfully sick man”. On June 13th appellant Roderick verified a complaint for divorce against Prank Roderick, which complaint was subsequently filed on June 18th. The complaint alleged extreme cruelty on the part of Prank Roderick specifically stating that he had frequently beaten her with clenched fists and called her vile names; that frequently and without cause he had beaten their two children; that on May 15th he had violently struck her, causing her to fall to the floor unconscious and had left the premises and that since that day she had not heard from him and did not know where he was. Upon the trial appellant Roderick testified that these allegations were false.

On June 14th, appellant Woodring delivered a note written by appellant Roderick to one James Allen reading

On June 22d, appellant Woodring was arrested and subsequently testified that he did not know at that time what he was arrested for. He further testified, however, that he had previously heard conversations to the effect that possibly the body of Frank Roderick was in the well and appellant Roderick’s folks and the lawyer were “building up a frame that I was the guilty guy that was the cause of the disappearance of Frank Roderick”. The witness Mr. Anderson further testified that on the Sunday before his arrest, Woodring had quite a bit to drink and said “If I get hung at San Quentin—come to see me and say ‘there is an innocent man hung’.” Appellant Roderick was not arrested until June 27th which was after the recovery of the body of the deceased. In the meantime, after appellant Woodring was arrested, appellant Roderick had endeavored to procure his release on bail.

On June 26th, a deputy sheriff and others started a search for the well. The vicinity had been recently plowed and scraped and all evidence of its location had been obliterated. They could not find it until given the approximate position by one familiar with its location. The digging of the well was started on that day. On the following day, the deputy sheriff told appellant Roderick that they were

We may now briefly consider some of the conflicting testimony of appellants given on the trial. Appellant Roderick testified that on the morning of May 15th she was in the house and heard a shot; that she came out and saw appellant Woodring and when she asked him “who shot?” he commanded her to keep still; that he told her to get her car out and threatened to kill her if she did not do so; that when she backed the car out to the place indicated by appellant Woodring, she saw the body of her husband on the ground partially covered with canvas and rope; that she started to “holler” and again appellant Woodring threatened to kill her; that appellant Woodring placed the body of deceased on the running-board of the car and commanded her to drive to the well; that she did so and then appellant Woodring lifted the body into the well; that she saw appellant Woodring haul two loads of manure from the manure pit and go in the direction of the well; that later he came into the house and told her to tell the story about her husband running away with a redheaded woman and taking $2,800 with him; that he

Appellant Woodring testified that on the morning of May 15th, the deceased sent him to do some work in the fields and that he did not return until about 11 o’clock; that as he came near the buildings, he saw appellant Roderick go into the house with a rifle in her hand; that some time later he went into the house and found appellant Roderick lying on the floor; that she told him that her husband had hit her and had gone away with a red-headed woman taking $2,800 with him; that later appellant Roderick asked him to drive her down to Peelc-a-Boo Inn; that as he went to the garage to get the ear, he noticed signs of some heavy object having been dragged along the ground; that he mentioned this to appellant Roderick who stated that they had been cleaning up around the place and had dragged ■ stuff from there over to the well.

Both appellants denied any intimacy between them. Bach denied any trouble with or ill feeling toward the deceased, but each gave abundant testimony regarding the quarrels and bitter feeling of the other toward the deceased. Appellant Roderick denied that she had participated in the killing of the deceased and appellant Woodring likewise denied that he had participated in such killing. Appellant Roderick endeavored to explain her actions following the killing of the deceased by her testimony to the effect that she had acted under the threats of appellant Woodring. Appellant Woodring, on the other hand, although admitting that he filled the well, maintained that he then knew nothing of the death of the deceased and filled the well under orders from appellant Roderick. A reading of the testimony shows that the jury was warranted in .giving no credence to the story of either appellant.

We shall not detail the conflicting statements made by appellants after arrest and prior to trial. We may observe, however, that in the statements made by appellant Roderick following the arrest of appellant Woodring and before her arrest, she made no statement implicating appellant Wood-ring nor did she refer to any threats on the part of appellant Woodring. After the discovery of the body of the

The foregoing evidence pointed unerringly to the fact that the deceased had met his death at the hands of one or the other or both of the appellants. The apparent affection existing between appellants up to the time of their arrest, their frequent quarrels and altercations with the deceased, their presence on the ranch when the crime was committed, their false statements made following the disappearance of the deceased, their concealment of known facts from the authorities and other conduct tend

In passing upon this question of the sufficiency of the evidence, we must assume in favor of the verdict every fact which the jury could have reasonably deduced therefrom and then determine whether such facts are sufficient to support the verdict. (People v. Tom Woo, 181 Cal. 315 , 326 [ 184 Pac. 389 ].) In our opinion the foregoing evidence was ample to sustain the verdict against both of the appellants. We are further of the opinion that there is no merit in the point made by appellant Woodring that the conviction of said appellant rests wholly upon the uncorroborated testimony of appellant Roderick, his accomplice. It does not appear that the conviction of either appellant rests upon the testimony of the other, but assuming that parts of the testimony of each appellant were accepted by the jury, there was ample other evidence tending “to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense” and that is all that is required. (Pen. Code, sec. 1111; People v. Haughey, 79 Cal. App. 541 [ 250 Pac. 406 ]; People v. Taylor, 70 Cal. App. 239 [ 232 Pac. 998 ].)

