Majority
The plaintiff commenced an action to recover the deficiency after having foreclosed a deed of trust. The defendant H. A. Turner answered. The trial court made findings in favor of the plaintiff and from the judgment entered thereon the defendant has appealed and has brought up a bill of exceptions.
On September 25, 1922, William H. Reicker and his wife owned lots 2 and 3, Hosier Tract, in Butte County. On that date they executed a promissory note which is as follows :
“$8,000.00 Chico, California, Sept. 25, 1922.
“On or before the 25th day of September, A. D. one thousand nine hundred twenty-seven, at or before three o’clock p. m. of that day, and for value received in lawful money of the United States, we, jointly and severally promise to pay to the Butte County National Bank of Chico, national banking association, duly incorporated and doing business as such, or to its order, at its office, the principal sum of eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00) in installments as follows: One thousand dollars ($1,000.) payable September 25, 1923, one thousand dollars ($1,000.) payable September 25, 1924; one thousand dollars ($1,000.) payable September 25, 1925; balance of principal payable on or before September 25, 1927. And we further promise to pay interest on said principal sum from date until paid at the annual rate of six per cent (6%) to said The Butte County National Bank of Chico, at its office in the manner following, to-wit: Semi-annually, and any installment of interest not paid as it becomes due shall be compounded semi-annually and thereafter bear interest at the same rate. And we further promise to pay both principal and interest in lawful money of the United States, waiving any right which we may have now or hereafter, to pay the same in any other currency. And further, we agree that in case of default in the payment of any of the amounts of principal or interest or installments above stipulated and at any time during such default, the entire unpaid balance of said principal sum shall become immediately due and payable, if the holder of this note shall so elect. This note is secured by Deed of Trust of date September 25, 1922.
“William H. Reicker,
“Maude Reicker.”
And at the same time they executed a deed of trust to secure the payment of the note. The note and trust deed were assigned by the Butte County National Bank to the Bank of Italy and the latter assigned it to the plaintiff. In the latter part of June or the first part of July, 1924, H. A. Turner commenced negotiations to purchase the above-mentioned lands. At that time the interest ivas due and payable in the sum of $406.67 and the $1,000 payable September 25, 1923, had not been paid. He called at the bank and held a conversation with its manager, Mr. Troxell. Mr. William
The complaint refers to a trust deed instead of a mortgage. Whatever it was the document does not appear in the record. That lots 2 and 3 of the Hosier Tract were conveyed by the.Reickers is clear but the conveyance is not contained in the record. Mr. Turner testified that the deed was made out to Mrs. Turner and that all moneys were paid by check signed: by her. He also testified that he never signed any writing' promising to pay the bank any money and that he was told that the security was a mortgage and that he did not know it was a trust deed until this action was commenced. He .also-
The action was commenced on January 7, 1928.
The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer to the second amended complaint. The demurrer was based on the grounds (1) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient, and (2) that it was ambiguous, etc. Neither attack was good. The liability of the defendant could be created by an express contract or an implied contract. (41 C. J. 721.) The plaintiff pleaded “That in July, 1924, the defendant H. A. Turner purchased the lands near Chico, California, securing said note and that at said time of purchase had actual knowledge of said $8000 encumbrance; that before the maturity of said note and for a valuable consideration he assumed said obligation of $8000 personally and agreed to pay it. ... ” That was a sufficient pleading of the ultimate facts. Continuing the plaintiff pleaded additional facts. Those facts were attacked as being ambiguous, etc. As they were mere surplusage the proper attack was a motion to strike out, but none was made.
It is contended that the plaintiff’s case falls within the statute of frauds. The point is not an open one in this state. (White v. Schader, 185 Cal. 606 , 608 [ 21 A. L. R. 499 , 198 Pac. 19 ]; 27 C. J. 161.) The point is brought about by reason of a misconception of the relation of the facts. In the case of Herrin v. Abbe, 55 Fla. 769 [ 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907 , at page 910, 46 South, 183 , 185], the Supreme Court of Florida said:
“The testimony relates to the consideration of the deed, and was clearly admissible on that ground, since the deed does not purport to be complete in stating the consideration.
“A promise by the purchaser of lands that are subject to a mortgage to assume and pay off the encumbrance as a part of the consideration or purchase price is not required to be in writing, because it is not a promise to pay the debt of another, but it is a promise to pay to a third party the debt the grantee owes to the grantor. The fact that in thus paying his own debt the grantee incidentally discharges the debt of his grantor does not bring the promise within the statute of frauds. (Citing cases.)”
In his next point the defendant states the question, “Do the letters constitute a promise on the part of H. A. Turner to pay the note!” It will suffice to say that they are at least evidence along that line. In addition to that evidence there was the testimony of two witnesses that Mr. Turner made the express promise.
Adverting to the fact that the plaintiff represents a bank, the defendant contends that if the plaintiff’s theory were sound that then the bank would have obtained a written contract from Mr. Turner showing that he had assumed the obligation. No doubt the trial court duly considered it. Furthermore the fact merely tends to create a conflict in the evidence and a court of review is not concerned with the conflicts.
The point is made that the real fact was that the note was secured by a “deed of trust” and that the evidence introduced in many places uses the expression “mortgage”. The variance is wholly immaterial. The defendant was being sued on a contract assuming the payment of money. Whether the debt was wholly unsecured, or was
Claiming that his alleged contract was within the statute of frauds, the defendant objected in the trial court, and now objects, to the admission of the letters written by him. As we have shown above, the defendant’s claim that the case falls within the statute of frauds is not well founded. That being so, it seems quite clear that the last-named objection is without merit. (Wurdeman v. Waller, 88 Cal. App. 393 , 398 [ 263 Pac. 558 ].)
In his closing brief the defendant calls attention to the evidence that he did not take title to the property but that the title was taken in the name of Mrs. Turner. Thereupon he claims that he is not liable. Turning back to the evidence introduced, it appears at once that throughout all of the transactions the defendant spoke in the first person. The mere fact that he made payments with his wife’s cheeks did not relieve him from liability. At no time did he disclose the fact, if it was a fact, that he was acting as agent for a principal and give the name of his principal. He may not do so now. (Civ. Code, sec. 2343, subd. 1; 2 C. J. 818.)
We find no error in the record. The judgment is affirmed.
Nourse, P. J., and Spence, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on March 3, 1932, and an application by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on March 31, 1932.
Cases cited
- White v. Schader 185 Cal. 606 at 608 p. 409
- Daniels v. Johnson 129 Cal. 415 at 417 p. 411
- Wurdeman v. Waller 88 Cal. App. 393 at 398 p. 411