Both appellants further contend that even assuming the evidence to be sufficient to warrant a conviction there was no evidence to sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree, citing People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 [ 281 Pac. 609 ], and People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322 [ 71 A. L. R. 1385 , 295 Pac. 333 ], The authorities cited are not in point. Here there was evidence to show motive and there was ample evidence, circumstantial in nature, to support the implied finding of the jury that the killing followed a wilful, deliberate and premeditated plan on the part of appellants to take the life of the deceased.

Appellant Roderick contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining her challenge to the panel summoned pursuant to the special venire. When the regular panel

Both appellants assert that the trial court erred in denying their motions for separate trials. We find no merit in this point. Since the amendment in 1921 of section 1098 of the Penal Code (Stats. 1921, p. 90), defendants jointly charged are not entitled to separate trials as a matter of right. That section now reads: “When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any public offense, . . . they must be tried jointly, unless the court

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in the giving, refusing and modifying various instructions. Appellant Woodring complains of the refusal to give his requested instruction which started with the statement: “You are instructed that the defendant Minnie Roderick is an accomplice in the crime of the murder of the deceased.” This instruction was properly refused. The evidence was conflicting and it would have been reversible error so far as appellant Roderick was concerned for the court to instruct the jury that appellant Roderick was an accomplice as a matter of law. The question of whether appellants were accomplices might well have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions, but no such instructions were requested. As both appellants contended that there was no concert of action between them, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in not giving such instructions of its own volition. Appellant Woodring further complains of the refusal to give his proposed instruction relating to the subject of reasonable doubt and particularly with reference to the question of reasonable doubt concerning one’s aiding and abetting in the commission of offense by another. The subjects were fully and correctly" covered by the court in other instructions.

Appellant Roderick complains of the refusal of the trial court to give various proposed instructions upon the subject of principals and accessories and of the modification of the following proposed instruction: “If you believe from the evidence that the defendant Minnie Roderick was not present when Frank Roderick was killed, and did not aid or abet in the killing, and the defendant, Minnie Roderick,

Much is said in the briefs of appellant Woodring regarding the following statement of the trial court in the early part of the instructions: “A murder was committed in this county on the 15th day of May of this year. Upon that point there is no dispute.” It is claimed that the trial court thereby erred in instructing the jury upon a question of fact. This contention might require serious consideration under certain circumstances, but here it was assumed by all throughout the trial that a murder had been committed. Appellant Woodring did not defend upon the ground that no murder had been committed, but based his defense upon his testimony to the effect that he had no ' connection with the killing and no knowledge thereof until shortly before his arrest. The inconsistency of appellant Woodring’s position is demonstrated when he complains about .the giving of the foregoing instruction and in the same breath strenuously insists as hereinbefore stated that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed instruction reading: “You are instructed that the defendant Minnie Roderick was an accomplice in the crime of the murder of the deceased.” We have read the entire charge to the jury and are satisfied that the jury was fully and fairly

Appellant Woodring further contends that the trial court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence. In the numerous specifications of alleged error set forth in a few pages of the brief, said appellant contents himself with page references to over 100 different pages of the transcript without quoting in the brief the portions of the record wherein it is claimed that error was committed. We have been at pains, however, to read the entire record with special reference to the pages specified. Many of the said appellant’s objections related to extrajudicial statements of the appellant Roderick made out of the presence of appellant Woodring. It was frequently stated in the trial that such statements were offered and admitted solely against the defendant making such statements and not as against the other defendant. Furthermore,, the jury was clearly instructed to that effect during the trial and also in the main instructions given before the cause was submitted to them. Many of the rulings excluding evidence were made during the cross-examination of the witnesses by counsel for appellant Woodring. In practically every instance, the questions propounded covered irrelevant matter or new matter of a defensive nature which carried the scope of the inquiry beyond that of the direct examination. We are satisfied that there was no prejudicial error in the rulings of the trial court.

Appellant Roderick makes the further contention that the trial court erred in striking, out the testimony of Filbert Roderick, the twelve year old son of appellant Roderick and the deceased, who was called as a witness by said appellant. This testimony was stricken out on motion of appellant Woodring. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erroneously granted the motion, it does not appear that this action resulted in prejudice to the appellant Roderick. No objection was interposed by said appellant to the granting of the motion and a reading of the testimony leads us to the conclusion that said appellant may have been entirely willing to have the testimony stricken. Although the boy testified on direct examination that there were no family quarrels or beatings, he admitted on cross-examination that he previously told the district

A further contention made by the appellant Wood-ring is that the district 'attorney was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in that he did not more vigorously prosecute the appellant Roderick. This is a novel ground upon which to base a charge of misconduct. No authority is cited by said appellant to sustain his contention and we know of none. In passing, however, we may add that we find nothing in the manner in which the district attorney presented the case to justify a charge of misconduct. Appellant Woodring further claims that the trial judge was guilty of misconduct. The assignments under this heading relate to the action of the trial judge in ruling upon the admission of evidence and in advising the various witnesses on numerous instances to refrain from answering questions asked. Owing to the numerous times upon which the trial court of its own motion instructed the witnesses not to answer, we have as hereinbefore indicated read the entire record with particular reference to the pages enumerated by counsel. As stated above, we find no prejudicial error in the rulings nor do we find any prejudicial misconduct on the part of -the trial judge.

Contending that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial, appellant Woodring calls attention to the fact that practically all of the points urged on this appeal were urged upon the motion for new trial. The motion was not based upon any grounds other than those herein considered.

Nourse, P. J., and Sturtevant, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on December 5, 1931.